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Abstract
Research into choosing individuals to fill positions at or near board level in
organisations is scarce; however we know that interviewing is the dominant selection
practice. The research into selection interviewing at junior and middle levels is
extensive. Overwhelmingly it takes the form of scientific (typically psychological)
studies of independent, interacting individuals understood in either rational agent or
stimulus-response modes.
This research narrates the author’s involvement as an expert adviser to the board of a
UK non-profit in the selection of their chief executive. The narrative material is
interrogated using the concepts of habitus and practice as developed by the
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. This work builds on explorations of power, skill and
intuition which use further narratives of the author’s experience as an interviewer
and a leader, and also a participant in the management doctorate programme at the
University of Hertfordshire. Previously the author worked for eighteen years in
executive search.
The author argues that both the practice of senior selection interviewing and its
theorisation are damaged by too narrowly scientific a discourse which neglects
substantial strands of relevant scholarship (for example within broader management
studies, sociology, critical theory and philosophy). Behavioural competencies and
transferable skills – bedrock concepts in contemporary human resource ‘best
practice’, including selection – are called into question.
The author experiences the practice of senior selection interviewing as stuck, caught
between cynical and scientific interpretations of itself (that is, self-interested power
play and disinterested measurement). Neither perspective yields a productive
dialectic. The ideas of habitus and practice open a different understanding which
does not simply reject the preceding perspectives but attempts to advance beyond
them.
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The interpretation of senior selection interviewing as the product of radically social
human agency is a new contribution to theory which aims to ‘unstick’ practice.
Bourdieu’s thought is used practically and in its multiple, interlocking aspects
(habitus, field, symbolic capital, illusio and misrecognition); working with isolated
elements or only abstractly has, in the author’s view, limited some earlier
interpretations and critiques. These tools for better understanding practice are
compared with sense-making as developed by Karl Weick, which is not radically
social but more familiar to English-speaking management scholars.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 My experience
I joined the Doctor of Management programme of the University of Hertfordshire’s
Complexity and Management Centre in June 2007, towards the end of eighteen years
engaged in executive search. I was almost 50 and exploring new career directions.
After a first degree in mathematics from Cambridge and a master’s in statistics from
Harvard, I had spent ten years in the ‘fast stream’ of the British Civil Service,
working mainly in H M Treasury. This included a year at the Civil Service Selection
Board (CSSB), a national centre of excellence in assessment. The centre selected
graduates with the potential to reach senior levels in public administration. The
centre’s work was research-based, well respected and scientific in orientation. I
absorbed the ideal of assessing candidates objectively, with interviews as one
element alongside written, group-based and other selection tools.
By contrast when I moved into executive search the emphasis was commercial.
Candidates had to be found and often persuaded, as well as assessed. Making a
sufficient number of clients happy was my goal and the key to my financial
livelihood. Interviews were often the only selection tool.
I will shortly give a picture of the executive search industry (section 2.2): for now I
note that between 1989 and 2007 I progressed from being a consultant to a director
and then deputy chairman of an executive search firm which grew from 15 to about
45 staff. On average during that time the firm ranked approximately tenth (by
turnover) among search firms in the UK.
My recruitment experience has been of a wider range of client organisations than
most executive search consultants – international, private sector (large and small),
government (large and small), NHS, charities and universities. At various times I led
my firm in its government, health, charities, finance and diversity work, and in some
of these the firm built a national reputation. In more than 70% of cases I worked on
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vacancies at board or senior executive team level. I estimate that I conducted over
7,500 interviews and advised on filling well over 1,000 positions. In practical terms,
I became an expert. This research asks, what did that mean?
In 2007 I was also recruited as non-executive chair of a national charity with about
300 staff.  In my thirties and forties I had served as treasurer of charities with about
15 and 50 staff.
I did not bring a clearly formed question to this programme of study; however I did
bring a perception. Something about senior recruitment – recruitment at or near
board level – which was broadly consistent across the private, public, non-profit and
academic sectors seemed to me important, not written about and different from the
recruitment at middle and junior levels on which selection or interviewing ‘best
practice’ was based. But what, I could not articulate.
1.2 This portfolio of work
Each of Projects One to Four examines narratives of my experience as an
interviewer, a leader or – in a few cases – a novice researcher. The projects were
written over three years in the order presented here.
Project One is preliminary. In it I take the first steps towards a critical understanding
of my professional practice. The subsequent projects are longer and develop themes
which were unknown in advance but emerged step by step from the research itself:
power, skill and intuition, and finally the logic of habitus and practice.
Each project came about in the same way. Working in a learning set of three students
with a supervisor, I wrote successive (between five and nine) versions of each
project. In each iteration the narrative material was confronted with wider literature
and learning set discussions, which took place over nine two-day learning set
meetings as well as by email and telephone. These discussions led me to think and
write differently, to shifts in theme and in which literature appeared most relevant,
and gradually towards the argument which emerged as the backbone of the project.
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A very difficult shift for me was how much, and in what way, to be present in the
text. Whether to use ‘I’, or whether to express my feelings? I started out most
comfortable in impersonal disguises (the scientific white coat). This tendency never
complete disappeared; it alternated with explosions of intense subjectivity. Now I
would say what I have struggled towards is a text in which at least two people and
their feelings can be present – I and you. The struggle never finishes, but without the
generous effort of those who read successive versions, it could not have started.
In addition to the nine learning set meetings, in the first eighteen months there were
also five five-day plenary sessions of all the faculty and learning sets. These were
often intense. They accelerated my engagement with literature and sharpened my
capacity to think about what happens in everyday interactions.
Finally this introduction and the synopsis were written. The latter discusses the main
themes that have emerged in the work and the line of argument they represent,
appraising them critically and taking them further. I highlight some of those themes
now, to focus attention on patterns of change within and between the projects which
strike me as significant to the argument which emerges.
That argument concerns the practice of selecting by interview senior executives –
individuals in organisations at or near board level. The dominant thinking about
selection interviewing comes from studies and experiments conducted mostly at
junior levels and within the conceptual framework of psychology (particularly
behavioural psychology). I will argue that this practice of senior selection is stuck –
resistant to improvement whether from inside or out. My claim will be that central to
this stuckness is the ideal of improvement which both practice and theory take for
granted. This ideal is scientific objectivity.
In this way of thinking, when we interview someone we measure them. Then we
compare the interviewee’s relevant qualities (inexactly measured) with the
requirements of the position (also inexactly measured). This research is not about
inexactitude but how we go awry when we think of these processes as measuring
anything at all.
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The intellectual dominance of scientific thinking in our society is such that it is
natural to ask: if scientific objectivity goes out of the window, is every opinion or
judgement (in this case about candidates) no better than any other?
Against this I will argue that interviewing is a complex social practice which needs
to be joined to wider debates in the humanities – for example about the nature of
human thinking and being, about power and about ethics. Particularly important is
the work which has been done by sociologists to develop concepts of objectivity
appropriate to the activity of people studying people. To make this argument, and to
show the gains in understanding interviewing which become possible, I will
particularly take up the work of Pierre Bourdieu.
The relationship of this argument just summarised to the projects which follow also
differs from that found in the physical sciences. Using the scientific method (widely
understood as a rule-following method), both method and a specific proposition are
stated in advance; information is then gathered to test predictions. Here, experience
is explored from which both argument and method emerge untidily.
Again the question arises: if science goes out of the window, is every opinion or
judgement no better than any other? Does this research have any objectivity or
purposefulness? The projects lay bare my grappling with this question with a
concluding discussion of method in section 6.7 in the synopsis.
1.3 An invitation to explore
This thesis is an invitation to join in the exploration of experience. I invite you to
bring to this work, as I bring mine, your experience and understanding of several
things: among them, interviewing others and being interviewed for particular roles;
management and leadership (since my focus will be on senior roles); relevant
discourses; and research. I start with no experience of the last of these.
Bringing our different experiences to common material, we are likely to notice
different things but with some overlap – in the same way that, writing this at the end,
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what I notice now in earlier projects differs but with some overlap from what I wrote
about originally. In highlighting three of those differences now, I hope to open up
further for you the experience of thinking with me the material which follows.
Firstly, the changing use of narrative across the projects. These shift from short and
fragmentary to more sustained and central to the inquiring thrust of each project. The
nature of that thrust also shifts: in Projects Two and Three something I find
surprising or puzzling in the narratives propels the inquiry; in Project Four the
inquiry struggles as much with the apparently straightforward as with the puzzling.
There is a shift towards the ordinary. The ordinary is more difficult to explore but
potentially more rewarding, because it cloaks what we take for granted and do not
see.
Secondly, the invitation to bring your experience will turn out to be much too
narrow. Of central importance will be our shared experience as thinking, acting
human agents.
Thirdly, many times the projects encounter, explore or assert a dividing line between
what I shall describe as atomic and ‘radically social’ thinking. What is at stake here?
Social thinking is commonplace in the sense that few of us are devoted to the study
of shipwrecked Robinson Crusoes. But in contemporary economics and significant
parts of sociology and psychology, and certainly in everyday life, we take it that
‘society’ refers to and is to be explained in terms of individuals who want things, do
things and interact1. Interdependencies, possibly complex ones, may develop in such
thinking but the individual remains the pre-eminent and prior unit, or atom, of
explanation.
Put another way, in such thinking the individual is ontologically prior to society.
Radically social perspectives, which will be introduced in Project Two but not taken
up in full force until Project Four, deny this. They claim that each of us, individuals,
1I am distinguishing two perspectives rather than categorising all perspectives: for example
structuralists may want explanations in terms of (say) class or linguistic structures and may regard
individuals as irrelevant.
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you and I, are not atoms but always already social: we emerge out of interactions
rather than the other way around.
Is this a question about the real world or the secular equivalent of a theological
dispute? That struggle unfolds in this work. So one way to read these projects is as
they were written, by someone for whom the distinction just made starts out
somewhere in the alarming terrain between the numinous and the barking mad -
although of course I was much too nervous to say so at the outset. This struggle
reaches a particular crisis at the end of Project Three.
But it might be fruitful to do an opposite reading at the same time, taking radical
sociality as a given. This means reading the projects asking why does this shift take
so long (not until Project Four)? What really changes?
Finally, throughout this thesis words italicised within quotations were always
italicised (or otherwise emphasised) in the original unless otherwise stated, with the
exception of habitus which I have italicised as a foreign word wherever it appears.
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Chapter Two: Project One - Contrasting Experiences of
Involvement and Detachment in Leadership and Recruitment
2.1 Introduction
In this project I will present three narratives from my experience and explore
reflexively both the sense which I made of them at the time, and that which I am now
beginning to make as a result of my participation in the Doctor of Management
programme at the University of Hertfordshire.
Within each of the narratives, my attempts to act were failures. By ‘failure’ I do not
mean that, if somehow the same scenarios could be presented again, I would
necessarily do anything differently. I mean that the word ‘failure’ is aptly used given
that each time I did not achieve something which I was trying hard to achieve, and
after which I experienced emotions of frustration, impotence or shame.
The first concerns my experience of strategy-setting as a leader in a consulting
(executive search) business, and unfolded over about four years after I became
deputy chairman of my firm in 1999. The second, shorter, narrative, describes a
project to recruit a chief executive for a major British professional institute; the key
actions unfolded over approximately six months. The third and briefest narrative
describes an experience on the first five-day residential module of this doctoral
programme.
Since two narratives in this project and a substantial narrative in Project Two concern
the work of executive search, I will briefly introduce that field of work.
2.2 Executive search firms
Executive search is a highly competitive segment within the wider, sprawling
recruitment industry. Executive search firms, which range from multinational
businesses to one or two person boutiques, are paid a mainly committed fee2 by
2 Elsewhere in recruitment, reliance on contingent fees (paid only after the client has hired an
individual) and putting several recruitment firms to work at the same time on the same vacancy make
difficult the development of any professional relationship with the client. Recruitment with those
characteristics is often described in the industry as ‘bodyshopping’.
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client organisations to identify, attract and assess relevant candidates for positions
which are hard to fill.
Why hard to fill? Mainly because the pool of good out-of-work candidates is (or is
perceived to be) thin. Commonly the present leadership effectiveness of candidates
already in strategic leadership roles would be damaged if it became known that they
wanted to move on; such candidates frequently do not respond to advertisements.
The cost of search may also be incurred because: the hiring organisation's position is
challenging and requires advocacy; the vacancy (or some key factors affecting it)
cannot be advertised publicly; experienced advice is desired in identifying different
candidates' strengths and weaknesses; there will be many candidates but diplomacy
in the handling of distinguished unsuccessful candidates is important; or, sometimes,
organisational vanity.
Executive search has low, or no, barriers to entry (anyone can start a firm tomorrow).
However to work at senior levels usually requires a substantial track record, which
can be a high barrier. Fees are often a proportion of the hired individual's likely
annual cash remuneration.  More generally the industry has pro-cyclical boom-and-
bust characteristics. It has some of the characteristics of an embryonic profession,
including a voluntary international professional body and a limited ethical code3.
In Britain the clear trend over the past two decades has been for organisations (and
their shareholders or other controllers) to perceive a widening organisational impact
from having 'exceptional' instead of 'adequate' leadership – witness the widening
differentials between top and average pay4. In step with this financial rewards in the
search market have expanded.
3 https://members.aesc.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=codeofethics (accessed 20 March
2010)
4 Between 1980 and 2002, the multiple by which the total pay of the highest-paid directors exceeded
that of ordinary workers in FTSE 100 companies increased from 10 to 50 (Froud, Johal, Leaver, &
Williams, 2006, p. 58)
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2.3 Narrative 1: putting strategy into practice
When Andrew5 the older of the two founding partners of my search firm retired, as is
common with old friends and valued business colleagues, he retired in stages.
Nevertheless around 1999 there was a clear break when Andrew ceased to be
chairman, a director, a consultant, an employee and a shareholder of my firm, all of
which he had been until that point. I was invited by his business partner Bill to
become a shareholder and deputy chairman. I paid for a ten per cent stake. In buying
out the rest of Andrew’s shares, Bill gained control of more than fifty per cent of the
company. In any case Bill was the largest single revenue-generator for the firm, with
the commercial power which that implied.
Becoming deputy chairman was a big deal. Neither for Bill nor for me was this a
routine progression. Bill could have chosen not to create such a role and left me as a
director alongside other non-shareholding directors. Or he could have brought in
someone from outside, for example by merging our firm with a smaller firm, whose
head would naturally have become deputy chairman (Bill had a wide network of
relationships with leaders of other search firms).
For me, what happened was an honour, a financial commitment6, an invitation to
create a new kind of relationship with Bill and a considerable duty and responsibility
as well as opportunity. I had recently turned 40. I cared a lot for the people who
made up the firm and for the quality of the work which we did for our clients.
Accentuated by my new role, I certainly cared about the impact which the firm’s
reputation over the coming 5-10 years would have on my own reputation. I labour
these points to underline my intense involvement in what was at stake in deciding the
strategy of the firm from 2000.
I also had a degree of detachment or objectivity in considering the position of the
firm (and my own role). Historically the firm had not had a strategy. By strategy I
meant, at the time, a written text, not necessarily long, which said where the firm was
5 The names of the individuals in this narrative have been changed for confidentiality.
6 Since my remuneration was largely driven by client fees, the change did not mean a significant
increase in salary or bonus.
Page | 16
trying to go and how we hoped to get there7. If asked, Bill would answer that since
its creation in 1986 the firm had grown by about 20 per cent a year and our strategy
was to continue to do that.
Andrew and Bill had driven the firm largely intuitively. ‘Strategy days’ of the whole
firm took place each autumn, overnight and the following day at a castle in Kent.
They were an important feature of community life. But they were not about strategy.
Sometimes they were entirely idiosyncratic; once we flew an American author over
for two days to teach us to write haikus.
I believed that the firm would perform better in commercial terms if it had a short
strategy: in particular if we had some measure of our market and brand position. I
also thought that, provided Bill and I (and other directors) demonstrated commitment
to the strategy in actions and decisions, and engaged in honest dialogue about the
strategy with members of the firm, having an explicit strategy would contribute to
the next stage in our maturation as an organisation. This would be to move beyond a
paternalistic model of leadership in the firm (with Bill and myself as the ‘parents’).
But considering the position and history of the firm realistically, any strategy which I
could help bring about would need to be very short and simple, and to have some real
commitment from Bill (as well as myself and others). I considered that the most
significant choice we had to make, lying beneath the surface of any strategic words,
was whether, as an innovative quality firm lying in the lower reaches of our
industry’s top ten, we wished to work hard to win some of the most prestigious
commercial assignments which were presently a little beyond our reach. Or did we
prefer to place our focus on ourselves as a community, on building our values, and
perhaps less stressed lives?
With all the care that I could command, quietly over a period of time in one-to-one
conversations, I explored with Bill this choice. I had some preference for the more
ambitious course, but could be very happy making either work. I spelled out that the
7 In the next section I turn in more detail to the concepts of strategy and leadership implicit in my
thinking and actions.
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least attractive position to me would be that we embarked on the first choice because
we thought that as red-blooded commercial executives it was what ‘we ought to
want’, if in fact we were not willing to follow through.
This least attractive position was exactly what we did. Believing that we had chosen
privately to raise our firm’s game, as the new deputy chairman I led an exercise in
2000 naturally involving others which produced ‘4 in 2004’, a short strategy with 4
points, fewer than 100 words and a measurable goal for the year 2004. By 2002,
notwithstanding that we had been very busy fighting a major recession, I was
convinced that whether or not Bill had willed ‘4 in 2004’ as an end, he did not will it
as a means. We scrapped it. We needed to try again.
In the autumn of 2002 Bill and I spent a week at a leadership programme led by
Professors Jack and Carol Weber at Darden Business School at the University of
Virginia. The sessions were primarily experiential rather than theoretical. They
surprised me by focussing critically on the importance of ‘conversations’ to
leadership.
As a result I moved to a different concept of strategy. My concept of strategy had
been a fixed text expressing which businesses an organisation is in and how it aims
to succeed in those businesses, together with some assessment of the extent to which
the text’s core is or is not made real in day-to-day business. I now began to think that
this put the cart (text) before the horse (what people think). I changed to the
conception that strategy is the pattern of conversations which take place in the firm
shaping what businesses it is in and how it intends to succeed in them. The
commitment horse may or may not be helped by having a textual cart.8
At Virginia I told Bill that, in strategy-setting terms, the previous two years had not
been a success for me. Despite all care, I had been mistaken in concluding that he
8 I see this now as a shift towards thinking about strategy as a patterning discernible in (and only in)
the collectivity of individuals’ actions, among these particularly conversations, and therefore a shift
towards the perspective articulated by Ralph Stacey at Hertfordshire: ‘From a complex responsive
process perspective, an organisation is evolving identity ... Strategy is the evolving narrative pattern of
organisational identity’ ([1993] 5th edn 2007, p. 435).
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was committed to our previous strategy: and I challenged him to write a new strategy
himself, from his heart; to write what he believed. I thought it very likely that he
would produce something to which I and others in the firm could commit; to move
the firm forward, what we needed to believe was that he was committed to it. The
programme also included anonymous feedback for us as leaders from our colleagues
which encouraged me to persist in this strategic endeavour.
Bill wrote a short set of goals (which we called ‘the 5 Mosts’) which became our
new strategy. I could indeed commit to them, and worked energetically over the
following 2-3 years – with special attention to my changed concept of strategy and to
the importance of conversations - to lead the firm forward on those lines. In my
judgement the results of ‘the 5 Mosts’ for the organisation were positive, but less
than they could have been, as was Bill’s commitment to them. I felt that I had failed.
2.4 First reflection on my concepts of strategy and leadership
I turn now to consider, in the events just summarised, what concepts of strategy and
leadership helped form what I thought and did? Unsurprisingly these were by no
means specialised or unusual. To assist subsequent comment, I set them out in some
detail, referring to two thinkers – Ohmae and Kotter – who influenced me at the
time.9
My understanding of strategy at the start of my search career in 1989 was
particularly shaped by the then chairman of McKinsey in Japan, Kenichi Ohmae.
Several of his books on strategy were bestsellers in Japan, among them the book on
which he based the American best-seller ‘The Mind of the Strategist’ (Ohmae, 1982).
Ohmae defines strategy as:
Actions aimed directly at altering the strength of the enterprise relative to
that of its competitors (ibid., p. 37).
9 Needless to say, many other writers articulated consonant or complementary views; nor is what
follows summative of  either Ohmae or Kotter’s total work.
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He sees what he has to say as ‘very personal’ and embodying ‘many controversial
judgments’ (ibid., p. 8). He sees himself standing outside systems thinking, at least in
its non-complex forms:
True strategic thinking thus contrasts sharply with the conventional
mechanical systems approach based on linear thinking. But it also
contrasts with the approach that stakes everything on intuition, reaching
conclusions without any real breakdown or analysis. (Ibid., p. 13)
Locating Ohmae’s thought within a popular taxonomy of strategy (Mintzberg,
Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998, pp. 354-359), Ohmae has a strong focus on analysing
customers’ needs and the product market (Mintzberg’s positioning school) but with a
bias towards creative entrepreneurialism and a strong antipathy towards planning:
It is not unreasonable to say that many large US corporations today are
run like the Soviet economy. (Ibid., p. 3)
Within this conception of strategy, what should leaders do? According to Ohmae: use
the full broad and deep potential of the human brain (the mind of the strategist) to
identify creative new ways forward in the marketplace; be analytical; be courageous;
and inspire many others throughout the organisation to think and act similarly.
This emphasis on the role of strategic leaders in fostering broad and deep thinking
and courageous action throughout their organisations – everyone a strategist, one
might say – matches well the thrust of the book on leadership by Jim Kotter at
Harvard which was also formative for me (Kotter, 1988). Kotter contended that more
turbulent, faster-changing, more competitive markets required much more, and more
widely distributed, leadership than top-down US corporations were typically in a
position to provide. It is worth briefly following the development of his thesis and
then making some connections with Ohmae.
Kotter begins:
There is no generally accepted definition of leadership. For the purposes
of this book, leadership is defined as the process of moving a group (or
groups) in some direction through mostly noncoercive means. Effective
leadership is defined as leadership that produces movement in the long-
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term best interests of the group(s). This definition is generally consistent
with those used by Burns, Jennings and other thoughtful writers on the
topic. (Ibid., p. 5)10
He goes onto identify effective leadership as requiring an inclusive vision, an
intelligent strategy, a supportive network and a committed core team (ibid, p. 20). He
sees more effective leaders throughout organisations at all levels as vital to success in
more turbulent market conditions. The culmination of his book emphasises what we
might call ‘everyone a leader’:
The business environment today has, in a sense, democratized leadership,
making it relevant not for the few but for the many. (Ibid., p. 133)
2.5 First reflection on power
Already a question is apparent: does ‘everyone a strategist’ or ‘everyone a leader’
actually make sense? I will explore this further through the management literature
which influenced me, and then return to confront these questions with the experience
I have narrated of strategy-setting.
Starting with Ohmae and Kotter, why does a market environment which requires
many more problems to be solved faster, more creatively and throughout an
organisation require distributed leadership as opposed to distributed problem-solving
capability? The latter, arguably, is Ohmae’s vision (everyone a strategist); but many
of these problems will be cross-cutting, so that localised solutions will frequently
create conflicts. Kotter also leaves this point unaddressed. It is unclear how conflicts
are to be resolved if every part of the organisation invests in improving its skills at
persuading other parts of the organisation.
The fundamental issue here is power. What impact can rank-and-file members of an
organisation hope to have not only on each others’ decisions and actions, but on the
largest decisions and actions? Can they, for example, seriously affect their leaders’
10 Along with others, Kotter was instrumental in drawing the distinction between leadership and
management which became popular during this time. He sees the tools of management as generally
controlling or coercive. (Ibid., pp. 21-24)
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visions and proposed strategies? After all (as pointed out in critical vein by Douglas
Griffin at Hertfordshire) in the dominant discourse on management:
The action of leading is located in autonomous individuals, the leaders,
who become the objective observers of organisations as whole systems
and the formulators of visions and values which provide the leadership
according to which such systems are to unfold their future (Griffin, 2002,
pp. 205-206).
This accurately describes the role I was attempting to play.
The issues about power left unresolved in naïve approaches to empowerment
produced some detectable shifts in management literature, though no deep resolution.
I give two examples from books which influenced me.
Jim Collins’ ‘Good To Great’ (2001) is one of the last in the 1980s/90s series of
popularised studies of strategy through ex post statistical analysis11. Collins had been
a Stanford faculty member and co-author with Jerry Porras of a preceding statistical
blockbuster (Collins & Porras, 1997). Although Collins gave his research team
instructions to ‘downplay the role of top executives’ (ibid., p. 21), the study’s first
conclusion turned out to be the importance of Level 5 leaders who:
... build enduring greatness through a paradoxical blend of personal
humility and professional will. … [By contrast a Level 4 leader]
catalyzes commitment to and vigorous pursuit of a clear and compelling
vision, stimulating higher performance standards. (Ibid., p. 20)
This shift (which Collins describes as new and unexpected) entails, in the reference
to humility, some more profound degree of listening by the strategic leader: a leader
whose authority and whose vision are not preserved pristine ‘outside’ the
organisation ‘in’ the big picture, but are more embedded and vulnerable within the
organisation’s changing conversational life.
11 From an initial population of 1,435 US companies derived from the Fortune 500 lists between 1965
and 1995, by successive statistical cuts a core 11 were found which demonstrated ‘fifteen-year
cumulative stock returns at or below the general stock market, punctuated by a transition point, then
cumulative returns at least three times the market over the next fifteen years’ (ibid., p. 6). Sector
effects were eliminated and each company compared with a pair chosen to be as similar as possible
but without the arrival of stock market outperformance. The ‘transition point’ is of course an ex post
statistical artefact.
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This theme is taken up much more explicitly by INSEAD professors W Chan Kim
and Renée Mauborgne (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). Their ‘blue ocean’ strategic
thinking is remarkably kindred to Ohmae’s; both stress that on sufficiently close and
creative inspection, profitable strategic opportunities may be found in
unprepossessing places. Thus Kim and Mauborgne open with the example of the
declining circus industry (where they consider Cirque du Soleil). But, at first sight,
they address very explicitly the conflict issue which Ohmae sidesteps. Thus Kim and
Mauborgne stipulate that an essential feature of making successful radical strategic
moves in practice is ‘fair process’, which entails employee engagement, explanation
and clear expectations. Critically, engagement must encourage ideas (including
management’s) to be refuted publicly on their merits (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p.
175). Moreover:
By organising the strategy formulation process around the principles of
fair process, you can build execution into strategy making from the start.
With fair process, people tend to be committed to support the resulting
strategy even when it is viewed as not favourable or at odds with their
perception of what is strategically correct for their unit. (Ibid., p. 184)
But a considerable degree of contradiction seems to me to remain present in the
thinking of these authors. Elesewhere in their book they significantly undercut the
possibility of leaders and their visions being changed by the led. For example they
talk at length, with extended reference to Bill Bratton’s leadership of the New York
Police Department from 1994, about ‘tipping point leadership’ through which leaders
instrumentally deliver ‘a fast change in mindset that is internally driven of people’s
own accord’ (ibid., p. 152). As described this is considerably manipulative and well
within the systems paradigm in which free thinking and moral choice belong to
strategic leaders standing outside organisations populated by objects for
manipulation. Notwithstanding this qualification, to identify and give ‘fair process’ a
prominent role in strategy is a notable development and a pointer to continuing
tensions.
The tension is underlined by the sense I now make of my experience in Narrative 1. I
entirely failed to address the question of whether the pattern of power within the firm
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to which Bill was committed was freedom of action unconstrained by any fixity of
strategy (even if the strategy had been entirely of his own creation). This
interpretation of mine does two things: it places power at the centre of our field of
vision rather than at the periphery; and it raises the question of whether monarchy is
intrinsically undiscussable in many modern organisations? Even if it were in some
sense agreed, can one in fact put monarchy ‘on the table for rational discussion’
between the implicated parties? This was what I attempted to do in the consulting
assignment which I now summarise.
2.6 Narrative 2: a chief executive succession
PA, a leading British professional association with substantial international and
business operations, had grown dramatically in size and reputation. Its workaholic
chief executive for more than the past ten years, Patrick, was now approaching
retirement. It was, for example, very active in launching and delivering novel (and
cash-generating) programmes and qualifications in China, India and Africa, as well
as playing a significant role along with other British associations in this profession
not just in the UK but in the G8 and similar fora. As with most British professional
associations, governance (including the appointment of the next chief executive) was
in the hands of a large and unwieldy elected board, further weakened by the
constitutional rotation of officers into and out of the position of chair once a year.
Along with three or four other search firms, we were invited to submit a proposal for
the recruitment of Patrick’s successor – including a timetable and all key steps for
making the decision, including the evaluation of any internal candidates. All these
were sensitive issues. In addition, the commercial success of PA meant that the board
attached a lot of importance to the effectiveness of the search in attracting dynamic,
international, commercial and other candidates of stature who might ordinarily
consider the chief executiveship of a professional association too dull.
Already, without having met Patrick, I had sufficient experience to identify as
potentially important the possibility of a too-powerful incumbent. If this possibility
materialised and the incumbent in fact dominated the process of attracting and
selecting their successor, I had many scars with which to identify serious problems
which could arise.
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When we made our presentation to the relevant committee, it was not a surprise to
see Patrick sitting alongside them (silent, but clearly influential). That, too, was
familiar and could be turned to advantage. Politely but bluntly, after covering other
more predictable issues, I made clear our strong view that while an incumbent had a
critical role to play in certain early stages of the process, it was inappropriate for him
to be involved in short-listing, final interviewing or the committee’s final decision.
Normally the presence of an incumbent during such a presentation was an advantage.
If we failed to persuade the committee members or if the incumbent was more
powerful than the committee and wanted to be involved in the final stages, then  one
of our competitors would be given the assignment. In one sense all this could not be
simpler or more rational: having gained sufficient experience to learn certain lessons,
by placing these (including the possible issue of a powerful incumbent) on the table
before our services were contracted, then – problem solved.
Not so. My firm was appointed. The search was international and creative, and took
several months. A high quality international field was identified. Throughout these
stages Patrick behaved impeccably. As the final stages approached, this rapidly
changed. Previous rational discussion, recalled by our strong representations, failed
to stop Patrick at short notice pressuring the committee to let him sit in on their
interviews and deliberations. I failed to stop PA’s chairman giving in to him.
Shortlisted candidates felt constrained by Patrick’s presence from presenting in a
frank way their analyses of PA’s shortcomings, and were concerned by this departure
from etiquette. Although things were now tense,  the job was offered to an individual
who accepted it and resigned publicly from a high-profile position. A few weeks
later he ‘unresigned’ and took his old job back; Patrick had already made his
designate position intolerable. Another firm was engaged to carry out a fresh search.
Months later, that also resulted in an individual resigning (and in this case actually
starting in his new role as chief executive); only to resign from PA brief weeks later,
for similar reasons. The cumulative damage by this stage to PA’s reputation was
considerable. On the third attempt, Patrick left and the position was filled by an
internal candidate.
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In relation to this narrative, I draw out in the next two sections two themes.
2.7 Power and undiscussability
The continuity of the theme of power between Narratives 1 and 2, and its importance
in the second narrative, is clear. If the management literature so far explored is
constrained in helping us to explore this issue, what other concepts may be more
helpful?
Several concepts of power are valuably analysed by the sociologist Steven Lukes,
springing from the core idea (which Lukes quotes from Dahl) that:
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B
would not otherwise do. (Lukes, 1974, pp. 11-12)
However the term ‘power figuration’ introduced by the sociologist Norbert Elias
suggests we consider power issues as universally present ones of mutual dependency,
even in situations of apparently very one-sided power imbalance:
From the day of his birth, a baby has power over its parents, not just the
parents over the baby. … But whether the power differentials are large or
small, balances of power are always present wherever there is functional
interdependence between people. … Power is not an amulet possessed by
one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human
relationships – of all human relationships. (Elias, 1978, p. 74)
Thus in Narrative 2, my interpretation of PA’s ‘shameful secret’ (so to speak) is that
it was as much about the weakness of the elected board as Patrick’s strength, and
both co-operated to disguise both aspects for as long as possible. In Narrative 1, a
possible line of inquiry opened up by Elias’ concept is in what ways, and for what
reasons, may I have blinded myself to power issues? What was the function of such
extended strategy discussions, set within a taken-for-granted conceptual framework
within which issues of power were either not prominent or treated contradictorily?
Was it to allow leaders wrongly to convince themselves and others that the questions
most central to the organisation’s future were being identified and (at least to some
degree) rationally or transparently resolved?
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The fact of undiscussedness, the possibility of undiscussability, or alternatively (as in
Narratives 1 and 2) the futility of apparent discussability, may either be
consequential or proximate aspects of power in modern management contexts:
clearly there are possible lines of inquiry here. At this stage I simply note a relevant
connection which Lukes makes. Lukes called his study ‘Power: A Radical View’
because he argued that it was necessary to go beyond the evidence of domination or
influence visible as a result of tangible conflictive acts:
... The bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of
individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially
structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of
institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals’ inaction.
(Lukes, 1974, pp. 21-22)(emphasis added)
... The crucial point [is] that the most effective and insidious use of
power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. (ibid, p.
23)
The importance to me of the undiscussable may indicate why, as thinking developed
particularly during the 1990s on the learning capability of organisations, I was
particularly struck by the work of Chris Argyris (at Harvard) on organisational
defences12. Argyris focussed on the need for successful organisational learning to
overcome not simply ignorance but also deeply ingrained habits. He saw that these
habits were intended to avoid embarrassment and that their work in doing this was, in
general, undiscussable within organisations. He set out his aim trenchantly:
This book takes direct aim at organizational defenses. It uncovers what is
often known privately in organizations about defenses but is bypassed
and covered up. I want to make the undiscussable discussable. (Argyris,
1990, pp. xi-xii)
Finally, Narrative 2 differs from Narrative 1 in introducing recruitment as a practice.
In this regard I am struck by the parallels between the description the sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu gives of what happens in scientific research and the very similar
pattern in recruitment decision-making:
12 By contrast, although Peter Senge’s ‘learning organisation’ became much in vogue and my firm was
asked by some organisations to carry out searches to find people who could help them achieve this
state of existence, those ideas had at the time little resonance with me. (Senge, 1990)
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In short, scientists use two linguistic registers: in the ‘empiricist
repertoire’, they write in a conventionally impersonal manner; by
minimizing the references to human intervention, they construct texts in
which the physical world seems literally to act and speak for itself. When
the author is authorized to appear in the text, he is presented as either
forced to undertake the experiments, or to reach the theoretical
conclusions, by the unequivocal demands of the natural phenomena he is
studying, or as rigidly constrained by rules of experimental procedure. In
less formal situations, this repertoire is complemented and sometimes
contradicted by a repertoire which stresses the role played by personal
contingencies in action and belief. (Bourdieu, 2004, pp. 22-23)
But the dual truth of the experience that agents may have of their own
practice has something universal about it. One knows the truth of what
one does (for example, the more or less arbitrary or in any case
contingent character of the reasons or causes which determine a judicial
decision), but to keep in line with the official idea of what one does, or
with the idea one has of oneself, this decision must appear to have been
motivated by reasons, and by reasons that are as elevated (and juridical)
as possible. Formal discourse is hypocritical13, but the propensity to
‘radical chic’ leads people to forget that the two truths coexist, with more
or less difficulty, in the agents themselves ... . (ibid., pp. 24-25).
In the making and recording of recruitment decisions this dual discourse (of which
only one has an official existence) is an immediately recognisable feature. It, too,
points to a kind of undiscussability: the shared experience of many individuals that
certain kinds of opinion, reasoning or data may only be discussed behind doors to
which not every individual has the necessary keys.
2.8 Systems thinking
My second group of reflections on Narrative 2 and Narrative 1 highlight the
fundamental, pervasive and unremarked (by myself) nature of systems thinking. I
draw here particularly on the critiques of systems thinking made by Stacey ([1993]
5th edn 2007) and Griffin (2002).
In his tour d’horizon of different types of systems thinking, the systems scholar
Michael Jackson defines in this way the root concept which such kinds of analysis
share:
13 I understand Bourdieu to use ‘hypocritical’ factually without implying malignity or fraud.
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A system is a complex whole the functioning of which depends on its
parts and the interactions between those parts. (Jackson, 2003, p. 3)
Systems thinking is extremely powerful and aptly applied to many problems in the
physical and biological sciences. It has also been applied with dramatic practical
success to important and difficult problems too numerous to mention - such as the
behaviour of economic markets or the flow of traffic on roads – in which human
agency is involved, but in such a way that modelling the phenomenon as if the agents
were not human but embodiments of some decision or response function (such as
utility maximisation) often proves worth doing. For example I used (or relied on
others’ use) of such tools extensively in working in the Treasury: they were
fundamental. Cost benefit analysis; the assessment of capital adequacy for banks, and
for the banking system; medical manpower modelling; the list is long.
To point out now in relation to the work which I did in the Treasury that much of it
used systems thinking (and systems assumptions) does not change much my
reflection and evaluation of what I and my colleagues were doing. At the time, if
asked I might or might not have reached for ‘systems thinking’ as a relevant label;
but that is a matter of labels. The substance was that we were all the time creating or
using ‘as if’ models of complex human situations; they were always simplifications
but, depending on their parsimony or complexity and cost, they could be worth
looking at.
Quite different has been the impact of realising the extent to which as a search
professional and a manager, working with essentially universal management
concepts taught not only by practitioners but also by academics, I had imported
unawares systems concepts into areas where not only is their application more
problematic, but also the problematic nature of what I was doing (using ‘as if’
models which were ‘wrong’) was not kept prominently in mind. While often
claiming to act from an explicit values base in exercising authority and influence
over or on behalf of others, one which gave individuals respect, was I in fact doing
so?
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Relevant to Narratives 1 and 2 is the problem of boundary or frame, put by Stacey
thus:
The problem of infinite regress is fundamental to all forms of systems
thinking simply because systems thinking is built upon a conceptual
spatial metaphor. It always involves postulating a whole separated by a
boundary from other wholes. There is always an ‘inside’ and an
‘outside’. Drawing a boundary creates an ‘inside’ which has to be
different to what is ‘outside’. This cannot be other than a dualism in
which one kind of causality applies to the inside and another kind to the
outside. There always has to be something outside the system that is
drawing the boundary around it and what that something is must
eventually be a mystery. ([1993] 5th edn 2007, p. 134)
A consequence of boundaried or framed thinking about organisations as systems is
that it becomes ‘obvious’ that setting strategy is a task for leaders who, as part of the
strategy process, both ensure and demonstrate that they have ‘stepped back’, looked
at ‘the big picture’, thought ‘outside the box’ and, having done all these things, bring
back into the organisation the essential view of things from which correct strategy
can be inferred. I have already quoted Griffin’s articulation of this (see page 21). In
this concept of strategy-setting leaders climb out of the frame to get the big picture,
which they then bring back into the frame (inside the system) on the path to action
and ‘implementation’. Such leaders act in movies which they also direct, with the
causal duality pointed to by Stacey that outside of the frame they think freely and
make moral choices, whereas the inside of the frame is populated by objects for
manipulation.
The ways in which I took part in leading (unawares) from this perspective in the
events of Narrative 1 included not just what I thought strategy was as well as my
responsibilities as a leader for shaping it; but also my constant questioning of myself
(outside the frame) of what I could do to induce Bill (inside the frame) to identify his
‘real’ choice; and of course the close association of strategy-forming with going
away (for example to Darden) or awaydays (castles in Kent). In this way of strategy-
setting, perhaps awaydays have an almost performative function. Their enactment
certifies to people in the company that their leaders have indeed climbed out of the
frame and seen different views from them.
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Narrative 2 is to me now a vivid account of an intervention proceeding from the
fundamental viewpoint (though in no sense the specific detail) of soft systems
methodologies, developed by such thinkers as Peter Checkland, originally of Bell
Telephone Laboratories. He considered that systems engineering did not take
sufficient account of messy human realities, including unsurfaced and clashing
worldviews. Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) was a next step which  approached
these problematic situations systematically. Surfacing and articulating differences,
iteratively as necessary, SSM offers:
... An organized process in which the real situation is explored, using as
intellectual devices – which serve to provide structure to discussion –
models of purposeful activity built to encapsulate pure, stated
worldviews. (Checkland & Poulter, 2006, p. 22)
This has the happy result that
Given the frame of mind outlined above, any problematical situation in
human affairs may be tackled with some confidence. (Ibid., p. 168)
It is important to be clear that Narrative 2 was not an application of SSM; rather I am
noting the confidence in rationality and discussability on which SSM relies, and
expressing misgivings.
2.9 Narrative 3: an incident in the formation of this doctoral cohort
In June 2007 the nine members of the doctoral cohort of which I am one met for the
first time as a complete group. Faculty were also present. The occasion was the
programme’s first five-day residential module. The timetable made clear that one and
a half hours in the afternoon of the third day would be used for the nine of us to form
ourselves into learning sets of three without faculty intervention.
Notwithstanding that my work requires developed social skills, I thought right away
that this session was likely to be difficult for me, for reasons akin to being picked for
teams in school games. I was aware of what a rational, game-theoretic approach
would be to the situation, including using the opportunities of all sorts of
conversations with other participants during the first two and a half days to assess
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their potential fit. I expected that in some of the conversations which might have
ensued, ‘would we be a good match in a learning set?’ would be an explicit topic,
while in others it would be concealed. I very strongly did not want to spend the first
two days with my fellow researchers operating with this instrumental mindset, and
rejected this course.
When the session began, I was feeling nervous and distressed. My proposal that we
form the learning sets by lot was rejected by the faculty and not taken up by other
cohort members. Then for the best part of an hour there were nine of us in a room,
with the faculty apart in a corner. My eight fellow cohort members stood and moved
to talk to each other, forming small conversational figurations and then changing
these every so often. I felt emotionally paralysed and physically did not wish to be
part of this activity, though nor did I want to walk out. I sat, rather than stood; I
pushed my chair to the fringe of the group, half turned away and (as I recall)
sometimes read a newspaper.
One cohort member has since told me that my self-excluding behaviour was not
obvious, but to me it was obvious and an excruciating experience. I ‘knew’ that ‘all I
had to do’ was to stand up and join whatever conversation might be going on nearby.
Reflecting on the experience I do not think I can meaningfully distinguish between
whether ‘I’ was not willing to stand up and do that, or whether (short of a fire
breaking out in the room) such a movement of limbs felt impossible.
Some cohort members came to speak to me. With these I spoke but also said that the
session was causing me significant distress. All the time, without knowing the time, I
was conscious of time moving towards a climactic moment when, as happened, the
director asked us to try to form sets by sitting together. Two members approached me
and asked if we could form a set together. I was relieved and grateful to be put out of
my misery. Within a few minutes I was able to function normally again. I am very
happy in my learning set.
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2.10 Involvement and detachment
Involvement and detachment are significant themes arising in all three narratives. It
is not simply systems thinking but the scientific method, if transplanted incautiously
into social studies, which contends that truth is to be accessed by an emotionally
detached (and materially disinterested) observer – or the closest alternative to this
which circumstances allow. This presumption is so widespread that one or two
examples from this project will suffice: thus, the two linguistic repertoires identified
by Bourdieu (see page 27), or by comparing Narrative 2 (a consulting episode) with
Narrative 1 (a leadership episode).
Commonly consultants are taken to be detached neutral arrivals, impartially chosen;
and if a sense of my greater detachment was apparent in Narrative 2 compared with
Narrative 1, then that may also have helped me to tell the story more briefly, because
of a greater implicit trust on the reader’s part (I am speculating).
By contrast, leaders are expected to be engaged – leaders are usually not credible if
not apparently engaged. Engagement involves emotion, passion and possibly
material interest (hence stock options attempt to align the material interests of
commercial leaders with those of their shareholders). However, it is normally also
considered desirable for leaders to be knowledgeable; and since detachment is
thought to favour this we encounter again the systems duality in which leaders climb
out of the frame of their situation in order to be objectively well-informed, but return
within the frame in order to be convincingly, sometimes dramatically, engaged.
In undertaking this research, I will be attempting to hold together detachment and
engagement at the same time (rather than sequentially, as the concept of the frame
implies). Sometimes the attempt to do this fails, and the consequences for the
individual may be paralysing. This is what I recount in Narrative 3 – in some detail
not only so that the reader may sense the level of affect involved, but also to point to
the physicality of what I did: trying, at real cost although not quite whole-heartedly,
to climb ‘out of the frame’ of people and chairs, with a boundary policed by the
faculty, a whole figuration in which I felt deeply threatened by lack of power.
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Central to reflecting on this is Elias’ detailed treatment in ‘Involvement and
Detachment’ (1987). Elias considers that humanity’s first mode of relating to the
world was engagement, dominated by magico-mythic thinking in which everything
and anything might have a purpose towards or against oneself. From this emerged
detachment, and more specifically scientific detachment, providing the basis for the
major advances in knowledge of inanimate and non-sentient matter.14 But he
suggests that in the social sciences, a further step is required on the grounds of
realism:
... the hypothesis which played a dominant part in the traditional
philosophical theories of knowledge: the assumption that the point of
departure for all theories of knowledge is a subject-object relationship. ...
I have tried to show that this step towards greater detachment does not go
far enough. It represents one to oneself as if one existed in isolation, as a
wirloses Ich – an ‘I without a we’. (Ibid., p. 57)
Descartes gave the signal: Cogito ergo sum. What can be more absurd!
Merely in order to say it, one had to have a communal language; and why
say it if no-one was there to listen, to accept or to reject it? (Ibid., p. 14)
2.11 Looking forward
This project gives rise to many questions. But a central one, affecting both the
content and the form or process of this research, is what alternative is possible to
systems thinking, to subject-object knowledge, and to leadership by climbing out of
the frame?
14 Elias also uses the example of Edgar Allan Poe’s story ‘A descent into the maelstrőm’ (ibid., pp.
108-109) to illustrate the possibility of paralysis.
Page | 34
Chapter Three: Project Two - Power and silence: a reflexive
exploration through involvement and detachment
3.1 Introduction
In Project One I made an initial exploration of my experience of leadership and
recruitment. In this exploration, power and undiscussability began to emerge as one
theme. I also became more aware of the systems basis for my thinking about
leadership, in which from time to time I pictured myself stepping ‘outside’ my
organisations to formulate strategic perspectives and appropriate goals. This
introduced the theme of involvement and detachment; in particular, the treatment of
this by Norbert Elias (1987).
Now I will take this work further in two ways. Firstly, I will explore power and
silence. In the next few paragraphs I set out why. Secondly, in doing this I will
encounter or return to the theme of involvement and detachment. Asking with
increasing reflexive intensity of this research as I carry it out, ‘What am I doing?
What of my exercise of power and silence in the very creating of this research? How
shall I now go on?’ will open up questions of research method.
Over eighteen years as a search professional I have conducted a lot of senior
interviews (Introduction, section 1.1). Over 70% of these were at board or senior
management team level. Compared with the specialisation typical in executive
search, my experience spanned an unusually wide range of sectors and sizes of
organisation. It is not, of course, ‘representative experience’15. But it leads me to
inquire more deeply into power and silence. Although power is one of the defining
issues in senior management and leadership roles – and it affected my practice
deeply (for example the chief executive succession in Narrative 2 in Project One) –
15 I can point to some biases in my experience compared with the general population of senior UK
vacancies. These biases reflect the client’s decision to use executive search at all, then the decision to
use my firm, and then the decision to use me. Biases of which I am aware include the majority of my
clients being in the public or non-profit sectors; a large part, and possibly the majority, of my
candidates being in the private sector; a minority of the searches being international; and a significant
proportion of the positions filled being new or innovative.
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in helping to choose over 1,000 leaders, mention of it was infrequent. Full, candid
discussion of its ramifications was unheard of.
I will now point to a pattern relevant to power and silence which I notice as present
in all parts of my career, in different sectors and sizes of organisation, and at
different rungs on the power ‘ladder’ (section 3.2). This pattern – which might be
limited to parts of educated British society - is concerned with how we so organise
matters that the powerful have their wishes acted on even before they have uttered
them. I confront this in section 3.3 with an opposite narrative, a narrative of failure in
which over a two year period I was impotent. This was in one of the most powerful
leadership roles which I have held, and in which I brought into play all my
understanding about leadership at the time.
This leads me to ask more closely, what is power? To explore this, I offer an initial
naïve analysis and critically reflect upon it (section 3.4). Then I will take up insights
from other thinkers (section 3.5) and reflect on these in the light of my experience
(sections 3.6 and 3.7). I will then ask the questions ‘What am I doing? What of my
exercise of power and silence in the very creating of this research? How shall I now
go on?’, and so make a reflexive turn into questions of method (sections 3.8 and 3.9).
Finally I will draw together for reference what I have suggested about power and
silence (section 3.10).
3.2 ‘Lip-reading’: one pattern of power and silence
By ‘lip-reading’16 I mean paying such focused and habitual attention to the superior
or other that on significant occasions the subordinate experiences the wishes of their
superior before any gesture by the latter.
In calling attention to lip-reading I am pointing to patterns of social reward and
recognition in the environments in which I operated, and which extended across
public and private sectors and large and small organisations. I am therefore pointing
to lip-reading as an ideal socially re-created on a wide scale in which subordinates
are rewarded for enacting rapidly and without reflection.
16 Or one might say ‘mind-reading’ – but ‘lip-reading’ draws more explicit attention to the use of
metonymy. ‘Mind’ often is taken to exclude the body.
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I start with a commonplace in the voluntary sector. A few weeks ago I was in a
meeting with the recently appointed chief executive (Tom) of a national charity. A
question was put to the senior management team. Charles, the most relevant team
member responded. Then the chief executive said, ‘Charles has, like any good senior
management team member, anticipated what I wanted to say.’ The words passed
without notice or comment; they were taken as words of routine approbation. The
routineness, the naturalness, of the ideal which the chief executive was putting
forward – that the job of senior management team members is to anticipate his
thoughts – is my point.
In the private sector, as a search professional lip-reading was a daily drill. The job of
consultants is to lip-read clients. According to this view, by anticipating clients’
wishes and, where possible, turning them into reality before they have been spoken,
one creates ‘customer delight’. Delighted customers, ones whose expectations have
been not only met but also substantially exceeded, become your fans and powerful
generators of your brand or reputation, and of your future business. If a customer has
to make an explicit request, then its fulfilment is more likely to create customer
satisfaction (meeting expectations) than delight (exceeding them). In business this
marketing jargon is commonplace: again, its banality is my point.17
But the pattern of lip-reading was deep in me and my environment long before I
joined the private sector. Since the point of the foregoing examples has been their
ordinary, everyday quality, I will recount an experience which was unusual and
intense.
In 198718 I worked in the Treasury, which considered itself an elite department built
on fundamental principles of conserving public money. I moved to a job in which, as
17 Oliver, Rust and Varki concluded that ‘unexpected high levels of satisfaction or performance
initiate an arousal →pleasure (positive affect) → delight sequence’. (1997, p. 311) An example in
typical business use today is ‘Delighted customers are those where you anticipate their needs, provide
solutions to them before they ask and where you are observing to see if new and/or additional
expectations are about ready to be required’ http://www.customerdelight.com (accessed 27 February
2008).
18 The audit report to which I will refer was considered by the House of Commons Public Accounts
Committee on 1 April 1987.
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a result of decisions taken and legislation passed some years earlier, a policy was
pursued in relation to trustee savings banks (now the ‘TSB’ part of Lloyds TSB)
which became controversial. Among other things it was suggested that the Treasury
might not have considered carefully enough the complex ownership of these banks
and, as a direct result, perhaps allowed £1 billion of taxpayers’ money to ‘go
walkabout’.
There was an investigation by the National Audit Office. At that point it became my
job to obtain the relevant files from the archives and give them to the auditors; and,
of course, to read them before doing so. The files made a stack of paper about three
feet high. In them I read for the first time how the policy which had become an Act
of Parliament and which I had implemented had been made. It would have been
extremely embarrassing if the Treasury, of all departments, had been careless with a
large amount of public money.
In the files there was an exchange of minutes in which my predecessors had drawn
the attention of the most senior official in the Treasury to the risk that, accepting
legal advice in the way which they proposed to do, money which might belong to the
public would escape into private hands. The senior official confirmed that he was
content. Nothing could be more proper - except for the dates on those minutes: from
memory, 23 and 24 December respectively. Anyone with half an idea of what senior
government offices are typically like on those dates (a torrent of paper rushing in and
out plus the odd festivity) might have wondered whether that exchange reflected
careful and deep consideration.
I decided that it would be in the Treasury’s interest if the auditors did not read those
two sheets of paper. However, I was perfectly aware that it would have been illegal
not to provide them to the auditors; I needed if possible to come up with something
more creative. I decided not to ask my bosses what to do. To ask them would have
meant making them aware of the exchange and my planned way of dealing with it. I
felt that they would prefer, if possible, to remain ignorant. I resolved my ethical
dilemma by putting ‘helpful’ marker flags for the auditors on all the most relevant
papers within the three foot stack, but not on the two pages which I regarded as
Page | 38
sensitive. I handed all the papers to the auditors with the true if incomplete comment
that I had flagged up some papers which seemed to me relevant. Whether the
auditors never read the sensitive pages, or read them and found nothing amiss, I do
not know.
If in organisations of many kinds it is customary for powerful figures to become the
foci for extensive patterns of lip-reading, then we may expect a lot of influence to be
exercised without words being uttered. Later I will consider much more substantially
insights from the sociologists Robert Dahl and Pierre Bourdieu, but for now let me
make some brief connections to this phenomenon. Bourdieu comments that at the
most basic level of human interaction:
... The relation between two people may be such that one of them has
only to appear in order to impose on the other, without even having to
want to, let alone formulate any command, a definition of the situation
and of himself (as intimidated, for example), which is all the more
absolute and undisputed for not having to be stated. (Bourdieu, 1991a, p.
52)
Dahl’s interest in power pays more attention to senior roles, but the point which he
makes is consistent:
Let us suppose that even in the absence of any previous communication
from the president to Senator R, or indeed any previous action of any
kind by the president, Senator R regularly votes now in a way he thinks
will insure the president’s favor later. The senator calculates that if he
loses the next election, he may, as a result of the president’s favourable
attitude, be in line to receive a presidential appointment to a federal court
... [but] his votes are not the result of any specific action by the president
.... This kind of phenomenon is commonplace, important, and obviously
relevant to the analysis of power. (Dahl, 1986, pp. 51-52)
3.3 Narrative 1: a failure of power
I will now take up an apparently contradictory narrative in which despite having
power and attempting to exercise it, over two years I was not able to get across a
simple, express proposition.
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The context is provided in Project One (Narrative 1) in which I described strategy-
setting in the 45 person firm of which I was deputy chairman. The strategy which I
was instrumental in creating circa 1999 was called ‘4 in 2004’. It was printed on
cards and widely distributed in the firm, together with our mission statement and
values, and it said
4 IN 2004
We aim to be one of the best search firms on the planet. To that end, by
2004 we will:
(1) be one of the four search firms uppermost in the minds of UK
business leaders;
(2) be known for handling some of the most important and interesting
searches in Britain, including some at the top of the private sector;
(3) be recognised for the commitment, insight, candour and humanity of
our people; and
(4) – most days! – experience the firm as one of the most remarkable
value-based communities in which we expect to work in our lives.
As I narrate in Project One, by 2002 we scrapped this and replaced it with a
‘strategy’ devised by my business partner Bill. We called it ‘the 5 Mosts’. It was
similarly printed and circulated and read
We aim to become: (1) the most thoughtful;  (2) the most effective;
(3) the most innovative; (4) the most ethical; (5) the most professional
search firm in the world; and the most fun.
At the same time as we switched to the ‘5 Mosts’, Bill and I had strong structured
anonymous feedback (organised by Darden Business School) about the firm’s
experience of our leadership. I was experienced as able and inspirational but also
highly controlling. Bill’s pattern was different but with some overlap. In the light of
this it was fundamental for me to approach how we might ‘implement’ the 5 Mosts in
a more empowering way.
I came up with the idea (which Bill agreed) that we would invite volunteers from the
firm to champion the 5 Mosts. This would be an influencing, not a line management
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role, but one behind which I would personally commit to put my power enabling the
champions to have access to resources. I also committed to opposing any micro-
control of them by either myself or Bill. I intended, and spelled out, that my task was
to create a genuinely creative space for action by volunteers. Importantly, the space
would last for 2 years – so that there was time for people to discuss and act on more
than superficial quick fixes. I sketched out a short role description, agreed it with Bill
and got myself designated as the director responsible for this initiative and for
briefing and liaising with the champions (if any came forward).
Nine colleagues from all parts and levels of the firm volunteered for these roles, and
we added by invitation a tenth (a new consultant who had only just joined the firm,
but an experienced executive with an MBA). So we had ten champions, who to some
extent grouped themselves in pairs, one pair for each ‘Most’, and to some extent
operated in a more cross-cutting way. I met with them to commission them; I
stipulated that I wanted one half-day meeting with them, at a time of their choice
sometime in the third quarter of the two year period; but otherwise I would not join
their meetings, nor be copied on their emails, ask for progress reports or employ any
of the other possible tools of micro-control. On the other hand, throughout I would
be fully committed to our joint cause, and available to them at their initiative if they
felt that their work was being inhibited by management decisions or actions, or lack
of resources. I challenged each of them to set their sights high: to make a
contribution which they would think worthy of recounting in a job interview later in
their career.
I failed. The champions met, and they explored various low-level ideas. As I had
expected, quite some months went by before they realised that the initiative was
serious, and that I would not simply fill any vacuum with my own ideas. I did stick to
my self-imposed brief. But the ideas of the champions remained pretty mixed and
they quarrelled with each other. As I was later told, there was a cynical camp and a
keen camp (though even the cynics had volunteered): the cynics stoutly maintained
that the whole thing was a con and there was no way that the directors would do
anything radical if the champions suggested it. It also never escaped from the orbit of
the actual and perceived Bill/Douglas power struggle.
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After the two year period of the champions initiative we sold 70% of the firm to an
acquirer, and eighteen months later I left. As I left and after it, the firm’s ‘new
generation’ – several of whom had been champions – began taking the kind of
initiatives which I had failed to empower (or motivate) them to bring forward earlier.
What I am putting forward is, for me, an experience of deep puzzlement, a quandary
about the nature of power. Equipped with and motivated by feedback about micro-
control, I designed an intervention which took that challenge head-on19. I ensured
that I had, but did not simply rely on, formal authority: colleagues widely
experienced me (as the feedback showed) as a powerful player within the firm. I
pledged to exercise my power in favour of the creativity of the champions in a way
from which it would have been difficult for me to resile. I thought I knew the
weakest point of my action – I would be expected not ‘to walk my talk’. I walked my
talk for two years; and the whole exercise was fruitless. I did not move significantly
in my own understanding of this puzzle until I was quite far into the reading on
power which I began as part of this project, and to which I now turn.
3.4 What is power?
Power is a large subject, and reading can become detached. I wish to sustain – and if
possible heighten – my involvement and my detachment at the same time. To engage
with this reading, I first sketch out and critique my own starting point for thinking
about power (section 3.4). In section 3.5 I bring my thinking together with that of a
range of other writers. Through this process my thinking changes, and in section 3.6 I
make different sense of the quandary I have presented and notice changes in my
practice as a leader.
Many thinkers about power have found it enigmatic. Lukes writes:
When we are interested in power – in studying, acquiring, maintaining,
increasing, reducing or destroying it – what is it that we are interested in?
Answering this question turns out to be far from simple ... . (1986, p. 1)
19 ‘Feedback’ and ‘designed interventions’ are, of course, highly systems-based ways of thinking – I
use these terms because they are how I thought at the time.
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As a way in to this complex subject, let me start naïvely and critique the result.
In Newtonian physics, the power of an agent is the amount of change which it can
effect in the world (measured as work, or force multiplied by distance) in a unit of
time. Echoing this, in a world of physical agents A and B without self-consciousness,
I will consider the power of each to be the largest amount of change which it could
effect in the world in a unit of time. Defined in this way, the power of an agent is
both situational and dynamic. If in a field we have a dog and a rabbit, then typically
the dog has greater power than the rabbit. In a few minutes it can rearrange the world
to eliminate the rabbit, a change which the rabbit cannot match. The dynamic nature
of the situation can be shown by noting that as a result of catching and eating the
rabbit, the capacity of the dog to change the physical world in a unit of time might
increase because of the rabbit’s food value, or decrease, if the rabbit was diseased.
In human interaction this physical dimension of power does not disappear. Within a
few hours the President of the United States could destroy large parts of the planet
while I could not. He is more powerful than me. If persons A and B sit in a room, and
A has a gun and B does not, then that remains a material aspect of their power
relations whatever patterns of mutual dependency (to use Elias’ sense of power
referred to in Project One) may also exist between them. Physical power is naturally
loud power, in that typically the successful exerciser of it gains strength from doing
so loudly (deterrent effects).
However the move to a universe of sentient beings is transformational. Now meaning
is also present and power gains additional space in which to operate, to bend others
to its will or to be defeated. In addition to the power to rearrange the world we must
add the power to rearrange interpretations of the world – which I shall call symbolic
power. C makes a gesture; say, she writes a message to D on a piece of paper. If E
burns the paper she exercises physical power. If E can change how D understands
what C has written, she is exercising a power not available before the advent of self-
consciousness. Symbolic power is naturally quiet power, in that typically the
successful exerciser of it gains strength from discretion, camouflage or silence.
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An elementary form of symbolic power is bluff. If something can mean something,
of necessity between sentient beings it can mean something else. Between sentient
beings with any kind of power relations, to be a horse necessarily includes the
possibility of being a Trojan horse. This is the fundamental ambiguity of meaning in
the face of power relations. Returning to A and B, B watches intently as A’s hand
reaches for and grasps the gun. At exactly the moment when B experiences (or
anticipates) the gun pointing at B, in other words the moment when the meaning of
threat arises from the gesture-response of A-B, there arises the possible meaning of
bluff: the gun may not be loaded.
On this analysis, the act of understanding (or of two people making meaning
together) is intrinsically ambiguous and political. The meaning of a communicative
gesture can never be singular: those of the powerful must be scrutinised especially
intently for the possibility that they mean something other than their face value. To
revert to a President of the United States, at the Republican National Convention in
1988 George H W Bush famously pledged, ‘Read my lips! No new taxes!’ only
because of the seriousness of the possibility that he might have to raise taxes20.
Why, then, do single meanings seem natural to us, so accurately descriptive of much
communication? After all, when someone says ‘This is your glass of wine’ often they
are gesturing towards a glass of wine, not a glass of poison. In this sense the meaning
made by two people in a situation of gesture-response may be suggestive of the
phenomenon noted in complexity theory whereby, when low intensities of a stressor
(say a form of power, such as heat flow) are applied to a situation, a single
phenomenon is observed; but when stressed beyond a certain point, the phenomenon
bifurcates and two or more solutions become possible.21 When not much is at stake
in the interdependence between two people or in their power relations, taking things
20 As he did in 1990, leading to the New York Post headline ‘Read my lips: I lied’.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Read_my_lips:_no_new_taxes (accessed 27 February 2008).
21 For example the discussion of pitchfork bifurcation, dissipative structures  and self-organization by
the Nobel laureate in chemistry, Ilya Prigogine. (1996, pp. 68-69) He is principally describing
chemical reactions governed by nonlinear equations where a continuing disturbance such as a flow of
a reagent or of heat (which I have called above a stressor) is applied to an open system to sustain it
away from equilibrium.
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at face value may make sense. Even so, the possibility of ambiguity and its
exploitation is always present.
But, on critical reflection, my starting point does not go far enough. From a world of
Newtonian physical agents I proceeded to introduce mind and meaning. While I did
so in a social way in the limited sense that ambiguity of meaning and its possible
exploitation as bluff only make sense in a world of at least two individuals, my
underlying concept of mind and meaning was not social but atomic – as if a solo
mind could arise, assign meanings to symbols for its convenience and then proceed
to contemplate the existence or not of the universe (a principal stream of thought in
Western philosophy). My initial analysis is also systemic in its approach, expounded
from a viewpoint standing outside systems variously of dog-rabbit, A-B and C-D-E.
The most glaring deficiency resulting from these points taken together is that I have
posited a discussion of power in the context of sentient beings, where there is
physicality and meaning, but no purpose, motive or self-conscious desire. So, thus
far, it is an analysis of power which might be of value in relation to animals and
intelligent but undesiring robots, but no further. And yet purpose, motive or self-
conscious desire are evidently intrinsic to a discussion of power in a human context.
More than this: if mind and self arise in a social way such as posited by Mead
(1934), then desire and unself-conscious motive (such as the dog’s appetite for the
rabbit) worked out in social interaction are necessary for the emergence of self-
conscious selves; so the concept of a universe of ‘intelligent but undesiring robots’
may not make sense in its own terms, let alone serve as a domain for the exploration
of power.
So now let me consider the study of power to be the study of patternings of cause and
effect in human interaction which tend to increase (or to sustain at a relatively high
level) or to decrease (or to sustain a relatively low level) the opportunities for
thought and action of human beings. Within this I will pick out the following themes
for comment22:
22 These themes may overlap. I am not proposing a definitional hierarchy.
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(1) physical and symbolic and telic23 power, which are patterns of cause and
effect discussed respectively according to the changes which they produce in
the physical world, in meanings assigned to that world and in the purposes,
motives or desires of individual human agents; and
(2) conceptions of identity and interaction underlying symbolic and telic power
which are atomic or radically social. A discussion of power which makes
sense in and relies upon a Cartesian universe of solo minds I shall call atomic.
These develop to include an interacting multiplicity (a system or society) of
atomic minds with, usually, a sender-receiver model of communication
between them. By contrast a discussion of power in which individual identity,
meaning and motive emerges and is sustained in a fundamentally
interdependent way I shall call radically social.
What happens when I bring this exploration of my own thought together with the
wider literature?
3.5 Concepts of power – Dahl, Lukes, Foucault and Arendt
I will consider treatments of power which are atomic (the concepts of power as used
by Dahl, Parsons and Lukes) and radically social (Foucault and Arendt).
3.5.1 Dahl
Project One included the idea of the American sociologist Robert Dahl that:
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B
would not otherwise do. (Lukes, 1974, pp. 11-12) quoting from (Dahl,
1957)
Dahl widens and formalises his discussion by formulating a discourse in which:
... power terms in modern social science refer to subsets of relations
among social units such that the behaviors of one or more units (the
responsive units, R) depend in some circumstances on the behavior of
other units (the controlling units, C). (Dahl, 1986, p. 40)
Dahl’s development of this can be illustrated by taking his discussion of ways of
measuring power (ibid., pp. 53-55). He suggests that there are broadly three ways of
doing this: game-theoretic, specifically Shapley and Shubik’s measurement of power
23 I introduce this term to identify an aspect of discussion which becomes significant with the
introduction of Lukes’ three dimensions of power on page 48, and with Foucault and Arendt.
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within a committee of equal voters; Newtonian, attempting to quantify the ‘amount
of change’ produced in one agent by the other; and economic, which extends the
Newtonian to take into account opportunity cost. Thus:
Harsanyi has argued that a complete measure of power should include (1)
the opportunity costs to C of attempting to influence R, which Harsanyi
calls the costs of C’s power, and (2) the opportunity costs to R of refusing
to comply with C, which Harsanyi calls the strength of C’s power over R
... [costs] to include psychological costs of all kinds. (Ibid., pp. 54-55)
The nature of agents (whether C or R) in this discourse is atomic – individual minds
with unexplained desires which act on each other.
By expanding the complexity of interaction to focus on groups of agents, Alvin
Goldman can offer quasi-mathematical formulations such as:
A person S has some power w. r. t. [with respect to] issue E if there is
some group G such that S is a non-dispensable member of G w.r.t. E and
the members of G have collective power w.r.t. E. (Goldman, 1972, p.
239)
We can be confident that Goldman’s underlying concept of agents is atomic because
he asserts:
The central idea in the concept of power, I suggest, is connected with
getting what one wants. ...To say that S is powerful is not to say that he
usually gets what he in fact wants, but that whatever he wanted he could
get, no matter what he might happen to want. (Ibid., pp. 222-3)
At this level of complexity we can say that Goldman is discussing something with a
systems dimension, but still atomic rather than radically social; as is for example
Talcott Parsons in his definition:
Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding
obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the
obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective
goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of
enforcement by negative situational sanctions. (Parsons, 1963, p. 237)
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Power as Parsons has just defined it is limited to its physical and symbolic
dimensions. Indeed by the nature of what is taken as an unexamined given (an atom)
in these views – namely the individual agent – all these analyses are at their weakest
point in dealing with telic power: how or why might an agent’s goals or desires
change, and if they did, should that be regarded as free will or as succumbing to
persuasion or propaganda?
3.5.2 Lukes
How does Lukes position himself in relation to these schools of thought? Preparatory
to articulating his ‘radical view’ in his book of that title (1974), he says that there are
first of all ‘one-dimensional’ views of power which involve:
... a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests. (Ibid., p. 15)
This description would characterise the line of thought above from Dahl onwards.
Lukes calls ‘two-dimensional’ the expansion of this perspective by, for example,
Bachrach and Baratz, who underline the need to examine non-decisions as well as
decisions – which is a form of paying attention to silence. Lukes sees two-
dimensional concepts of power as expanded to include non-decisionmaking as well
as decision-making but, in common with Dahl et al, there is a:
... stress on actual, observable conflict, overt or covert. Just as the [one-
dimensionalists] hold that power in decision-making only shows up
where there is conflict, [two-dimensionalists] assume the same to be true
in cases of non-decisionmaking. (Ibid., p.19)
Several steps happen as Lukes moves to what he calls a three-dimensional view of
power. Imagine examining the possibility of unfairness in a refereed football match.
In the one-dimensional view we focus on when the referee blew his whistle and
stopped play: we examine decisions. In the two-dimensional view, we also notice
that the referee’s non-decisions (failure to blow his whistle after the tackle in the
fifty-third minute) are also possible sites for bias. In taking a three-dimensional view,
we notice that the whole playing field may not be level – that there are other,
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particularly social forces at work which cannot be captured by focussing only on
decisions and non-decisions. Lukes considers that both the one- and two-
dimensionalists are following:
... Max Weber, for whom power was the probability of individuals
realising their wills despite the resistance of others. (Ibid., p. 22)
For Lukes, this pays insufficient attention to the group level of behaviour and
neglects the implications of telic power. Lukes proposes to judge whether telic power
has been used in an abusive way by its results, ie according to its effect on an
individual in relation to the individual’s (supposed) objective interests. Lukes also
considers both one- and two-dimensional conceptions of power to be overly focussed
on conflict, actual or suppressed. The successful exercise of telic power may avoid or
remove conflict; and, like Marx, he is not content to accept an agent’s subjective
understanding of what matters to him as an adequate expression of his real interests:
... Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have
the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by
controlling their thoughts and desires? ... Is it not the supreme and most
insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from
having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order
of things. ... To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine
consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated
consensus by definitional fiat. (Ibid., pp. 23-24)
This, then, becomes Lukes’ radical view of power, namely that:
A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s
interests. (Ibid., p. 34)
Lukes has developed a systemic framework inclusive of physical, symbolic and telic
power. A systems perspective is implicit in the supposition of a bounded whole and
the possibility of an external, detached observer required to suppose the existence of
agents’ objective interests. The lack of radical sociality is also indicated by the
continuing atomic nature of the agents under discussion.
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So far, I do not experience this thinking as helping me to make fresh sense of my
narrative. This reflects the extent to which my own approach to power was already
systemic. It suggests to my mind that my initiative failed because I did not have
enough capacity to enforce compliance with my goal; or that, having it, I failed to
exercise it. Thus, well into the two years I had the half-day meeting with the
champions which I had stipulated. I made no attempt to suggest that their individual
bonuses would suffer unless they came up with more substantial results than I could
then observe. Then and now my strong feeling was that this would be counter-
productive. Lukes’ radical step tends to intensify my quandary rather than reduce it:
on any plausible interpretation of the champions’ supposed objective interests, my
initiative was in their favour. For example, they could have proposed that it was in
the interests of the business to increase their pay, and I would have been morally
bound to argue for a serious hearing of their case.
3.5.3 Foucault
I turn now to approaches taken by Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt, which I
understand as radically social. What we see in both of these approaches is a breaking
apart of what was previously treated as atomic, namely the nature, purposes and
desires of agents. The consideration of these as being social in origin opens up
considerably the whole question of telic power.
Foucault wishes to make a change of approach. He writes:
... We can formulate the traditional question of political philosophy in the
following terms: how is the discourse of truth, or quite simply,
philosophy as that discourse which par excellence is concerned with
truth, able to fix limits to the rights of power? That is the traditional
question. The one I would prefer to pose is rather different. Compared to
the traditional, noble and philosophic question it is much more down to
earth and concrete. My problem is rather this: what rules of right are
implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses of
truth? (Foucault, 1986, p. 229)
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This problematisation means that Foucault is very much concerned with how patterns
of power interact with what is voiced and what is not, and what is considered to be
truth and what is not. Thus he goes on to emphasise:
We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot
exercise power except through the production of truth. (Ibid., pp. 229-
230)
Foucault’s perspective gives particular significance to the patterning of silence. Thus
elsewhere he writes:
Silence itself – the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the
discretion that is required between different speakers – is less the
absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a
strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said,
with them and in relation to them within overall strategies. There is no
binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not
say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such
things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are
distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of
discretion is required in either case. There is not one but many silences,
and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate
discourses. (Foucault, 1984, pp. 309-310)
The absolute necessity in senior roles to regard silence as part of communication and
to deconstruct it finds a strong echo in my experience. Pregnant silence is an
important part of executive search conversations. For example, two months prior to
resigning from my firm, I had a three hour breakfast meeting with Bill and the group
chief executive to whom we had sold 70% of our firm. I intended this to be a final
warning of my intention to resign. Once a leader states a serious intention to leave,
his position is irretrievably compromised. Certainly Bill and the group chief
executive realised this. So I judged that in a ‘final warning’ conversation I could not
suggest an intention to leave. For the communication to succeed, I and my listeners
not only needed to understand the words of disagreement and unhappiness which I
uttered, but also the silence: the communication depended upon the listeners realising
that no stronger words were available in the language to be said, without falling into
stating the impossible. How surprised Bill and his colleague were when two months
later I did resign, I do not know.
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Foucault also favours:
... an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal
mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory,
their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of
power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonized, utilized,
involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more global
mechanisms and by forms of global domination. (Foucault, 1986, pp.
234-5)
Note the shift in Foucault’s perspective away from atomic As ‘doing things’ to
atomic Bs which, however much systemic complexity was added, remained the
hallmark of previously discussed approaches. Foucault argues:
Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people want to dominate, what they
seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work
at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and
uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures,
dictate our behaviours, etc. (Ibid., p. 233)
Clearly we are now in a world of processes where the very composition of who we
are, and what it might be for us to want something, has become plastic and social;
and the questions about telic power open up dramatically.
3.5.4 Arendt
Hannah Arendt is so concerned that we should see something quite new which enters
the frame of discussion in this way that she prefers to restrict the term ‘power’ to this
new thing – for example specifically excluding physical force, which she calls
violence, from its ambit. Since physical coercion was foundational, part of the base
case, of power in all previous discussion, this definitional move of Arendt’s is
perhaps rhetorically provocative. For example it enables her to set up power (in the
Arendtian sense) and violence as opposites of each other, thus:
The extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of
violence is One against All ... . (Arendt, 1986, p. 63)
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Violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the
most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect
obedience. What never can grow out of it is power. (Ibid., p. 69)
Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the
other is absent. (Ibid., p. 71).
If we ignore the rhetorical provocation to focus instead on what Arendt is pointing to,
we come to an important insight.
For Arendt power refers to the fundamental importance of social, interactive
creativity, the power to make a new beginning together, or the concept of social
freedom. She says:
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in
concert ... . (Ibid., p. 64)
But we fail to grasp her meaning unless we realise the significance of action within
her thought. Arendt does not use ‘action’ to mean switching on a kettle. Arendt
distinguishes action from thought and labour. By it she means a socially originated
freedom to act, to begin, to initiate the unexpected and unpredictable. This concept
which she calls natality she contrasts with Rousseau’s concept of freedom as
sovereignty (Arendt, 2000b, pp. 454-5). The centrality of the concept for her is plain
when she says:
Action, with all its uncertainties, is like an ever-present reminder that
men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to
begin something new. ... ‘That there be a beginning man was created,’
said Augustine. With the creation of man, the principle of being came
into the world – which, of course, is only another way of saying that with
the creation of man, the principle of freedom appeared on earth. (Arendt,
2000a, p. 181)
What Arendt points out is that the classic picture of the efficacy of violence is
mistaken. Classically – and in everything hitherto presented – it is as if:
... Violence were the prerequisite of power and power nothing but a
façade, the velvet glove which either conceals the iron hand or will turn
out to belong to a paper tiger. (Arendt, 1986, p. 66)
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But Arendt asks us to notice how revolutions actually happen, and how the exercise
of large-scale violence requires the consensual acting-together – the power, in
Arendt’s sense - of a substantial number of people. In fact, she maintains that,
unnoticed in the classical analysis:
Everything depends on the power behind the violence. The sudden
dramatic breakdown of power that ushers in revolutions reveals in a flash
how civil obedience – to laws, to rulers, to institutions – is but the
outward manifestation of support and consent. ... No government
exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed. (Ibid., p. 67)
Arendt goes on to argue that:
Rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost; it is
precisely the shrinking power of the Russian government, internally and
externally, that became manifest in its ‘solution’ of the Czechoslovak
problem – just as it was the shrinking power of European imperialism
that became manifest in the choice between decolonization and massacre.
(Ibid., pp. 69-70)
This brings us to the fundamentally paradoxical nature of power (in my sense of the
word rather than Arendt’s), as something which can be both utterly plain and deeply
enigmatic – indeed the plainer, the more enigmatic. It also enables me to make sense
of my quandary.
3.6 My own leadership and exercise of power
The failure to empower which I narrated in section 3.3 perplexed me; now it seems
rather clear.
Through the champions initiative I tried to create a radical social creativity within my
business: in fact, Arendt’s concept of power. I wanted to will this into existence by
executive fiat – while all but one of the champions were volunteers, I did not open
their roles to any negotiation or evolution. Arendt suggests that while force can elicit
obedience, what it cannot elicit is power in her sense (quoted above on page 52). An
Arendtian analysis would also pay attention not just to the power of domination
which Bill and I enjoyed in the firm, but the active social consent needed for that to
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be so. From this I might have considered more carefully whether, despite the stated
feedback about micro-control, there was a preference for the status quo which
continued until my departure removed that option.
From the perspective of communication, I am struck that over the two years I acted
as if, provided my words were clear and my actions were consistent with them over a
long enough time, they could only bear one obvious meaning. Had I been conscious
then of the fundamental ambiguity of meaning suggested on page 43, then I would
have grasped the grave weakness of relying on a sender-receiver model of
communication when, according to this analysis, if there is anything in the envelope
then at least two things could be in the envelope.
I might further have realised that while I had chosen an unusually distanced mode of
acting in order to be unaccusable of micro-management, this mode excluded
continuing conversation between me and the champions; and possibly conversation,
for all its potential for misinterpretation, was the only way in which my intended
meaning would arise. Mead’s gesture-response suggests that meaning of any
complexity cannot possibly emerge between human beings acting as if they were
simply senders and receivers.
These reflections have accelerated a change in my approach to leadership for which
seeds were also sowed in the emphasis on conversation at Darden and in Project One.
These are a critical part of the approach which I have taken in my first year as chair
of the board of trustees of a medium-sized charity. In this year, having been recruited
from outside the charity, I have needed to establish how I would lead board
discussions; to begin building (as I hope) a durable and trusting relationship with my
new chief executive; and to be visible meeting front-line staff, volunteers and other
players within our sector. I am much more conscious than before that, working in a
particularly lively part of the voluntary sector, the ‘power’ which fuels our activities
is Arendtian power. I can neither will it into being, nor direct its path. So far this has
not meant, nor do I understand those I lead to want, a weak participation in the
conversation between us – a weakness which might mean saying little or treating my
positions and beliefs as disposable. Rather I am paying much more attention to
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whether the exchanges I participate in qualify as ‘conversations’ – do I feel a quality
of involvement and detachment which I experience as openness to what the other
person has to say?
Taking up themes from Project One, I am also trying to catch myself when I operate
from a systemic view (typically by asserting my view of a ‘big picture’), and
preferring instead simultaneous attention to both involvement and detachment. Three
weeks ago I gave a major speech for my charity in which I had sought to intensify
simultaneously its involved and detached aspects. It was well received; the chairman
of the conference said it made a strong impression on him because it was passionate
and factual, ‘an unusual combination’. But these changes in my leadership practice
cannot yet be regarded as seriously tested.
Looking backwards from a radically social perspective towards the Newtonian and
atomic approaches with which I began, the latter seem to me related to the former
somewhat in the way that tangents to a curve are related to the curve. The idea
behind ‘the largest amount of change which [an agent] could effect in the world in a
unit of time’ on page 42 in effect freezes for an instant an evolving social universe,
and substitutes for the agent in question a replica which has the Cartesian capacity to
decide whatever it wishes – thus Goldman’s ‘To say that S is powerful is not to say
that he usually gets what he in fact wants, but that whatever he wanted he could get’
on page 46. In an analogous way, the tangent to a curve at a point is produced by
imagining that at that point a particle following the course of the curve is freed to
move in a straight line. Tangents approximate and provide information about a curve,
but do not show how a particle following the curve would actually move forward.
Thus Newtonian and atomic conceptions of power provide some information about
social power figurations, and become more meaningful the closer reality approaches
to the theoretical freezing and Cartesian insertion: in other words, when dealing with
the terror induced by an arbitrary, psychopathic agent.
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3.7 An emergent theme: inversion of power relations
From a quandary in my experience as a leader exercising power, I proceeded to
explore a range of relevant literature. As a result my thinking about power became
more complex and I have been able to make new sense of my experience. In this
process have other things also shifted? I will point to one theme which has now
emerged in my thinking. It springs from asking, what if we give closer attention to
the telic power of the led to change what the leader wants?
Arendt challenges the prima facie relationship between strong and weak, as did
Norbert Elias, introduced in section 2.7 in Project One. Elias invites us to consider
power issues as universally present ones of mutual dependency, even in apparently
very one-sided situations. This theme of alertness to possible inversions of prima
facie power relations can be expanded considerably. Bertrand Russell spoke of
‘power behind the scenes: the power of courtiers, intriguers, spies and wire-pullers’
(1986, p. 27). Dahl points out that the successful anticipation of wishes (lip-reading)
may reach an extreme point:
For in the limiting case of anticipated reactions, it appears, paradoxically,
that it is ... not the king who controls the courtier but the courtier who
controls the king. (Dahl, 1986, p. 52)
While I was pursuing a career as a civil servant, I chose to ‘want’ whatever within
the rule of law the democratically elected government wanted. By ignoring what I
wanted, I had better chances of increasing my power. When the Parliamentary
committee hearing was fixed on the auditor’s report, all the (many) officials in the
hierarchy between me and the official head of the Treasury – whose presence was
statutorily required - were away or otherwise engaged. The team of witnesses
examined by MPs was the official head of the Treasury, the government’s most
senior solicitor and myself, an unusually junior official to take on such a role.
Perhaps I read correctly that my superiors were content to be absent but their
intentions guessed at. The reward for success (both in lip-reading and in handling
any ‘difficulties’ in the files) would be a raised profile, a step towards promotion and
increased power.
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Changing what one wants in order to increase one’s power chances is not just a
phenomenon of courtiers of a particular type within the British Civil Service. An
ambitious commercial executive may well set aside personal preferences in favour of
better chances of promotion – for example giving a commitment to sell off a group’s
low-performing division, or conversely to stick with it come what may. There is a
potentially self-serving aspect of self-negation.
The theme that the apparently powerless may not be so gains further traction if we
revert to Project One’s exploration of leaders not as extra-systemic super-agents, but
as functionalising their leadership roles day to day in local situations of conflict and
unknowing. Douglas Griffin at Hertfordshire (whom I quoted in section 2.5 in
Project One), asks
Why is it that in the theories of leadership dealing with business
organizations there is the marked tendency to extol leaders as something
exemplary and apart? What I am arguing is that they are by no means
apart – they are who they are only in the evolving context of local
interaction ... . (Griffin, 2002, pp. 195-196).
Griffin suggests that by emphasising their apartness, leaders (and authors on
leadership in the dominant tradition) reduce conflict and challenges to their power
which leaders do not want:
In the work of the management and organization theorists [treated
earlier] there was a central focus on harmony and striving to be a part of
a functioning whole. ... Authors on leadership appeal directly to cult
ideals and their systems thinking has the effect of covering over
ideologies and splitting off tendencies to challenge power. (Ibid., pp.
196-197).
Might we posit the possibility at the same time of the inverse phenomenon, which
could be called alchemy. Let us focus on ourselves as the led. Not so powerless as
may appear, we may powerfully shape what our leaders propose as values, principles
and strategies. We actually want these things to be ours. At one level we want to be
in charge. But what if we simultaneously despise what comes from us – what comes
from our everyday, local interactions? Then a function of the leader becomes
alchemy: to take our own base metal, to make its source disappear and to re-present
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it to us as gold. If we had this kind of social shame, it would be logical for one of our
strong cultural values to be the effacement or mythification of origins. Robert Chia, a
thinker about management, has suggested this. It is a Western cult value that cultural
objects (including academic work) should make invisible how they came to be
created. On this point Chia quotes the art theorist Norman Bryson:
Western painting is predicated on the disavowal of deictic reference. ...
[Paintings in the Western style are] autochthonous, self-created
parthenogeneses, virgin births ... . (Chia, 1998, p. 360)
If our leaders in fact have the task of alchemy, we will wrap it in silence.
3.8 Intensifying reflexivity - Bourdieu and method
Any exercise in communication is also an exercise in power. In that sense this project
is an exercise in power. Its subject is an exploration of silences. What in this project,
and the reflections so far reached, remains a significant silence? To pose this
reflexive question is part of intensifying involvement and detachment within this
work.
The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has played a leading part in developing the concept
of reflexive sociology. I will present brief points of his firstly on language and
secondly on sociological method, and will then use these in the course of responding
to the question.
Bourdieu notes that to speak and to be heard in any field of discourse depends partly
upon whether the speaker has accumulated sufficient capital (whatever is considered
valuable and worthy of respect in that field) and partly upon her skill in censoring
largely unawares her speech to conform to the expectations of that field. Censoring –
Bourdieu’s term – highlights the silencing function which is at work. His approach is
close to that of Mead’s gesture-response:
... The conditions of reception [of speech] envisaged are part of the
conditions of production, and anticipation of the sanctions of the market
[field] helps to determine the production of the discourse. This
anticipation, which bears no resemblance to conscious calculation, is an
aspect of the linguistic habitus which, being the product of a prolonged
and primordial relation to the laws of a certain market, tends to function
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as a practical sense of the acceptability and the probable value of one’s
own linguistic productions and those of others on different markets.
(Bourdieu, 1991a, pp. 76-77)
Turning to method, firstly reflexivity is Bourdieu’s means of avoiding the pitfalls of
both pure objectivity and pure subjectivity as ideals for understanding human action.
For him, individuals must be considered objectively, and at the same time as subjects
with intentions and understandings of what they are doing which are not
meaningless.
Secondly, he rejects ‘methodologism’ or any split of questions of method from
questions of substance. As expressed by his co-author Loïc Wacquant:
The array of methods used must fit the problem at hand and must
constantly be reflected upon in actu, in the very movement whereby they
are deployed to resolve particular questions. ... One cannot dissociate the
construction of the object from the instruments of construction of the
object and their critique. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 30)
Thirdly, in being reflexive he prefers to eschew what is more inwardly individual
(one form of what I mean by the ‘inwardly individual’ would be the psychoanalytic).
Thus, in relation to myself and this research, he would want reflexive consideration
given to the facts24 that, for example, I am an affluent, Western educated, 50 year old
man of mixed race, and to the fact that by inter-penetrating processes of selection and
self-selection my position as a successful search professional will lead me to believe
that what is inwardly individual about people makes a substantial difference to their
impact as leaders. This disposition may encourage me in undertaking reflexive
research to include personal feelings. Bourdieu regards this interpretation of
reflexivity as narcissistic and beside the point. Thus, when asked by Wacquant:
Can we do a Bourdieuian sociology of Bourdieu? ... Why this
unwavering reticence to speak about the private person Pierre Bourdieu?
(Ibid., p. 202)
Bourdieu replies:
24 These ‘facts’ are not, of course, simple facts, but socially constructed – as for example explored by
Dalal on race (2002).
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My sociological discourse is separated from my personal experience by
my sociological practice ... I, the concrete individual Pierre Bourdieu,
[cannot] escape objectivation: I can be objectivised like anybody else
and, like anybody else, I have the taste and preferences, the likes and
dislikes, that correspond roughly to my position in social space. I am
socially classified and I know precisely what position I occupy in social
classifications. If you understand my work, you can very easily deduce a
great many things about me from knowledge of this position and of what
I write. I have given you all the tools necessary for that; as for the rest,
leave it to me ... . (Ibid., pp. 203-204)
Wacquant says:
Bourdieu’s concern for reflexivity ... fastens not upon the private person
of the sociologist in her idiosyncratic intimacy but on the concatenation
of acts and operations she effectuates as part of her work and on the
collective unconscious inscribed in them. Far from encouraging
narcissism and solipsism, epistemic reflexivity invites intellectuals to
recognise and to work to neutralize the specific determinisms to which
their inmost thoughts are subjected. (Ibid., p. 46)
What then of my reflections now? What silences do I notice now within this act of
power itself?
Firstly, I have been deeply struck by the unity of the challenge of this research
(method) with the challenge of interviewing a candidate for a job (my substantive
inquiry). Both in this research, and when someone is being interviewed, we are
seeking to explore a range of experience which to a very large extent is only
accessible by the individual recalling that experience, making assertions about it and
reliving it in narration. For me this is a new observation, and striking.
Secondly, this project has been silent about my feelings about the journey
undertaken. Those feelings include strong excitement and fear, particularly at the
uncontrolled sprawling width of the issues which have opened up (and about which
the School’s Research Degrees Board expressed caution when considering my
research proposal).
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Thirdly, this project is also silent in a profound way about gender. I take gender to be
a powerful shaper of experience and meaning25: especially so on a subject such as
power. At this point in my research it happens that I, all the members of my learning
set, and both of my research supervisors, are men, as are with only one exception
(Arendt) the authors whom I cite in this project. (The way in which learning sets
were formed was described in Project One.)
Finally, I experience forces of self-censorship as a newcomer attempting to speak
into the academic field. I perceive this field as likely to be suspicious of feelings.
Moreover it is in love with the detached written word in the sense powerfully
expressed by the sociologist Michel de Certeau, commenting more widely about
Western rationality:
... One can read above the portals of modernity such inscription as ‘Here,
to work is to write’ or ‘Here only what is written is understood’.
(de Certeau, 1984, p. 134)
But I cannot overcome reflexively this silencing, this social self-censorship if I
simply surrender to my perceptions of academic expectations. I vigorously contend
that contra Bourdieu, in order to be as real as may be, reflexive sociology cannot
limit itself to sanitised words from a fictitious impersonal occupant of my social class
and professional track. To be so limited is to resurrect the ghost of the detached
scientific observer, albeit clothed in some social habits and outlooks.
When I reflected on the exploration in this project of different concepts of power and
whether my ‘naming’ of different ‘parts’ of power was a flight from (or avoidance
of) something, I did sense a fear of a vast and possibly dangerous unknown. That
feeling happened through the coming to mind of a famous war poem26. A few days
25 Some thinkers on gender will be cited in Project Four (section 7.1) but here my intention is simply a
naïve statement of my understanding.
26 ‘Naming of Parts’, a World War II poem by Henry Reed. Its first verse is:
Today we have naming of parts. Yesterday
We had daily cleaning. And tomorrow morning,
We shall have what to do after firing. But today,
Today we have naming of parts. Japonica
Glistens like coral in all of the neighbouring gardens,
And today we have naming of parts.
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later I saw an image taken by the prize-winning Italian photographer Luciano
Bonacini which struck me as relevant to the points about gender and logophilia
which I have just made. I have presented the point in words, but that is not at all the
same thing as to utter, and to receive, an image within the field of academic practice.
To duck the point would not be to take reflexivity seriously.
3.9 Narrative 2: research as a responsive process of local interaction
Essential to our research method is sending our supervisor and other members of our
learning set successive versions of our projects. When I send the preceding version
of this project which, for practical purposes, ends with a slightly longer version of
section 3.8, I am a bit nervous. I am self-consciously doing something unusual; but
that appeals to me. Indeed, is that the worry – am I just clowning, being childish to
gain attention?
Subjectively, I know I am not. I realise that point even more strongly when (after
seeing a reference to it in the project of another learning set member) I read Foucault
on parrhesia – a state of mind noticed and commented on in classical Greece in
which a speaker:
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... less powerful than the one with whom he speaks ... (Foucault, 2001, p.
18)
- certainly I feel that way about my supervisor and the wider academic community -
incurs a risk or danger in order to:
... [say] everything he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but opens
his heart and mind completely to other people through his discourse. ... In
parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty. (Ibid., pp. 12 and 19)
That expresses very well my motive in speaking, with my duty being reflexivity as I
currently understand it.
There are several comments on my project, mainly from my supervisor. I will only
note a few. My work is moving, taking quite large steps, but may be becoming too
inaccessible to someone not already ‘in the conversation’. He points to Poe’s
maelström, to which I referred in Project One (section 2.10)27. He suggests that
involvement and detachment is an emergent theme within this project (previously I
had not seen it as such, and there was no reference to it in the title). He says that
poetry can be dangerous in doctoral dissertations; if it is to be included at all, then
perhaps in a footnote. He does not comment on the Bonacini photograph. Separately,
he wonders if at times I am mentally addressing a commercial rather than an
academic reader.
I don’t find the discussion difficult. I remove a second photograph (on power) from
the project which he found too ‘journalistic’. I am inexpert at addressing an academic
reader, but it is to such that the remaining photograph is addressed, for the reasons
expressed by de Certeau (an academic, so safe?).
Mainly I resonate with the suggestion of involvement and detachment as a
substantial theme. I start to notice other things. My reflexivity in section 3.8 was
27 A story of two men whose boat is caught in a whirlpool. Both are intensely involved, indeed
threatened with drowning, but one manages sufficient detachment to notice differences between the
ways large and small pieces of wood are drawn into the vortex, which enable him to save his life.
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intense and honest, indeed parrhesiastic, but – to use the word I used in section 3.4 –
atomic. I could be on a desert island, trying to critique my thoughts alone; or alone
with books such as Bourdieu’s. I become aware that although I was working hard to
be self-critical, even the criticisms were self-focussed. I start to realise that it is
possible to be intensively reflexive yet remain caught purely around the pole of my
subjectivity. Intensifying my subjectivity through reflexive steps is relevant to what I
am trying to do, but I am now aware that, on its own, it may not give me the
intensified detachment which I also want.
I’m not on a desert island, I’m in a learning set – and I’m in one because this
programme sees research itself as processes of local interaction.
My supervisor has said something which makes me worry that I won’t be able to do
in Project Three something to which I am powerfully attracted, yet I’m convinced
that what I want to do falls within the method of the programme (or ought to). There
is potential conflict, loss, fear. So I rush off to read the book in which my professors
have – through the work of researchers before me – expounded their understanding
of method (Stacey & Griffin, 2005).
Stacey and Griffin take identity, society and indeed thought to be emergent from
complex responsive processes of interaction between relatively small numbers of
human beings. Making an analogy with complex adaptive systems, by ‘complex’
they mean:
... a particular dynamic or movement in time that is paradoxically stable
and unstable, predictable and unpredictable, known and unknown, certain
and uncertain, all at the same time. (Ibid., p. 7)
From within the self-organizing local interactions of agents in complex processes
such as Mead’s gesture-response there emerge for periods of time widespread
patterns, without any overall program or design for those patterns themselves. Theirs
is a flat ontology in which there are not understood to be systems or structures as
separate orders of existence, though these terms can meaningfully refer to things
within the thinking of individuals. On this view, and following Mead (1934) the
thinking of individuals is the socially shaped patterning of bodily activity, of gestures
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and responses made by the agent to others and to herself, a capacity (self-
consciousness) which emerged through increasing complexity in evolution.
As Stacey and Griffin go on to say:
If one takes the view that knowledge emerges and evolves in a history of
social interaction, rather than being developed by an autonomous
individual, then one attaches central importance to research as a
participative, social process. Research on organizations is then done by
participating in a community of researchers who are together exploring
the meaning they are making of their experience. This inevitably involves
conflict as people explore their differences and, indeed, this conflict is
essential for the movement of thought. (Ibid, p. 10)
One of the book’s contributors, Bjørner Christensen, a consultant in Norway,
expresses the perspective graphically:
The activities of research and consultation are themselves complex
responsive processes of relating. They are, in principle, the same human
processes as when I buy a shirt in a shop, drive my car in the traffic,
negotiate with my bookkeeper, or have an argument with my teenage
daughter. (Ibid, p. 99)
I read the book. It has seven chapters, of which five (like Christensen’s) contain
‘live’ research with narratives of detailed, local interactions. I notice that none of
these happen to be interactions within learning sets or within the process of
supervision, which may be a matter of accident, editorial selection or that none such
have so far been produced in the programme in which I am participating. This is a
new point for me.
But, clearly, these ‘research’ interactions are not different in kind from the other
local interactions reflected upon by researchers in the programme. That they are key
to the movement of thought in research is exactly what I am experiencing.
Of course, it is not possible to know what would have happened if in section 3.8 I
had decided to be more cowardly than parrhesiastic. It felt subjectively important, a
matter of duty, to be true to my own reflections. That gesture elicited responses. A
more mundane gesture might have elicited more mundane responses. Those
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responses, and the patterns of anxiety, excitement (or boredom) and other feelings of
which they are a part, the shifts in power and potentialities for conflict, and the self-
conscious reflection in a group setting, are what has produced several substantial
movements of my thought in this project: the close linkage but also sharp difference
between this reflexivity and Bourdieu’s is sharply drawn.
3.10 Power and silence
For reference I summarise below the connections between power and silence noticed
so far in this inquiry. In all these cases, the nature of the connection means that
breaking the silence is difficult, threatening or logically impossible – these strands of
connection are difficult to ‘cut’. Nor is the list exhaustive. Power and silence are
bound together in a thick web.
This puts into a context why in my helping to choose over 1,000 individuals for roles
concerned with power, its many aspects were so undiscussed. It also suggests how
problematic it might be to apply at senior levels some parts of recruitment ‘good
practice’. Professionally recognised practice for recruitment into front-line, middle-
management or technical roles (in which the exercise of power is less central)
typically relies on making explicit from the beginning the important features of the
role and the skills thought to be of high priority for its successful performance. But
what if what is most at stake cannot be made explicit?
In section 2.7 in Project One I pointed to three patterns of silence.
(a) Insidious power. Lukes suggested that ‘the most effective and insidious use
of power’ may be manifested by the absence rather than the presence of
conflict or overt action (Lukes, 1974, p. 23).
(b) Shame. Argyris pointed to deeply ingrained defensive habits within
organisations which aim to avoid shame or embarrassment. To succeed,
these make both the potentially embarrassing matter and the defence of
covering it up ‘undiscussable’ (Argyris, 1990, pp. xi-xii). The discussion
in section 3.7 about alchemy and wishing to make obscure to ourselves
how things come to be is also relevant28.
28 One could add here the observation made by Galbraith: ‘... that power is thus wanted for its own
sake cannot, as a matter of basic decency, be too flagrantly conceded.’ (1986, pp. 216-217)
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(c) Pretended objectivity. I made connections in Project One to our tendency in
explaining actions to produce post-rationalized formal discourses which
silence that which was intuitive, exploratory or contingent (Bourdieu,
2004, pp. 22-25). I have expanded this in section 3.8 into Bourdieu’s
thinking in relation to the self-censorship which he sees as an intrinsic
part of speaking and being heard within any particular field.
This project has added some further connections between power and silence.
(d) Lip-reading. This was explored in Narrative 1. If one dimension of power is
the anticipation of unexpressed wishes, by definition those wishes are not
(in the sequence of events under direct examination) expressed.
(e) Interpreting silence. I noted on page 50 that for Foucault, relations of power
are inseparable from the shaping of discourses about what is true, and
patterns of silence are pivotal in considering this. The step in the analysis
of power which Lukes characterises as the move from one dimension to
two, ie noticing for analysis non-decisions as well as decisions (discussed
on page 47), is a kindred one.
(f) Inversion. I dealt with this theme in section 3.7, referring to Arendt and Elias
and exploring leadership as a situation in which there may be relations of
power concealed (or made silent) by apparent relations of power in the
opposite direction.
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Chapter Four: Project Three - Intuition and Interviewing: A first
inquiry into practical knowing
4.1 Introduction
My central professional activity for almost twenty years has been interviewing
people about their working lives and advising clients on their own interview
processes. By interviewing I mean conversations led by one or more interviewers,
with one interviewee, which explore the latter’s experiences or personal qualities.
In the UK interviewing dominates senior selection processes. In a review for the UK
government in 2005 on ‘the most reliable, validated techniques for recruiting and
selecting senior staff in the private, public and voluntary sectors’ Clive Fletcher, a
psychologist and leading UK scholar of selection, noted that ‘ ... 85% of external
[non-Civil Service] organisations still use just interviews and references for top
posts.’ (Fletcher, 2005, pp. 5, 8)
I am launching a specialist career advice business and product. At the centre of my
product is a three hour interview. The emergent process of choosing this direction for
myself – and creating a product which can move me in that direction – represents an
important transition in my professional life. My livelihood, professional reputation
and job satisfaction for the next ten years are at stake.
As I describe my interviewing practice in this embryonic business, what stands out is
its intuitive genesis. My central question in this project will be, when we focus on
intuition and on interviewing, with what kinds of knowing are we concerned?
4.2 Changing career direction
4.2.1 A three hour interview
Keith, previously a research physicist in industry, is now a professor of strategy at a
major UK business school. Because he is considering a further significant career
change he has become a client of mine. In two days we will have a three hour
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interview. I download the preparatory work which Keith has done on the internet. It
runs to 12 pages and (so the software tells me) took him 3.5 hours. In it I have
Keith’s thoughts about his career situation and goals for the next 5 years, his
interests, his skills, his values and his preferred styles of operating; his hobbies, his
heroes and in general terms his financial constraints.
My first reading electrifies me. Keith, now in his mid-40s, is considering whether to
take up farming. If my new business about career advice for people wanting to
explore lateral options is about anything, it is about this. My own closest contact with
farming was one search several years ago for the head of an agricultural college.
A year ago, just before my fiftieth birthday, I left my search firm. I had a financial
window of opportunity to take a new direction. Gradually, this crystallised as a
specialisation within career advice. My choice of general field was unsurprising: at
an early stage in my search career I had seized responsibility at director level for
people development, and subsequently declined to give it up. Through reflection on
my own motivations, and consideration of which features of my search experience
were objectively unusual, this took further shape as a one man business focussed on a
niche not previously defined: individuals already successful in one (or more)
career(s) wishing to explore seriously making lateral or creative moves.
One day during this exploratory period, without any prior experimentation, several
features of my product came together suddenly in my mind. Thus, although I would
discuss with clients their needs for on-going coaching or support, I would not
(according to my intuition) offer coaching myself. Because I would need to market
predominantly to individuals, not corporations, I would keep the price as low as
possible by minimising follow-up paperwork. Then, the centrepiece of my product
would be an intense three hour conversation. And finally (according to this intuition),
although it would reduce my field of clients and cost me time in screening, I needed
to weed out of the process individuals who were only curious, rather than hungry, to
explore lateral possibilities.
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I had never before done a three hour interview: a handful out of several thousand
interviews had approached two hours. It was one of these conversations which I was
about to have with Keith.
Proper preparation on Keith’s internet material distilled itself into a page and a half
of further questions and three or four ‘trial balloon’ thoughts about possible future
career paths. ‘Proper’? Keith was my fourth trial client in an otherwise untested
process: how did I know in what ‘proper preparation’ should consist? Yet, intuitively
I thought I did: I absorbed his material as deeply as possible so as to identify more
questions, and fought my craving to go into meetings with clients already knowing
answers.
This ‘proper’ preparation scared me. I knew that by the last half-hour of the three
hours, ‘something’ (whether called answers or not) needed to emerge between us, or
I would look a fool and a charlatan.
Opening the conversation with Keith, I suggested that our discussion would have
broadly three movements: questions drawing me more deeply into what he had
written, or inquiring after possible omissions or contradictions; jointly brainstorming
possible futures, in which we put ourselves imaginatively into each future in turn and
reflected together on what it might be like to live out; and finally, a drawing out and
choosing of priorities and possible next steps.
The first phase continued for more than an hour. I started with a rain of factual
inquiries about his family, his existing house and his animals. I asked him to tell me
much more specifically what it would mean to ‘develop more with [his] boys and
wife as they develop’ and ‘to have a house in [a certain part of the country] which
feels like home’. From his internet material the central importance to Keith of these
goals (and of involvement with animals) was clear: I felt a strong need to visualise all
this more concretely.
The next questions sniffed around every possible small clue, which might or might
not turn out to be material. For this plenty of time is essential, otherwise things are
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overlooked; three hours turns out to provide something like an ample urgency. I pick
up on a brief written reference to music and poetry: it turns out that Keith has
privately written poetry since he was sixteen and has never stopped. Asking about a
particular research project unexpectedly leads Keith to provide strong evidence of
selling skills, which elsewhere he has vigorously denied having.
Roving by continuous reflection and intuition between his internet material, his cv as
interpreted by my search experience and the now rapidly accumulating body of oral
evidence, new questions come to my mind thick and fast. Some test for different
kinds of pattern. Is there a pattern of creeping boredom which overtakes both of his
first two careers, in physics and then in business research, and which might overtake
even farming?
Other questions seek to decompose farming into its interacting elements. We
separate out different aspects – land/the outdoors, animals, a greater tactile/physical
aspect in his work. Each of these turns out to be important to Keith in different ways.
What about the financial side? What would having a farm would mean for his wife
and children, and what have they said about that?
To keep the grilling energising for him it matters that I do not lose my thread, while
constantly adjusting my approach to his flow. To keep his confidence I need to be
visibly on top of the large amount of emotionally nuanced information which pours
out. To keep his trust I need to embody a deep sense of interest in his life and
happiness. In less intense and complex form this interviewing stance evolved through
my practice in executive search; now I can deploy these skills solely in Keith’s
interest, rather than that of organisations which might hire him.
As I go, I am watching the time and adding to my list of possible options which we
will seek to bring to imaginative life in brainstorming. As we explore those
possibilities (even apparently ludicrous ones), I am watching for different patterns in
his whole expression in the way he picks them up and discards them or not. I draw
some of those patterns to his attention.
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More than two hours in, I judge that we should make the final conversational turn
towards priorities, choices and practicalities. There is a moment of truth for me here:
I own up that try as I might, I cannot come up with a full-blown farming option
which is even viable-in-fantasy. We have both tried, and so far I cannot see it. Have I
failed?
I act out of a belief that imagined, creative, warm possibilities and cold realities,
commitments and limited time and resources are (properly handled) not annihilating
opposites, but complements. But that feels like faith, not intuitive conviction.
I experience the conversation as ending on a mutual high. Keith says, ‘This is a really
important conversation. It’s something to have someone like you spend this amount
of time thinking about my life.’ The meaning of the conversation for Keith will arise,
and arise again and change, as weeks go by and further conversations take place with
himself and others. Within a couple of days I take two or three hours to compose a
five page follow-up letter drawing out some of the themes and points which strike
me as particularly significant. One of my product intuitions was wrong: people
would rather have the letter and pay for it.
In a subsequent conversation with Keith I reflect on the emergence by intuition of
these three hour conversations. I say, ‘It’s like I’m teaching myself to do something
which I’ve never done before. What on earth can that mean?’
Keith is perplexed and alert. ‘That’s a strange way to put it. Why don’t you just say
you discipline yourself to do certain things?’
I try that formula on for size. ‘Because that’s not quite it,’ I conclude. ‘I can
discipline myself to do something which I think is right without having the subjective
feeling of knowing that it is right. But ‘teaching’ means that part of me feels it knows
from experience that it is right. Yet I have never done it before.’
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4.2.2 The theme of intuition
Central to this narrative is intuition. According to the narrative, intuition suggests
itself as a feeling linked to a way of knowing: a feeling of capacity of action into the
unknown (I know what to do) which may be mistaken but is not racked by doubt, and
a way of knowing distinct from knowing by rational calculation.
In the narrative intuition appears in two forms: micro-patternings in the course of
conversations and a large, singular leap - the creation as if ex nihilo of the three hour
interviews. The common thread seems to be a subjective ‘feeling of knowing’: but
the two kinds of intuition might prove to be very different things.
Creation ex nihilo is implausible. My business may fail, and the idea of three hour
conversations may prove to be flawed: but however flawed, there was skilled
creation of a highly skilled action. I did not draw ‘three hours’ out of a hat, but out of
experience.
4.2.3 The theme of interviewing
Out of what experience? In particular the experience of interviewing. This point
needs to be substantiated. Although only a handful of interviews out of more than
7,500 conducted by me had even approached two hours, might not the intuition’s
genesis lie in my experience of other kinds of meetings?
As chair of a national charity, for approaching two years I have chaired board
meetings which normally last 3.5 hours and involve about 15 people. And as a search
professional, on many occasions I led colleagues in presenting to client committees
the results of sifting or interviewing work which required covering thirty or more
candidates. Many of these meetings took 3 or 4 hours. But all are very distant from
what I was doing with Keith. I prepared in intense detail and the conversations were
planned in advance in smaller segments, indicated by an agenda or list of names:
spontaneous segments of conversation might only last 5 or 10 minutes (or 40 minutes
for an extended board discussion). In my professional life continuous threads of
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discussion of an hour or more centred around one person’s life occurred in
interviews.
We (including those of us whose specialism it is) habitually think of interviewing as
a confined subject concerned with a limited palette of questioning techniques.
‘Generally prefer open rather than closed questions’ is a commonplace example. The
title of this project implies that I am coming to think of interviewing more broadly in
the context of different ways of knowing; but at this stage I am meaning the word
quite conventionally.
4.3 Thinking about intuition – interactionist perspectives
I begin this inquiry with an account of the stance towards intuition embodied in my
interviewing practice over twenty years, including in professional norms which I
partly assimilated and partly rejected (section 4.3.1). Then I begin taking up current
literature on intuition and management (section 4.3.2). Intuition as described in this
literature connects well with both the smaller jumps and the large leap which I have
narrated, but the gains in understanding made remain limited.
More light is shed if we stop positing intuition as an affective or cognitive
phenomenon isolated from other ways of knowing. I compare the model of expertise
which is dominant in recruitment – competencies (originally developed by Boyatzis)
– with the understanding offered by Dreyfus (sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). This changes
my understanding of my narrative and of intuition significantly. I then make a further
exploration of my narrative themes with the insights offered by Weick’s treatment of
improvisation (section 4.3.5), which I compare with Dreyfus and critique. By now a
movement of thought is under way which will go beyond the boundaries of this
project.
4.3.1 Intuition within recruitment
I first worked full-time as an interviewer for one year around 1988, on secondment
from H M Treasury to the Civil Service’s assessment centre for fast-stream
recruitment (CSSB). I soaked up as an enthusiastic novice a professional ethos of
recruitment.
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That ethos valued scientific detachment. CSSB perhaps exceeded any other
assessment centre in the UK in terms of length of scientifically examined track
record. Candidates were assessed in groups of four or five over two days by teams of
three, comprising a ‘Chairman’ (a retired senior civil servant), a ‘Psychologist’ and
an ‘Observer’ (a younger civil servant such as myself). Each of us had structured 40
minute interviews with each candidate. The scientific stance was shown in the
emphasis (given to assessors and candidates alike) that the assessment required was
against an objective standard which all the candidates in one group, or none of them,
might reach; quite unlike the competitive context of interviewing later in my career.
Even the quaint terminology ‘Observer’ was inaccurate but telling.
Assessors were trained that intuition was not useful: it was dangerous. Many studies
had shown grotesque results from letting unstructured, subjective intuition loose in
personnel decisions. For example, Richard Boyatzis whose work on competencies I
shall come to in section 4.3.3 noted that:
… the [Broadway Manufacturing Company] designed a study in which
people who had entered the company as supervisory managers 20 years
earlier would be examined … They found that the people who were
promoted the most within the company were different than their less
effective counterparts on only one dimension: they were taller. (Boyatzis,
1982, p. 4)
There is much else in this genre, which moves quickly into wider questions such as
racism and sexism. To treat this literature fully would be an inquiry (or several) of its
own. Sufficient here to note firstly, that these effects are widespread and well-
documented29 and, secondly, that training in such matters had a profound impact on
myself. Many professional experiences later confirmed that the training was on the
mark.
29 For example, studies among managers in utility companies have suggested that physical
attractiveness is correlated with interview ratings as well as with assessed job performance
(Motowidlo & Burnett, 1995) (Burnett & Motowidlo, 1998) (DeGroot & Motowidlo, 1999). Women
facing male interviewers should wear dark jackets (and preferably blue rather than red), while female
interviewers are relatively uninfluenced by colour (Damhorst & Reed, 1986) (Scherbaum & Shepherd,
1987). Or, it is estimated that the time taken by untrained interviewers to reach an intuitive decision
for which they may use the rest of the interview to provide corroboration has been estimated at 9
minutes (Tucker & Rowe, 1977) or 4 minutes (Springbett, 1958).
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The one-on-one interviews which I moved on to do as a search professional were
typically between 1 hour and 1 hour 15 minutes. Normally I was armed with a cv
(possibly out of date). This stage would typically involve my firm in having attracted
the interest of 12-15 candidates, with 3-5 being recommended after interview by us
to meet the client with a view to a single person being appointed. Few other selection
tools available to me: perhaps a formal or informal telephone reference, or (if the
candidate had been interviewed by us for a job previously) the assessment prepared
by us against that (differing) specification. If we failed to fill the appointment to the
client’s satisfaction we would need to do the whole project again for no additional
fee.
This commercial work was much more exposed than sitting as part of a team,
working in a government institution shielded from such realities as candidate supply
and demand. Financially, in a good year my total remuneration could double that in a
bad year. It was scary to get to the final three out of twelve one-on-one interviews for
a critical role, having yet to meet anyone both well-qualified for the role and
persuadable to take it.
Most search professionals do form intuitive judgements which they have difficulty
explaining. This is criticised and runs legal risks. For example an exposition of good
current recruitment practice by a psychologist and an HR consultant (Wood & Payne,
1998) observes that:
If [a biographical interview is not driven by clear criteria], this can
quickly become an unstructured interview. … This is the kind of
interview often favoured by headhunters who reckon they know how to
find ‘the right kind of chap’ … . (Ibid., p. 97)
As those authors also observe:
Many studies have shown the predictive validity of unstructured
interviews to be around zero. (Ibid., p. 96)
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The current ‘best practice’ model, not only for recruitment but for the systematic
management of human resources in organisations, is to analyse both the positions to
be filled and the capacities offered by candidates in terms of competencies. Because
of the dominance of this model in contemporary human resource practice, I provide a
close examination of it in section 4.3.3. Here I simply note, what kind of interview is
partnered with competencies as ‘best practice’?
Craig Russell (1990) describes how a Fortune 50 company selected internal
candidates for promotion to its top general management tier – ie a situation without
any of the issues of persuasion or selling faced in executive search. The candidates’
average age was 47.5, with 22 years’ previous service with the company. They
underwent recorded interviews which lasted between 4 and 8.5 hours (average 4.5)
concentrating on their main challenges, achievements and learnings in their previous
work history and in their current role. Transcripts were prepared and assessments
made independently by 5 raters against each of 9 specially-identified top
management competencies. This was combined with assessments by direct superiors
and a range of other colleagues. At the time of writing up this work, Russell noted
that insufficient time had elapsed to make a judgement about its success.
Such techniques offer remarkable granularity of data of particular kinds at various
costs. One cost is the time required which, if good candidates are hard to attract, can
be sufficient to kill off busy individuals’ potential interest in the role. But even in
situations (such as Russell’s) in which credible candidates are willing, or when as is
common the full-blown concept of competencies is drastically simplified (Wood &
Payne, 1998, pp. 21, 26, 27), competency-based interviews set out to ignore
biographical narratives in favour of ones of episodic behaviour. This a serious
lacuna: to treat a person as a collection of skills is not only to remain detached from
her as a person, but to remain in the dark as to which skills she will be motivated to
use in the role for which she is being considered.
Intuition and structure need not be antithetical, but in examples such as the one
given, they are. Such interview processes are attempts to create objective knowledge
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about a person based on the detachment and implicit interchangeability of observers.
It has no place for intuition.
What part did intuition play in my own practice? By conventional standards my 60-
75 minute conversations were semi-structured. I opened by explaining the three
stages of the interview. These were: what steps would follow if the client and the
candidate both so desired (usually four or five minutes); then a request to the
candidate to identify three or four questions about the vacant role of importance to
her, to which I would respond so far as I was able (this might take between ten and
thirty minutes); followed by an edited biographical interview.
In this latter stage I aimed for a relaxed narrative flow from the candidate (with
myself as attentive listener and note-taker) while making various interventions to
weave a cloth incorporating several strands: the changing pattern of the candidate’s
career motivation, noting promotions or their absence and stated reasons for changes
of employer; greater specificity about responsibilities and claimed achievements in
previous jobs; and brief accounts of the relevant career achievements of which the
candidate was most proud.
Intuition played a growing part as skills were developed by intensive repetition. I
have 32 pages of stream-of-consciousness notes which I dictated for training
purposes in 2000. On the first page I addressed novice interviewers in my firm thus:
... the best way to learn how to interview in a company like this is to sit
in on a range of people interviewing and to see what they do and to push
them on what they’re doing and why they’re doing it .... anyone who
watches some of the most experienced people in the firm interview, will
watch a huge amount of intuitive activity going on in the interview. This
can be highly misleading. Although everyone who is selected to work as
a consultant needs a certain level of intuitive capability, actually what
you’re observing as intuition is all their accumulated wisdom and factual
knowledge about everything. By doing this stuff for 5 years or 10 years
and getting to the point where you know an awful lot about an awful lot
of organisations then interviewing magic starts to happen. There is no
short-cut to that, but the start is that stock of knowledge built up over
time. (Board, 2000, p. 1)
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However I was also scathing about any suggestion that ‘you know in the first two
minutes of the interview that someone’s any good or not’ (ibid., p. 4). So in relation
to intuition two strongly contrary features emerged from the collision of ‘good
practice’ models and training with my own increasing experience: agreement with
those models in challenging strongly intuition as ‘first impressions’, but a strong
assertion in the face of those models that intuition somehow bound up with 5 or 10
years of repeated, skilled performance was at the heart of my role.
The narrative shows that in moving on from practice as a search professional, the
work which I have currently chosen intensifies both of these contrary aspects.
Moving yet further away from first impressions, I offer a product in which my client
and I will spend between us seven or eight hours enhancing our understandings about
what makes my client ‘tick’ before we have our principal meeting; while on the
foundation of such developed preparations, the three hour interview itself both
enables and forces an intense level of intuition in the way we work together.
However this discussion of how I encountered intuition within recruitment does not
shed any light on the ex nihilo leap to the idea of the three hour interview itself.
4.3.2 Current thinking on intuition
Intuition is increasingly noted and studied as a feature of contemporary studies of
organisational life. Eugene Sadler-Smith (2008) notes that in a 1999 study of senior
managers in US businesses, 59% stated that they used intuition often or very often in
making decisions; 89% stated that they did so at least sometimes. Quoting a global
study of more than 1,000 managers (Parikh, Neubauer, & Lank, 1994), Sadler-Smith
observed that:
... The three most popular accounts [of intuition] were: a perception of
decision without recourse to logical or rational methods; an inexplicable
comprehension that arrives as a feeling ‘from within’; and an integration
of accumulated knowledge and previous expertise. (Sadler-Smith, 2008,
p. 499)
For him:
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Intuitions are rapid, affectively charged judgments arrived at without
conscious awareness of the reasoning processes involved. ... Intuitive
judgments based on nonconscious pattern recognition ... and somatic
(bodily) state activation/awareness (commonly known as ‘gut feeling’ ...)
are acknowledged as significant in human decision-making processes.
(Ibid., p. 494)
In their wide-ranging study of the role of intuition in managerial decision-making,
Erik Dane and Michael Pratt (2007) examine 17 definitions of intuition from Jung
onwards. They conclude:
... We conceptualize intuition both by its process (which we refer to as
intuiting), as well as its outcome (which we term intuitive judgments) ....
our review of the various literature on intuition has tended to converge on
four characteristics that make up the core of the construct: intuition is a
(1) non-conscious process (2) involving holistic associations (3) that are
produced rapidly, which (4) result in affectively charged judgments.
(Ibid., p. 36)
The intuition variously described by these and other authors is recognisable to me as,
or as closely connected to, the experience into which I am inquiring. Among such
authors there is a strong consensus that intuition involves feelings; but is it a
knowledgeful process? Dane and Pratt (ibid., pp. 40-41) note that while one
substantial body of research suggests that intuitive judgements are inferior to rational
decision-making – and this is the view taken and evidenced in the recruitment
literature – there is an important distinction between expert and non-expert intuition.
Intuitive thinking of the latter kind is seen to involve heuristic processes, cognitive
approximations and short-cuts, applied in a generic way even in fields about which
the subject is ignorant; while the intuition of experts rests on different, highly
domain-specific, ‘expert schemas’:
While the heuristic-based view of intuition has dominated research on
intuition and problem solving, a growing body of research suggests that
‘experts’ can make highly accurate intuitive decisions. ... We argue that
the main differences between these bodies of research lies in the nature
of the schemas of experts, which are (1) highly complex and (2) domain
relevant. ... [A 1973] study revealed that chess masters are able to
recognize at least 50,000 different configurations of chess pieces on sight
... . (Ibid., p. 42)
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This distinction between intuition as expertise (good) and intuition as amateur
heuristics (dangerous) explains well the strong distinction within my practice to
which I pointed at the end of section 4.3.1. Why had this distinction not already been
taken up in recruitment interviewing, an activity whose outcomes are acknowledged
to matter to individuals, organisations and wider society, and afflicted by the widely
known problems in first-impressions interviewing? The following can only be
suggestions.
Firstly, the mantle of expertise in selection interviewing has been claimed by
psychologists using predominantly behaviouristic tools. The scientific nature of these
tools seems to have had an intellectually hegemonistic effect. I am not aware either
from practice or from searching specialist selection literature of a vibrant ecology of
contesting intellectual or practice-based perspectives, such as exists around the
activity of leadership. The activity of interviewing feels like an island only connected
at occasional low tides to the organisational mainland. The point that such isolation
could have non-trivial consequences was experienced and articulated by Russell as
part of his preparations for the top-level selection exercise described on page 77:
Hunter and Hunter’s (1984) comprehensive review of selection tools
failed to cite any of the literature in Bass’ (1981) comprehensive review
of the leadership literature. Theorists and practitioners become even more
discouraged on finding that none of the scholarly literatures provide tools
for the selection of top level corporate leaders, despite considerable
current attention to ‘successful planning’ in the personnel selection
literature and ‘transformational’ skills in the leadership literature.
(Russell, 1990, p. 73)
Secondly, candidate interviewing is not a high status activity within either of the
relevant professional sub-fields in human resources – neither in client HR
departments (where work which can be described as strategic or systemic is prized)
nor in search firms (where sales and client handling are prized). Analysing the top-
level corporate search market in the US, the management sociologist Rakesh
Khurana found search to be a low-status activity with a theatrical, legitimising
function for clients who themselves evaluated ‘prospective CEOs based not on their
individual abilities and achievements but according to a set of essentially extraneous
criteria employed in a process of ‘social matching’.’ (Khurana, 2002, p. 118)
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Thirdly, within large, blue-chip organisations the past three decades in HR
management have seen the rise of the competency framework for understanding
people and their skills. The framework itself and its behaviourist implications I shall
examine in the next section; here we may notice the hegemonic effect of any system
which many corporations have sought to embed not only in their cultures but in hard-
wired integrated human resource systems (which control recruitment through to
payroll, training, appraisal, promotion and retirement). Wood & Payne put it like
this:
Competencies, then, offer a way of binding together and integrating the
elements of a progressive human resources strategy. If competencies are
defined, as they should be, with reference to the needs of the business,
then a competency-based appraisal system can help to reinforce
particular approaches to work (for example, continuous improvement or
customer focus). Delivered in this way, competencies can be a powerful
tool when trying to change the culture of an organization. The overall
effect is to oblige everyone in the organization to focus on their
performance in specific, common areas, to develop their skills
accordingly and ultimately to improve the performance of the
organization. (1998, p. 22)
Hollenbeck notes:
Behavioral competency models – a benchmarking study by the American
Productivity and Quality Council in 2004 found that every one of their
best practice organizations had developed a behavioural competency
model, designed to guide their selection and development efforts. It is
difficult to find any organization today that doesn’t have its competency
model. (2009, p. 132)
Finally, the same three decades have been significant in western societies in terms of
raised profile and increased legislation and political action concerned with the
alarming impacts of heuristics-based intuition on gender, race or other
discrimination. These impacts combined with the form taken by measures mandated
by law to redress them (for example standardised interviews in which identical
questions, and no other questions or conversation, take place between the
interviewers and each interviewee) have intensified the drive towards rules-based,
non-subjective and non-intuitive practice.  Both the march of law and litigation and
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the concealed conflict so engendered ( indicated by the use of the term ‘political
correctness’) has strongly opposed the possibility of noticing expert intuition as a
professional resource in interviewing.
What of my intuitive leap to the 3 hour structure? As already noted, this seems a leap
beyond all past experience, not the rapid matching of a pattern within it. So is it part
of the same intuitive phenomenon?
A relevant distinction is recognised by Mary Crossan and her colleagues at the
Richard Ivey School of Business:
Whereas expert intuition provides insight into the important process of
pattern recognition, entrepreneurial intuition has more to do with
innovation and change. No two situations are the same, and patterns,
while similar, are never identical. The ability to make novel connections
and to discern possibilities is also key to intuiting. ... Whereas expert
intuition may be past pattern oriented, entrepreneurial innovation is
future possibility oriented. ... Entrepreneurial intuiting generates new
insights. (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999, p. 526)
Crossan et al go on to note some observations by Koestler on the gestation of new
insights from the natural sciences, and some examples of mixed success for intuitive
entrepreneurs in business. But while these authors note entrepreneurial intuition, they
do not have much to offer in explaining it, or justifying why it is sensible to use the
word ‘intuition’ to embrace both things.
The leap in my narrative to creating the three hour interview therefore remains
unclear. However we have made some progress on exploring intuition as a micro-
activity. We are not discussing free-floating first impressions, but a domain-
dependent way of knowing closely linked to the development of skill, which (in
words quoted above from Sadler-Smith) involves rapid, affectively charged
judgments arrived at without conscious awareness of the reasoning processes
involved. We should therefore look more closely at what constitutes skill and its
progressive development. I present and critique first the framework for thinking
about skill which I have already characterised as currently dominant in the human
resource practice of large organisations: competencies.
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4.3.3 The competency model of practical knowledge (Boyatzis)
Richard Boyatzis based ‘The Competent Manager: A Model for Effective
Performance’ (1982) on studies by McBer and Company involving over 2,000
managers working in 8 Fortune 500 companies in different sectors together with 4
federal US agencies. Stung by the appalling results of cumulative ad hoc selection
over time, Boyatzis and his colleagues devised an exhaustive procedure for
identifying salient differences between more effective and less effective managers.
Boyatzis begins with candidate criteria initially generated and refined in discussion
with managers themselves – particularly discussions focussed on striking events
(critical incidents) perceived as fundamental to organisational success. These are
tested for behavioural measurability and correlations with assessments of effective
and ineffective individual performance. From iterations of this work emerge
‘competences’, which in Boyatzis’ formulation have dimensions of motivation, self-
image and social-role (interaction with others) as well as demonstrated behaviour.
Against these competencies, candidates for appointment can be measured by
detailed, structured, behavioural interviews of which Russell’s example on page 77 is
illustrative.
For the definition of a competency, following Klemp Boyatzis states:
A job competency is an ‘underlying characteristic of a person which
results in effective and/or superior performance in a job’. A job
competency is an underlying characteristic of a person in that it may be
a motive, trait, skill, aspect of one’s self-image or social role, or a body
of knowledge which he or she uses. The existence and possession of
these characteristics may or may not be known to the person. (Ibid, pp.
20-21)
Based on combining different McBer and Company studies (all of them large
organisations in the United States), Boyatzis propounds 21 competencies which
correlate with ‘effective general management’, which he takes to be common to and
abstractable from the corporates studied. However ideally, as in Russell’s example,
competencies should be tailored to effectiveness and ineffectiveness within a single
organisation’s unique context (though to carry this through rigorously is an
expensive task).
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The broadest objection to competencies is that having invented these constructs from
aggregated human behaviour, its proponents then re-invent people as what they are
not, collections of competencies. Peter Vaill has made an extended critique of the
competency movement. His central concern is that competencies are reifications or
abstractions:
... of a very tricky sort for they involve splitting action from
consciousness. Managing of any sort, let alone highly effective
managing, is a very personal intertwining of consciousness and action ....
the [competency movement’s] idea of what is real is an abstraction twice-
removed for in its creation of a competency it has aggregated the visible
action-capabilities of many actors, smoothing out the differences of
energy-level, personal style and cultural attunement which individual
actors manifest. (Vaill, 1989, pp. 45-46)
The Boyatzis model becomes more difficult to implement at the most senior levels of
organisations. The populations of post-holders become too small to generate
reliability, and judging what behaviour is effective versus ineffective necessarily
becomes contested and political. Also, an organisation blindly wedded to
expensively researched competences may struggle to cope if its future is unlike its
researched past. None of these points need impede a self-confident chief executive
from driving  her organisation through competencies which take for granted her own
perspective. But even then the model has weaknesses. I focus on three which are
linked – motivation, sociality and specialist knowledge.
Even when competencies are fully implemented with the motivational dimension
included, which in my experience is uncommon – Wood & Payne describe the
‘progressive simplification and muddying’ of competencies as ‘a worrying trend’
(1998, p. 21) - the concept of motivation is behavioural. For example:
When people with a high achievement motive encounter a situation in
which their performance can be measured and a goal can be stated, their
achievement motive is aroused. Once aroused, the motivated thought
directs and selects their behaviour. (Boyatzis, 1982, p. 28)
Many organisations would be concerned to appoint leaders whose significant
behaviours would be aroused so unreflexively. If we were the creatures which
competencies posit, it would be nonsensical for Keith to experience as a valuable
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self-clarification hours spent discussing whether he should now make farming part of
his life: the smell of manure on Wellington boots would tell all that he (or anyone)
could know. But for Charles Taylor and some other philosophers, a central fact of
being human is that we have the second-order dilemma of whether we want to want
to farm. (Taylor, 1989)
Boyatzis’ concept of action is also not social. In a curious and unexplained move he
notes local interaction as important but arbitrarily breaks with it to postulate social
roles as enduring attributes of persons:
In his framework, Bales has described the roles that a person may take in
a particular group. The role is determined by the interactions of the
person with others in the group. The social role level of the competencies
is a distinction based on the contention that individuals will demonstrate
a degree of consistency in the roles that they will take in various groups
at work and in their lives. (Ibid., pp. 30-31, emphasis added)
Finally, Boyatzis treats specialised knowledge as discrete data ‘downloadable’ into
any effectively thinking and reasoning general manager:
Specialized knowledge is defined as a usable body of facts and concepts.
Literally, knowledge refers to the retention of information, whether that
information is technical or a method of communication (eg a language).
The ability to utilize knowledge effectively is the result of other
competencies that involve ways of thinking or reasoning. (Ibid., p. 26)
In effect, competencies leach all the subtle, intuitive skill out of concrete
(‘specialised’) interactions and replant it in abstract general constructs. Contrast, for
example, the rendering above of ‘specialised knowledge’ as ‘a usable body of facts
and concepts’ with the intuitive skill-content implied by the following self-
description statements, which align with different generalised competencies: ‘I know
what I’m doing and will do it well’, ‘I can verbally communicate well’, ‘I can make
groups work effectively’ and ‘I can keep an appropriate emotional distance’ (ibid.,
pp. 118, 118, 138 and 180). This is the opposite of linking effective intuition with
domain-specific expertise. In the next section we try a different tack.
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4.3.4 The Dreyfus model of expertise
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, a philosopher and a computer scientist, propose that
expertise can only be acquired by progressively more involved encounters with
numerous practical situations in which something is at stake (Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1986). In their view, most commonly individuals progress sequentially through the
stages set out in the table on page 89, though both leaps and regression are possible.
Their proposal comes from their study of skill acquisition by airplane pilots, chess
players, automobile drivers and adult learners of a second language; in a subsequent
study by Benner it was found to match well the acquisition of nursing skill. (Ibid., p.
20) (Benner, 2001)
In marked contrast to Boyatzis, Dreyfus & Dreyfus emphasise that expertise is not
abstractable and generalised, but intrinsically context-dependent, dependent on
extensive situational knowledge not reducible to rules specifiable in advance.
Moreover the way in which that situational knowledge is tapped does not resemble
linear inspection of a library of cases – it is not ‘information processing’ but closer to
‘holistic similarity recognition’ (ibid., p. 28). Their work brings out two other
features. Firstly, involvement and detachment – a theme which has occupied us in
Projects One and Two. The significance of involvement is striking: they see no
detached route to the higher levels of expertise. Secondly, they distinguish rationality
from intuition and develop a structured synthesis of the two. Before taking this up I
note that in encountering this model, I experienced a substantial shedding of light not
simply on my narrative but also on my professional experience as an interviewer.
I can now make more sense of the trends in my interviewing practice over twenty
years. As in a piece of wood there is a grain, a direction, inherent in my professional
practice. It runs towards increased involvement and greater spontaneity and
reflexivity in real time, and a changing relationship between rules and knowledge
derived from encounters with a large multiplicity of individual situations. My
narrative shows this in action with Keith.
Moreover, the leap to the 3 hour structure, while still a creative action, no longer
comes ex nihilo. It is a leap in the direction pointed towards by Dreyfus’ successive
levels of expertise, a move within a game towards the game’s most skilful
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possibilities. As for the distance leaped – to 3 hours rather than 2, 4 or 5 – these
insights prompt me now to notice more precisely what my intuitive conviction was.
It was not that 3 hours was some optimum. Rather, it was that I could make 3 hours
work; that I was unconfident of making durations much longer than 3 hours work;
and that of all the durations about which I felt confident, 3 promised the best results.
In one or two years’ time I could find that 4 hours has become do-able and proves
more productive still.
I experience the Dreyfus model as shedding light not only on the evolution of my
professional practice (the subject of my narrative), but also on a significant part of
the content of that practice – how to make some assessment through interview of an
interviewee’s skill level in a domain of which one has no personal knowledge30.
However the way in which Dreyfus & Dreyfus separate intuitive thinking from
rationality deserves thought. Was the step not already taken in section 4.3.2, that
intuition (if only by definition) is not rational? No. Intuition was suggested to be fast,
non-conscious and involving feelings. Inability to produce straightforwardly a
rational account of one’s conclusion is certainly taken by the authors I have cited as a
mark of intuition. Yet none of these things irresistibly implies lack of rationality. In
the nature of chess, for example, must not successful intuitive expertise – however
fast, non-conscious, unaccountable and involving of feelings – be a form of rational
thinking?
30 In my training notes I posit the example of a search assignment ‘to find a brilliant someone to be an
outstanding virtuoso, young first violinist for an orchestra’. I assume that none of us know anything
about orchestras or violin-playing, but we now have to interview 12 candidates found by telephone
research from recommendations from all over the world. I suggest some ways of approaching the
interviews and propose that from a variety of sources, including the person’s ‘body language and ...
emotional language’ as they discuss various pertinent topics, ‘you start to build up some picture of
which ones are better and which ones are worst, even in a field in which we know nothing’ (Board,
2000, pp. 17-18). How much better the notes would have been had I known of the Dreyfus model
then.
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THE DREYFUS MODEL OF EXPERTISE
Skill level Nature of
decision-
making
Implied
commitment
Brief summary31
Novice Analytical Detached The novice follows context-free
decision rules
Advanced
beginner
Analytical Detached The advanced beginner’s
decision rules embrace some
situational as well as context-
free elements
Competent Analytical Detached
understanding
and deciding.
Involved in
outcome
The competent performer
assesses situations consciously
and, after deliberation, may
depart from some rules
Proficient Analytical Involved
understanding
The proficient performer
recognises situations intuitively
(‘holistic similarity
recognition’) and chooses
actions deliberately
Expert Intuitive Involved For the expert, assessment and
action are seamless and intuitive
31 The first three columns of this table are extracted from Dreyfus & Dreyfus’ own table (ibid., p. 50);
the summaries are my distillation from their exposition of the five skill levels (ibid., pp. 16-51).
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Dreyfus & Dreyfus (one of whom is a tournament chess-player) considered earlier
work on chess-masters and challenged it with an experiment in which an
international master continued to demonstrate expertise in five-seconds-a-move
chess while his conscious thinking capacity was fully absorbed by having to add
numbers spoken to him at about one per second (ibid., p. 33). This leads them to
disbelieve that expert intuition consists of conscious rationality speeded up by
application to a reduced problem - the problem having been reduced by a large,
rapid-access library of component situations, each tagged with a ‘best move’
rationally analysed on a previous occasion. They propose that truly expert intuition is
not reducible to ‘here is some thinking which I did earlier’, but engages a new mode
of thinking.
That the intuitive expertise of the chess-master produces rational results Dreyfus &
Dreyfus do not dispute: what they differentiate it from is conscious, linear, analysis
of wholes into parts:
The word rational, deriving from the Latin word ratio, meaning to reckon
or calculate, has come to be equivalent to calculative thought and so
carries with it the connotation of ‘combining component parts to obtain a
whole’; arational behaviour, then, refers to action without conscious
analytic decomposition and recombination. Competent performance is
rational; proficiency is transitional; experts act arationally. (Ibid., p. 36)
While experts may act in an unreflective flow, when time permits and circumstances
warrant, they do (Dreyfus & Dreyfus suggest) take time for reflective deliberation –
but this thinking will be arational, not analytic:
While most expert performance is ongoing and nonreflective, when time
permits and outcomes are crucial, an expert will deliberate before acting.
(Ibid, pp. 31-32)
… Detached deliberative rationality … can enhance the performance of
even the intuitive expert. … Such deliberation tests and improves whole
intuitions. … It is not the sort of calculative rationality used by the
beginner or competent performer as a surrogate for intuitive thinking … .
(Ibid., p. 40).
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Comparing Dreyfus & Dreyfus’ suggestion with the narrative and my experience of
interviewing candidates as a search professional, where I see substantial coherence is
in the idea of a partnership between analytical and other modes of thinking: a
partnership with a variety of possible configurations, in which the configuration used
itself arises intuitively:
[The deliberative expert] is thinking about the process and product of his
intuitive understanding. There may even be experts at thinking about
their intuitive thinking, who would then have intuitions about the validity
of their intuitions. (Ibid., p. 167)
Thus in my narrative the intuition to create the three hour conversation is
accompanied by the intuition to precede it with internet-based software and candidate
preparation. In interviewing candidates as a search professional, how much
predominantly analytical thinking was required to make judgements after the
interviews were concluded varied. But, reflecting on my own experience, I would
disagree with Dreyfus’ suggestion that at a high level of expertise one sees the onset
of some fundamentally different way of thinking. Rather I would interpret intuitive
and analytical thinking as in general present at all levels of skill, with the levels in
the table on page 89 serving as good descriptions of predominant but not exclusive
patterns (no novice completely follows context-free decision rules, as anyone who
has taught novices will realise).
4.3.5 An alternative model of intuitive skill – improvisation (Weick)
We have advanced some way in understanding the narrative. The three hours
interview now seems much less of a surprise to me. My example of entrepreneurial
intuition may turn out to be more closely related than section 4.3.2 suggested to
expert intuition; and intuition itself may (I suggested at the end of the immediately
preceding section) be inseparably linked to analytic thinking.
The model of expertise which has proved most productive in this respect has been
that of Dreyfus & Dreyfus, which I noted stood in marked contrast to the model of
expertise (competencies) dominant in my professional field. But we have already
noticed that field stands as something of an island untouched by the larger currents in
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organisational thinking. It would therefore be valuable to contrast the Dreyfus model
with something also offering a five-level progression in intuitive skill, coming from
the contribution of the organisational scholar Karl Weick to the discourse on
improvisation. Weick is most noted for his development of the perspective of sense-
making, which contends that a broad range of organisational activity including
apparently forward-looking acts such as the making of plans and choices may often
be better understood as backward-looking acts in which we construct and reconstruct
our experiences of past and present in order to make some sense of them (Weick,
1995). We shall return to this in the Synopsis (section 6.6). But my present focus is
on his contribution ‘Improvisation as a Mindset for Organizational Analysis’ (Weick,
2001, pp. 284-304).
Just as in the Dreyfus model increasingly skilled domain-specific practice is seen as
emerging in stages which can be identified by comparison with following a rule, so
improvisation – and Weick takes jazz as his source domain – is concerned with the
skill involved in music-making which starts by, but goes beyond, following a given
melody. Drawing substantially on the analysis by Berliner (1994), Weick pulls out as
pivotal:
... The compression of experience into the single word ‘intuition’ [which]
desperately needs to be unpacked because it is the very nature of this
process that makes improvisation possible and separates good from bad
improvisation. (Weick, 2001, p. 286)
Weick then puts forward a framework of four stages of variation on an initial melody
which he derives via Berliner from Lee Konitz (ibid., p. 287) and which is transposed
into tabular form and rule-following language on page 94.
To what extent does Weick’s thinking illuminate my narrative? Weick and the
sources on which he draws emphasise that improvisation involves preparation as well
as unplanned spontaneity. This relationship is of a particular kind, in which Weick
conceives of spontaneity as arising as a result of special conditions. This is apparent
when, having reviewed a number of conceptualisations, Weick finds it ‘hard to
improve’ (ibid., p. 285) on the following:
Page | 93
Improvisation involves reworking precomposed material and designs in
relation to unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped and transformed under
the special conditions of performance, thereby adding unique features to
every creation. (Berliner, 1994, p. 241)
The ‘special conditions’ of performance are not analysed in an exhaustive way
because Weick focuses more on the output of improvisation than the process (I shall
return to this point in making a comparison with Dreyfus). But a number of features
are clearly suggested. Most especially they include an unusually attentive listening
by the performer in real time to herself and to fellow performers:
If you’re not affected and influenced by your own notes when you
improvise, then you’re missing the whole essential point. (Konitz cited in
Weick, 2001, p. 291)
Wynton Marsalis observed that in playing, as in conversation, the worst
people to talk to and play with are those who, ‘when you’re talking,
they’re thinking about what they are going to tell you next, instead of
listening to what you’re saying’. (ibid., p. 293)
Jazz performance also involves expectations and valuations of difference, intensified
by – we may infer – themes of control, fear and shame, which play some part in the
process of creation. For example we may contrast:
... [Charlie Mingus] reduced a promising young saxophonist to tears
before an audience with his running commentary of ‘Play something
different, man; play something different. This is jazz, man. You played
that last night and the night before.’ (Ibid., p. 289)
with Weick’s frequent suggestion that especially valuable and difficult to produce are
transformative changes and major reworkings (again quoting Berliner):
... A soloist’s most salient experiences in the heat of performance involve
poetic leaps of imagination to phrases that are unrelated, or only
minimally related, to the storehouse, as when the identities of formerly
mastered patterns melt away entirely within recombinant shapes.
(Berliner, 1994, pp. 216-217)
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THE WEICK/KONITZ MODEL OF IMPROVISATION
Level of
improvisation
Brief summary Transposed description32
with suggested comparison
points  in the Dreyfus
model of expertise
No improvisation The source melody is performed
exactly as given
An unchanging rule (the
source melody) is followed
exactly – novice
Interpretation The performer takes minor
liberties (novel accents or
dynamics) while performing the
source melody basically as
written
Some situational elements
within the context of an
essentially unchanging rule
– advanced beginner and/or
competent performer
Embellishment Whole phrases in the original
are anticipated or delayed
beyond their usual placements;
the melody is rephrased but
recognizable
Some departure from a
still-recognisable rule but
no new material is created
in real time – competent
(or, if the re-phrasings are
not rehearsed in advance)
proficient performer
Variation Clusters of notes not in the
original melody are inserted, but
their relationship to the original
melody is made clear
Substantial departures from
a still-recognisable rule –
proficient performer
Improvisation The melody is transformed into
patterns bearing little or no
resemblance to the original
model or using models
altogether alternative to the
melody as the basis for
inventing new phrases
The rule while providing a
starting point has been left
almost completely behind,
with substantial real time
creation of original material
– expert performer
32 The brief summary in the second column uses Weick’s language; the transposed description in this
column is my own.
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I experience some parts of Weick’s understanding as illuminating my narrative but
others as alien. The three hour conversation has a number of the characteristics of ‘a
performance’. The themes of spontaneous creation, intensive real-time listening to
self and other, control, fear and possible shame are visible in the narrative and, it
would appear, put to creative work. Moreover the whole performance rests on a
substantial foundation of preparation, by Keith as well as myself.
However Weick’s insistence that ‘improvisation involves reworking precomposed
material’ (quoted above) only partially meshes with my excitement and fear on
discovering that one of Keith’s principal interests, farming, was something on which
I had no ‘precomposed material’. At no point during the two days remaining before
the interview did I try to find and read materials on farming. The relationship of
expert intuition and its products to precomposed material seem to me closer to
Dreyfus’ suggestions than to Weick’s.
The preoccupation with precomposed material is in fact foundational to the method
of classification set out in the second column of the table on page 94, and leads to a
substantial problem. An explicit comparison with the Dreyfus model provides a way
to approach this issue.
There are broad similarities though not exact correspondences with the Dreyfus
model, indicated by the five-level structure and my interpretations in the third
column of the Weick table. This provides some encouragement that both may point,
imperfectly, towards a pattern of increasing complexity found in a broad range of
skilled human activity – ie that this pattern is not simply an artefact of Dreyfus’ or
Weick’s observational framework. An obvious difference is that Dreyfus describes
how the performer acts while Weick describes what the performer takes in and
produces. Here we return to the point about precomposed material.
Weick/Konitz’s scale of improvisation is exclusively a function of the input (source)
melody and the output (improvised) melody. The classifications in the second
column could be adjudicated by a suitably programmed computer equipped with the
input and output sound recordings. Take as a source melody any memorable tune. On
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Weick’s classification (but not Dreyfus’), anyone who improvised a random message
in Morse code on a single musical note would be classified as an expert improviser.
This is because of the radical extent of the transformation in tunes, and because the
second column analyses melodies (and differences between melodies) as information
processing signals rather than a social language.
This outcome is not what Weick intends. But the second column on page 94 only
makes his intended sense if the melodies submitted to its adjudication  already make
sense to some human ‘speakers of jazz’. The true improviser must not only make
change but, in a social context (or in solo play rooted in a social context), make
meaning by making change. This requirement Weick only notices inconsistently and
does not develop.
For example, the intrinsically social is apparent when Weick writes:
Discussions of improvisation in groups are built on images of call and
response, give and take ... . (Weick, 2001, p. 293)
However only a few lines earlier Weick cites the musician Stan Getz as if Getz’
implied concept of language was equivalent:
It’s like a language. You learn the alphabet, which are the scales. You
learn sentences, which are the chords. And then you talk
extemporaneously with the horn. ... Musically I love to talk just off the
top of my head. (Ibid., p. 293)
In other words, the intuitive process of improvisation to which Weick draws attention
has, as part of the act of genesis, a necessarily social dimension which he ignores.
This has practical consequences. It leads him to value creative difference based on
the distance between symbols, not the distance between meanings; I find myself
doing the reverse.
For example in musical terms, the singer-songwriter Bruce Springsteen released one
of his most famous tracks ‘Born To Run’ in 1975. He was 24, it was played loud and
fast and included as a critical lyric, ‘We gotta get out while we’re young’. By the
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time he was 40 he would from time to time perform a solo acoustic version of the
same song: quieter, more slowly, but with unchanged tune and lyrics. In the
Weick/Konitz classification, this is no more than interpretation, the least-valued form
of modification. This misses that the meaning of the whole song, and not least of the
unchanged lyric line above, has been transformed – close to reversed.
Or in professional terms I contrast my work with Keith with that with another client,
Lewis, who is approaching sixty years old. He runs, as he has for the past thirty
years, a small consultancy of half a dozen people providing specialist communication
services mainly to FTSE 100 corporates. Retirement is not beckoning: rather Lewis’
anxiety at potentially being trapped is not dissimilar to Keith’s, but the changes
which it is pertinent for him to explore are small (no farming here: in five years’ time
he is likely to be still working three days a week for his present firm). To understand
these changes from the outside is to consider them small. To understand these
changes from the inside – what they will cost Lewis and offer him, emotionally,
relationally, creatively, financially and in other ways – is to appreciate their size.
Does the objection which I have raised to Weick apply to Dreyfus? The latter model
was created to demonstrate the irreproducibility of high levels of human expertise by
machine. So, by focussing on human action and transformation, not simply outputs,
it would not categorise the monotonal ‘Morse improviser’ as an expert, and does not
fall into the first part of this trap. But while the final column of the table on page 89
does not suffer from the same weakness as the Weick/Konitz model, I now notice
that it suffers from an analogous one. Its progressive gradations of skill using
differing patterns of rational analysis and ‘holistic similarity recognition’ also only
say something intelligible on a particular assumption: namely that the outputs which
the performer produces are socially recognisable as increasing in quality. Without
such a presupposition of quality, the scale gradations describe the process of getting
drunk as well as the process of becoming expert.
A final observation on Weick. He reaches a curious aesthetic crescendo about the
relationship which he perceives between the special conditions of skilled jazz
performance and what goes on in everyday life:
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To watch jazz improvisation unfold is to have palpable contact with the
human condition. Awe, at such moments, is understandable. (Ibid., p.
297)
Might one not have ‘palpable contact’ with the human condition by being alive?
Might we not find the same patterns in things which all of us do every day? In this
respect, too, Dreyfus’ approach is different: they introduce their model through
riding a bicycle, and go on to say:
You know how to carry on a conversation, and how to do so
appropriately in a wide variety of contexts with your family, your friends,
at the office, in a party and with a stranger. Not only do you know what
sorts of things to say in various social settings, but how far to stand from
your conversational partner and what tone of voice to use. You almost
certainly know how to walk. Yet the mechanics of walking on two legs is
so complex that the best engineers cannot come even close to
reproducing it in artificial devices. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, pp. 16-17)
4.4 Towards social intuition and knowledge
Some progress has been made in illuminating the experience narrated in section 4.2.
A significant contemporary literature on intuition suggests that both expert and
entrepreneurial intuition are present in the narrative, and distinguishes these in terms
of evidenced effectiveness from first-impression heuristics. This is a distinction not
yet developed to any substantial degree within either interviewing practice or
research. I have begun to perceive the narrowness of the connections between
interviewing and wider organisational practice and research; a narrowness
(dominated by behavioural psychology) which may have implications for the
choosing of leaders, given that interviewing remains a way of practical knowing
preferred in the selection of senior executives and leaders.
I have examined the skills framework which is currently predominant as the ‘good
practice’ model in recruiting and wider human resource management – the
framework of competencies originated by Boyatzis. This exhibits limitations which
increase the more senior the roles to which it is applied. It does not treat intuition
explicitly, but moves first to posit and then to give close attention to context-
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independent generic competencies (the skilful exercise of which may require much
intuition), whereas ‘specialised knowledge’ is reduced to useable data and schemas.
By contrast, the Dreyfus model posits that human expertise across broad swathes of
human activity is intrinsically context-dependent and typically has the potential to
develop within a scale of increasing complexity and involvement, for which they
propose five levels. Development of skill within this framework implies greater
involvement and intuition (non-linear, arational thinking). This model enabled a
significant movement of my thought. My narrated entrepreneurial intuition – the
creation of three hour conversations within a supporting structure for the purpose of
career advice - no longer appeared either ex nihilo, or at best distantly connected to
my other ‘expert intuitions’. The Dreyfus model also made new sense of my wider
experience as a recruiter in assessing the skills of others.
Weick/Konitz also offer a five level model of the products of improvisation,
conceived as a process which depends upon practice and precomposed elements, but
in which greater intuitive skill yields increasingly radical, unplanned change from
source materials. This model shed some light but less than Dreyfus’ on my narrative.
It also verged on meaninglessness in the absence of an interactive social
understanding of the activity being modelled, a critical constituent element to which
Weick refers, but inconsistently.
Reconsideration of the Dreyfus model showed that, with differences from Weick,
nevertheless it too suffered from a significant weakness in its social nature. It is
striking that, with the exception of adult language learners, the Dreyfus model was
developed from studying skill acquisition in relation to tools rather than activities
involving the full intricacy of human relating (leadership, say, or interviewing)33.
I return to the contemporary thinking on intuition which I introduced in section 4.3.2
to put the social aspect at the centre of our consideration. Possibly because at an
early stage Jung linked intuition with a function which he hypothesised of
33 Chess-playing and car-driving do involve other people, but with restricted degrees of freedom.
Nursing, which provided the model with some corroboration, is of course a socially complex activity.
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‘transmitting perceptions in an unconscious way’ (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 35), most
mainstream thinkers about intuition have taken pains to localise it within single
individuals. For example, Crossan et al stipulate that:
... [Intuiting] only affects others when they attempt to (inter)act with [the
intuiting] individual. (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999, p. 525)
What is more interesting is how bound to the individual such thinkers’ concepts of
intuition remain even as they explicitly address its implications for collective
knowing and action (as the texts from which the next three citations come all do).
The point has a taken-for-granted quality – no experiments are reported to test the
following firm assertions - because intuition is framed as some cognitive/affective
process within an individual body:
... Intuition is a uniquely individual process. It may happen within a
group or organizational context, but the recognition of a pattern or
possibility comes from within an individual. Organizations do not intuit.
This is a uniquely human attribute that organizations do not possess ... .
(Ibid., p. 525)
It is acknowledged that human beings intuit and organizations do not.
(Sadler-Smith, 2008, p. 495)
The knowledge assets of a firm are mobilised and shared in ba34,where
tacit knowledge held by individuals is converted and amplified by the
spiral of knowledge through socialisation, externalisation, combination
and internalisation. (Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000, p. 30)(emphasis
added)
This leads to an extensive development of proposals for the management of
organisational learning through processes which have a distinctly industrial, or even
hydraulic, character. Crossan proposes that the first area for further research is:
... understanding the mechanisms that enhance or restrict the stocks and
flows of learning. (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999, p. 535)
34Ba is a Japanese term introduced by Nonaka et al to refer to the social context for knowledge
conversion and amplification between individuals. They refer to it as ‘shared context in motion .... ba
provides the energy, quality and place to perform the individual conversions and to move along the
knowledge spiral.’ (2000, p. 14)
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Nonaka’s amplifying spiral of knowledge reflects chaotic elements within
organisations, including chaos deliberately introduced by leaders (Nonaka, Toyama,
& Konno, 2000, p. 26) who – in a phrase to which the authors return several times –
need to ‘read the situation’ (ibid., p. 26), in this case in order to know when and by
how much to increase or decrease chaos. (This ‘reading’ of organisational situations
is a key intuition, or tacit knowledge, which on this view leaders must possess.)
Dreyfus & Dreyfus do not articulate a particular organisational view, but the tenor of
their work clearly has individual novices or experts as its focus. However their model
was taken up in a major way by Bent Flyvbjerg (2001). He notes that:
... The Dreyfus model can be criticized for being slightly mechanistic and
insensitive to issues of creativity, innovation and power. (Ibid., p. 22)
However Flyvbjerg is unconcerned by this because the single property of the model
which he wishes to take up in his exploration of social science as a way of knowing
is ‘the qualitative jump ... from rule-based, context-independent to experience-based,
situational behaviour’ (ibid., p. 22) as skill progresses beyond competence.
Is it clear that intuition must be individual? Flyvbjerg himself cites a description of
group virtuosity from a Danish book ‘Football Angels’ by Hans-Jørgen Nielsen. The
description is worth repeating in detail:
We get a free kick, just within the other team’s penalty zone, just to the
right of the goal, and I take it, self-assuredly waving the others off, with
the seductive movement which means that I and no one else knows what
needs to be done. The opponents stand up in a wall in front of me in
order to block a shot aimed at the goal, as I perhaps also had first
thought, but suddenly, Franke stands next to them, far to the right, like an
extension of their wall. This has happened during my approach, while
everything is focused on me, and I keep running toward the ball as if to
kick directly. When I get to it, I instead kick it in a very flat arc, over the
defensive wall, and the ball would have taken the turf a few meters
behind it. In the same moment, Franke has made his way around and has
rushed toward the place where it would have landed. It never does, he
catches it in the air with his right leg, half-gliding it into the goal with his
left. No one else is able to grasp what has happened before he lifts his
arms.
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Soccer players tend to have this kind of thing with them from home,
working on it over and over again during training. Franke and I have
perhaps done something similar before, but never practiced it as
something specific in this way, we don’t exchange a word before I take
the free-kick, not even a telling glance, everything happens during the
run-up, completely natural, he just stands there where he stands, I just
play him like he has to be played when he has positioned himself where
he has suddenly positioned himself, the thought doesn’t even become
anything we are so aware of that it can become clear for us in advance. It
is a shared knowledge, from the perspective of the body and the eyes,
ready to become reality, and it is prior to our being able to speak about it
as a language and an ego ... . (Ibid., p. 18)
I find this strongly suggestive of ‘social intuition’ or plural expertise, in which the
subject explicitly rules out a model of (even non-verbal) interpersonal co-ordination.
This is also precisely the mutual, dynamic, simultaneous and anticipative ‘reading’ of
game situations posited by thinkers such as Bourdieu. A potentiality to act exists
between people caught up in an on-going figuration – caught up not simply because
physically present in a time and place, but drawn into an activity and what that
activity makes possible and values – an activity which knowingly and unknowingly
they sustain and modify as they participate in it.
Thus the approaches explored in this project all remain within an interactionist
perspective, in which the starting point for thought is individual agency, atomic and
pre-existing; and although within this constraint progress has been made, the
constraint emerges as an important and fundamental one. In the final project I shall
take up the radically social framework of games and habitus (Bourdieu).
Intuition emerges as intimately connected with practical knowing and what
knowledge is. Turning back to the narrative, the question of social intuition which
emerges can be framed like this: is the whole story, alongside and interwoven within
its conscious elements, one continuous, fast, unrehearsed, skilled, non-conscious,
social performance? Are Keith and I are running all the time to take free kicks,
feinting, standing beside walls, lifting our arms? On this view ‘social intuition’
would not only be one type of intuition or way of knowing among others, but a
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condition of possibility for our lives – and a condition of possibility therefore for our
rational thinking. ‘Social intuition’ might be hard to see because it is ubiquitous.
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Chapter Five: Transition from Project Three to Project Four
Moving to a radically social framework of thought
Project Three explored intuition from the standpoint of my professional practice and
found significant insight in the model of expertise offered by Hubert and Stuart
Dreyfus (1986). However it concluded by noticing that neither this model, nor the
model of skilful improvisation offered by Weick (2001) with which I compared it,
made sense except against a hitherto unremarked background of social sense-making
and practice. Project Three, then, invited but did not carry out a radically social
exploration of interviewing – where ‘radically social’ refers to frameworks of
thought in which individuality emerges out of or with society, as opposed to atomic
frameworks which may emphasise society but conceive of it as the interactions of
already-given individuals. I take up that task in the context of a senior recruitment
project in Project Four, drawing on the thought of Pierre Bourdieu.
We can place the movement of thought in Project Three in a larger context. With
hindsight, the realisation that neither the Dreyfus nor Weick models make sense
without a taken-for-granted social ground is, writ small, the movement in Western
thought which the philosopher Charles Taylor associates with Wittgenstein,
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Taylor, 1997, pp. 20-33).
Taylor reprises Wittgenstein’s argument that it is impossible to make sense of any
apparently abstract, context-free rule without ultimately appealing to a shared context
or ‘common sense’. How might we start to grasp this common ground? Taylor
suggests:
In recent years Pierre Bourdieu has coined a term to capture this level of
social understanding, the habitus. This is one of the key terms we need to
give an account of the background understanding invoked above. (Ibid.,
p. 171)
Page | 105
Intuition
What happens to intuition, the central thrust of Project Three? As that project
(section 4.4) showed, intuition is generally understood as an atomic concept.
Therefore the term appears much less frequently in Project Four. However the
continuity between these Projects in terms of the questions to which ‘intuition’ has
pointed is strong.
I used ‘intuition’ to explore two feelings which I associated with acting as a
purposeful, knowledgeable agent (Project Three, section 4.2.2):
... A feeling of capacity of action into the unknown (I know what to do)
which may be mistaken but is not racked by doubt ... and is distinct from
knowing by rational calculation.
[This] appears in two forms: micro-patternings in the course of
conversations and a large, singular leap ... .
The large leap explored in Project Three was my creation of three hour interviews as
a central feature of my new business. The questions, then, are about how we find
possibilities for action into the unknown in which we experience knowing what to
do, and in feeling we so know, take innumerable small steps and occasional large
ones. In posing the question whether these two-fold aspects of intuitive capacity for
action could be considered a social phenomenon, I closed Project Three with a
detailed description by Nielsen of a football free kick.
Compare this with Bourdieu’s concept of practice:
A player who is involved and caught up in the game adjusts not to what
he sees but to what he fore-sees, sees in advance in the directly perceived
present; he passes the ball not to the spot where his team-mate is but to
the spot he will reach – before his opponent – a moment later,
anticipating the anticipations of the others and, as when ‘selling a
dummy’, seeking to confound them. He decides in terms of objective
probabilities, that is, in response to an overall, instantaneous assessment
of the whole set of his opponents and the whole set of his team-mates,
seen not as they are but in their impending positions. And he does so ‘on
the spot’, ‘in the twinkling of an eye’, ‘in the heat of the moment’, that is,
Page | 106
in conditions which exclude distance, perspective, detachment and
reflexion. (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 81)
At this point the narrative of choosing learning sets in Project One (section 2.9)
begins to invite a new interpretation. It now stands out as a vivid account of an
experience of the collapse of agency – of not knowing how, in small or large steps, to
move forward. In it I experience the opposite of what I have been focussing on as
intuition.
The shift to the perspective of practice is also part of a larger philosophical current.
Dreyfus develops this theme in his exposition of Heidegger:
... Heidegger has a more radical reason for saying that we cannot get
clear about the ‘beliefs’ about being that we seem to be taking for
granted. There are no beliefs to get clear about; there are only skills and
practices. These practices do not arise from beliefs, rules or principles, so
there is nothing to make explicit or spell out. (Dreyfus, 1991, pp. 21-
22)35
A personal change
Leaving until Project Four my reasons for choosing Bourdieu instead of another
radically social thinker, taking up some such perspective is work which I need to do
– whatever I feel about it - to further my inquiry. But in the transition from Project
Three to Project Four (via a progression viva) the way I make sense of the world has
changed. In personal terms the journey hitherto now seems a ‘testing to destruction’
of the fundamentally atomic and Cartesian understandings which I had of myself and
others when I began this research. The contrasting perspective which I will explore
in Project Four still feels strange and unfamiliar, but I am no longer exploring
something ‘out there’ in the literature. It has become my own perspective.
35 A different route to a similar juncture also descends through Mead (1934) (and Project Two, section
9): see for example ‘A (neo) American in Paris: Bourdieu, Mead and Pragmatism’ (Aboulafia, 1999).
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Project Four: Senior selection interviewing as a radically social
practice
5.1 Introduction
An opportunity arose contemporaneously with this research to act as adviser and
interviewer in the recruitment of a chief executive to an organisation which was new
to me.
The Simon Trust36 is a grant-making charity with a non-executive business,
academic and specialist board of about 12 and a staff of about 20. The unexpected
early retirement of their chief executive has just been announced. The only board
member known to me (Andrew, the treasurer)37 introduces me to Bryan, a
businessman and chair of the trust. Grant-giving trusts is an area in which I have
some experience.
In week 1 the board appoints a search firm to identify candidates (by advertisement
as well as by private approaches) and myself as an expert adviser. The narrative
(section 5.2) begins when the board begins to select candidates (week 7). It seeks to
convey a sense of the interwoven patterning of multiple individuals influencing each
other in the processing of choosing one from multiple others. Of course many stories
remain untold: such as how and why the candidate field changes from 15 women out
of 56, to 3 out of 20 in the longlist (in my judgement not the strongest 3), to 1 out of
6 in the shortlist.
There is a shortage of research material about ‘live’ selection processes at senior
level. The narrative review of 278 studies on interviewing since 1989 (Posthuma,
Morgeson, & Campion, 2002) demonstrates the predominance of studies at well
below board level, experiments with university students being paid to act in artificial
interviews, and so forth. Indeed as a live, top-level study Russell’s (1990), on page
36 Not its real name.
37 Client personnel are named alphabetically starting with Andrew, candidates are named towards the
rear of the alphabet starting with Xavier. Implied genders are correct.
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77, stands out as a rarity. Bozionelos (2005) postulates the selection of professorial
candidates on political and ideological grounds, but he did not observe or participate
in the process which he investigates. Khurana’s study of selection processes at the
top of corporate America cited on page 81 relies on agents’ ex post accounts (2002).
By contrast this study is of contemporaneous action produced under the conditions of
urgency, incomplete information and involvement. I am under the normal
commercial pressure to protect my reputation and ‘deliver value’ to the Simon Trust
in return for charging £1,600 a day. My client and most of the candidates have even
more at stake.
5.2 The recruitment of a chief executive
5.2.1 The arrival of strangers; the longlist meeting (week 7)
I have been having confidential discussions with the Trust’s senior staff. A common
thread is their desire for reassurance: I tell stories to get across that I understand how
frightening the present situation is. The departing chief executive was long-serving,
and his early retirement unanticipated. Now his replacement is to be chosen by a
non-executive board: the staff will not participate. Andrew and Bryan devote perhaps
a day a week to the Trust, other trustees perhaps a day a month.
The chief executive’s departure has upturned the world of the Trust’s staff and other
stakeholders. Who now has real authority? Will colleagues try to leap over their
peers? Is there a ‘land grab’ by the chair? How will loyalty to the past chief
executive now be evaluated? For a time even familiar faces become strangers, and
real strangers have appeared ‘out of nowhere’ – an adviser and a search firm. These
strangers are entrusted with a share in the organisation’s most private deliberations
from which others are excluded. And they are simply tokens of the prospect that the
organisation itself will shortly be headed by a stranger.
In week 7 we reach the longlist meeting: an evening meeting with the search firm
and myself present, but no staff. The previous business overruns. We take something
over an hour. No doubt most of us are tired.
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A booklet prepared by the search firm gives summarised career details of the 21
candidates whom the firm – based on paper inspection - judges closest to the Trust’s
advertised requirement. It also lists 35 other candidates who either applied or were
approached through the search but are judged less relevant. For confidentiality, the
booklets are taken back by the search firm at the end of the discussion. Two days
previously the search firm had given Bryan and myself a preview of the booklet’s
contents. The intended outcome of the meeting is agreement on a list of about 15
individuals (the ‘long list’) whom the search firm will then interview.
Alphabetically the first name is that of Xavier. At the preview stage, Bryan was
excited about him – someone of national reputation, known to Bryan, and in Bryan’s
view a ‘star’. The search consultant’s voice and Bryan’s expression are neutral as
Bryan looks round the table for the first comments. Bryan emphasises that this is an
early stage of the recruitment process, and he is only looking for quick comments.
The first comment, from Curtis, is quick enough. ‘I will resign if Xavier is
appointed.’ Twenty-eight eyes dart in his direction, to see if he is joking. Apparently
not. ‘He [Xavier] is a disaster where he is. He has got everything wrong in the last
few years. He has no idea what good is [in this field].’
After a brief pause, Bryan responds in a measured tone. ‘I disagree. I know Xavier
and his work quite well. I think he has done an excellent job in a difficult situation.’
Curtis: ‘Simply ask anyone in the field [ie a practitioner or specialist, not a
manager].’
Another trustee: ‘Yes, Xavier is a good administrator. Probably. But he’s got no
imagination, no charisma. He’s the opposite of the change we need here.’
Another trustee: ‘He hides behind pillars. Behind his spectacles.’ (Several trustees
laugh.)
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Bryan: ‘Well, I know him pretty well and I think what he’s done is pretty amazing.’
Pause. ‘Well, let’s carry on through the list and see where we get. We’ll probably
need to come back.’
Formally we never do come back, because the meaning of this exchange only
becomes clear as we work through several more candidates. We reach one where two
trustees say concretely, ‘I think this one should be dropped from the list,’ ‘I agree,
not worth the search firm seeing.’ Gradually we construe that the candidacies of
Xavier, and some others also subject to lively exchanges, will survive to the next
stage.
In terms of the arrival of strangers, the exemplar is Yves. Yves is in his 50s and has
spent all his working life in business, reaching main board level in nationally known
companies. He left this career a few years ago and has involved himself in some of
the Trust’s main specialist areas. Nevertheless he is a clear outsider. No-one knows
anything about him beyond his own cv. Yves is one of 4 outsiders among the 20
allowed by the board to go onto the ‘longlist’.
Bryan reminds the board of the next steps. He expects that board members will not
object, and he is right. Bryan will choose an interview panel of about five, including
myself. In week 11 the search firm will submit to this panel a written report on their
longlist interviews, and the panel will agree on a shortlist (of perhaps 4). Before
being interviewed by the panel each shortlisted candidate will have a private hour to
ask Bryan questions. A short board meeting scheduled for week 14 will ratify (or
throw out) the panel’s choice.
5.2.2 Weeks 13 and 14 – the final interviews
The shortlist accepted by the panel comprises 6 candidates, including Xavier and
Yves. Except for Zelda all are men; Yves is the only manifest outsider. The list is
closely in line with the search firm’s advice. In the meantime I have drafted and sent
the panel a one-page checklist of what to look for in the candidates (see page 142).
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Besides Bryan (chair), the panel comprises Andrew (treasurer), Diane (a trustee with
experience in communications and marketing), Eric (an expert in one of the Trust’s
specialisms) and myself. We decide on interviews of 50 minutes each, beginning
with 2-3 minutes of opening remarks in which we ask the candidates to sketch out
two or three possibilities for imaginative change at the Trust. For diary reasons the
interviews are spread over two days. My checklist is agreed without amendments; the
panel are happy for me to suggest based on the checklist areas of questioning on
which each panel member should lead, taking into account their personal
preferences.
In the event the six opening remarks vary between 4 and 20 minutes, and the
interviews between 45 to 60 minutes. Candidates with long opening remarks do
badly. Bryan’s manner is welcoming to the candidates, and he sticks to his agreed
areas of questioning. I am pleased that panel members do not interrupt each other,
and often ask candidates to back up their answers with examples of concrete
experience (both things which I had advised). In other respects my professional
structure is ignored: several panel members wander ‘off-piste’ in their questioning
(mainly into others’ areas, rather than irrelevant areas); few use the checklist after the
interviews to rate the candidates.
Zelda is the third candidate we interview on the first day. While there are issues to
ponder about each of the first two candidates, the mood is upbeat as I bring Zelda –
an elegant, poised woman - into the room. Her reputation in fund-raising is well-
known. The question preoccupying me is that her experience has been for nearly 20
years in one institution which she dominates: the task of extrapolation to the Simon
Trust is difficult (almost as difficult as with Yves).
As in the other interviews, I scribble down a phrase or two of every question and
answer.
In her 5 minute opening, delivered without notes, Zelda offers three suggestions. I
regard the first as sensible but not exciting. Another is about more intensive celebrity
patronage (something for which she is particularly noted). Certainly a plus for the
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Trust were she appointed but, in context, not very imaginative. Finally, she wonders
about setting up a fund for emergency grants from the Trust. Since the Fund’s
resources are already quite liquid, without a sense of how new income could be
raised for such a fund this strikes me as vacuous.
Bryan probes the emergency fund suggestion, but no further substance is
forthcoming. This pattern is repeated in some other exchanges. As he has with all the
candidates, Eric asks for a concrete example of the candidate’s engagement with the
Trust’s specialisms within the past year or two. Zelda has little to offer. That remains
the case when Eric tries another variant of the question.
My rear-guard slot is approaching. My colleagues’ questions strike me as
progressively more ingratiating (‘I don’t know if you have a view about’ in a kindly
tone versus ‘What is your view of’ in a more energetic tone). The panel have
switched off (I think); they only want to reach a polite end. All the more important,
then, for me not to do that: I want to give Zelda the best chance I can to overturn the
hypothesis forming in my mind, which is that she is a potent and charming influencer
well below the necessary intellectual grade.
I express warm admiration for her achievements in nearly 20 years at her present
institution. ‘Although your job title remained the same, I’m sure the job itself
changed a lot during that time. Could you divide it into different phases for us, and
pick out the most important skills which you were learning in each phase?’
Zelda’s answer is in terms of bricks and mortar – the development of her site – and
growth in client numbers, with no reference to skills.
I am focussed on her, listening and smiling. I repeat back appreciatively part of her
answer, and try again. ‘That was very interesting in terms of the building, but could
you help me understand the changes in terms of your skills? How did what you as
chief executive had to concentrate on doing change?’
She retraces the previous answer.
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I close the door after she has gone and am turning back towards my colleagues.
Some have started to stand up, others are stretching. Even before anyone has spoken
my world has begun to spin. I sense that my interpretation of this interview is
markedly adrift from most, if not all, of the others. So it proves. Following the order
of questioning, I give my opinion last. Eric notes that Zelda’s answers to his
questions were weak, but the consensus is clear – she is a strong candidate. ‘What a
good candidate.’ ‘She could do it, no question.’ Few of the comments are reasoned or
evidential - ‘Think of the money she’d bring in’ might be the closest to this. But they
are emotional – relieved, delighted.
An intense challenge has suddenly arisen. I am drawing on all my professional
instincts and brainpower. I know I want to stimulate a discussion about reasons and
evidence – what is leading each of us towards the judgements we are proffering? But
my feeling is that the amount of reflection, or consideration of ‘data’, which the
panel will swallow will be limited. Moreover my instinct is if I underplay the gap
between us, even for this tiny window I will not stimulate any serious consideration
of a U-turn.
I smile: ‘I guess this one could be quite difficult.’ I stop smiling. ‘I thought that
interview was dire.’ There is surprise in the room. ‘We’ve seen three candidates
today. The only one I strongly feel could not do the job is the last one.’
From my notes, I take them semi-verbatim through two or three of the exchanges
which I think most clearly evidence the range and depth of my concerns. But the
discussion does not last more than five minutes. Bryan sums up the consensus –
Zelda’s answers on a number of fronts were weak, but in particular on the intellectual
front, I am setting the bar too high. She would bring in money – ‘Boy, would she
bring in money. If we raise more money, we can do more. If we don’t, it doesn’t
really matter how clever our director is.’
That we are interviewing over two days is a stroke of luck, so I encourage us all
(including myself) to continue reflecting. I re-read my notes and spend over an hour
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thinking. No question - in her present institution Zelda is an outstanding fund-raiser.
If I could satisfy myself that she would be an outstanding fund-raiser for the Simon
Trust, then she would represent a rational choice for the trustees - albeit not one who
(as best I can foresee) will deliver anything like the sweeping change which the
board discussed in week 1. But boards are entitled to change their mind, and it is not
unusual to  find that a chair wants a weaker chief executive than he claims to want.
Yet by the second day I still do not believe that Zelda will be an effective fund-raiser
for the Simon Trust. The central purpose of her present institution is tangible: that of
the Simon Trust is abstract. The intellectual dimension matters. I wonder how the
second day will turn out. Experience tells me Zelda might well be appointed. I will
try to keep my powder dry, and if I need to speak on this, I aim to be brief,
restrained, evidential and clear. There is no guarantee that I am right but my
considered view is what the Trust is paying for.
I never need to give that speech. Andrew and Diane volunteer that on reflection they
have adjusted their assessments of Zelda downwards. Also Xavier and Yves power
their way through to positions which (all agree) are well ahead of the other
candidates.
The panel is excited about Yves – Andrew, who hungers for radical change,
particularly so. I comment that in Yves’ case I have rarely seen an outsider provide
such a compelling interview – not only in terms of answers given and the manner of
answering, but in terms of the experience pointed to by those answers. Bryan is
delighted to have two strong candidates together with some back-up possibilities, but
also nervous at the risk of hastily appointing someone who has very little track
record in the Simon Trust’s fields. The ratification board meeting is this evening.
At my suggestion the panel agrees to seek the board’s authority to appoint (without
further reference back to the board) either Xavier or Yves after further inquiries. The
key elements for further inquiry – I argue – are thorough reference-checking
particularly of Yves by the search firm; and further time spent by Bryan with each of
the two (as chair he most directly needs to build a relationship with the appointed
Page | 115
candidate and will bear the brunt of a poor decision). We also agree on a challenge to
Curtis to state the basis of his resignation claim against Xavier.
5.2.3 Week 14 – the final board meeting
After an hour’s break, we re-assemble at 6pm. Apart from the interview panel and
myself, only three board members not on the panel show up, which angers Bryan.
Because of the resignation claim he calls Curtis, and reaches him. Curtis claims not
to have known about the meeting. Bryan says, ‘I was there when you wrote it in your
diary’ and withdraws to carry on the conversation in private.
Bryan returns. He is tired but leads the meeting through a thorough account of the
panel’s work since the shortlist was agreed. From the telephone conversation he
discloses that Curtis has never met or talked to Xavier, nor heard anything
specifically untoward about him. He made his claim from more general perceptions.
There is some consternation around the table.
The board members give the panel the endorsement they have requested. Therefore
they are open to both Xavier and Yves, but one trustee in particular returns three
times to the point that ‘none of us have ever heard of Yves. One simply does not
make appointments at this level of people of whom no-one has ever heard. It’s very
dangerous.’
There is no more discussion because it is late and the panel is being given the
authority which they need. I say to Bryan that in my experience, in asking Yves for
several different people to speak to about him, the search firm will rapidly find some
whom Bryan knows who also know Yves. But that point does not come to decision.
Within the next forty-eight hours Bryan spends a further hour and a half with each of
Xavier and Yves, and chooses Xavier.
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5.3 First reflections on the narrative
5.3.1 Primary questions
Project Three began to explore the nature of expertise. Section 5.2 is an extended
narrative of professional expertise in practice. I take as primary the question, can we
throw new light on the nature of this (purported) professionalism?
Narrative invites attention to its surprises: in this case Curtis’ dramatic intervention
against Xavier, and the different readings of Zelda’s interview. I observe the first but
am a leading actor in the second. These are obvious points of entry.
But professional expertise also expresses itself in routines – such as how I try to
organise the committee to interview or my preparation of a checklist. What
difference do these actions make? Is my work as a professional different from the
work which I think I am carrying out?
In this project I also start where Project Three finished, by taking up a radically
social way of understanding ourselves.
In the three preceding projects I worked to obtain more adequate accounts of things
which had surprised or puzzled me, in some cases for years. Necessarily those were
discrepancies judged from within my habitual (atomic) thinking. ‘Obvious’ surprises
such as Zelda’s interview or Curtis’ intervention may still be discrepancies of this
kind. A major shift in thinking is likely to mean noticing the narrative differently: the
unnoticed or the routine may come into surprising focus (as the social taken-for-
granted did towards the end of Project Three)38.
5.3.2 A stuck account of professionalism
Am I doing what I think I am doing? What do I think I am doing? I take up this
question in terms of the checklist (reproduced in the Appendix on page 142). My
checklist is an expression of the ‘person specification’ in this particular recruitment -
a concept regarded within recruitment as fundamental (Dale, 2006, p. 27).
38 This suggestion partly echoes Kuhn’s ideas about changes in world view (1970, pp. 111-135).
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In any book about recruitment and selection, competency-based or
otherwise, there should be only one place to begin, and that is with the
question: what do we want to measure? (Wood & Payne, 1998, p. 20)
Looking at the checklist now, I see I sweated over it. It is not lifted from another
organisation with just the specialist fields (P and Q) changed. It does not ask for a
track record of generic ‘leadership’ but of ‘leadership of innovation’ – itself carefully
chosen instead of ‘[individual] creativity’. It is on one side of paper, and tries to
focus attention on an even smaller subset of requirements – five. I have learned many
times that the capacity of a selection process to focus meaningfully on more than a
handful of issues is very limited. And so on.
Immediately I am inclined to dismiss this work of professional craft as of no
practical use. It was little used in panel members’ note-taking. In making critical
judgements – such as that between Xavier and Yves – the panel did not refer back to
the categories in the checklist. In Zelda’s case the checklist ‘failed’ me: the
dimension (intellectual capability) on which I found her wanting was part of the
background which I took for granted – that dimension does not appear in the
checklist at all. The checklist is an expensive ‘make work’ product which shows that
the supposed professionalism of this activity is empty.
This ‘exchange’ captures two voices which I recognise as influential in thinking
about senior selection interviewing. One voice is that of the professional-as-scientist,
trying to facilitate a tricky act of collective measurement. The other is that of the
cynic, the shrewd and battered survivor of numerous unspoken power shifts in
organisations, who sees everything as hollow, self-serving or both. This dialogue
strikes me as stuck: a barren, repetitive clash. I want in this research to find a
different way to articulate the professionalism of my practice – dismissing neither of
these perspectives but attending to a reality more complex than either.
Thus the cynical view ignores a number of things which the production of the
checklist actually did. Agreement to it enabled me to shape the areas of questioning
which panel members pursued; even if some veered into colleagues’ areas, no-one
Page | 118
veered into irrelevant ones. (The judgement of relevance is of course bound up with
power relations as well as any improvement to my client’s process.)
For panel members other than Bryan the checklist was the first tangible product by
which they could judge my professionalism. Producing a generic template or
something which commanded little agreement (or not producing anything at all)
would have damaged my credibility. The checklist increased my power.
Power to do what? What is my motivation in acting in this narrative – for example, in
steering questions towards ‘relevant’ areas? Are there any clues to something more
complex than cynicism (I am pursuing money, status and my impact on other
people’s and organisations’ lives) versus science (I am interested in the selection of
an objectively best candidate)?
Whether good or not, the checklist was crafted. I invested time and thought in
producing it. I acted as if there were standards in such things – not written down
anywhere but standards nonetheless – and as if I owed this organisation a good job.
But ‘this organisation’ does not exist in any tangible sense: it is language which I am
using to cover different shifts in different situations.
Thus the checklist is part of my ‘loyalty’ to the worried staff who are not part of the
selection process: the way it describes the managerial and trustee relationship skills
required remind me of those staff discussions. With Zelda, I give my ‘loyalty’ to
something beyond or beside the chair: I put my relationship with Bryan at risk when
I challenge so directly his view of her. Later I also protect him from being ‘bounced’
by a majority of the panel into choosing Yves, or from having the decision taken out
of his hands by the full board. I do this out of my belief that it will be disastrous to
recruit Yves as chief executive if the chair’s agreement is only half-hearted. What of
Andrew, who got me the work at the Trust? He sees Yves as the right radical
counterweight to Bryan’s caution. Have I been loyal to Andrew?
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Does my self-understanding as a professional aiming to do work which meets
‘standards’ and which puts the interests of my client ‘organisation’ first simply cover
up an idiosyncratic, self-indulgent shifting of direction in successive conversations?
5.4 Re-thinking skill
5.4.1 The perspective of practice
Practice is human action under the conditions of urgency, uncertainty and
involvement referred to on page 108. Its essence is expressed in the two footballing
accounts given as we made the transition from Project Three. In developing this
perspective we overturn two tenets of Cartesian thought.
Firstly, the logic of practice stands in contrast to the atemporal, reflexive, detached
logic of theory (Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 81-82). The logic of theory is the logic of
abstract thought in ‘I think, therefore I am’. The solitary Cartesian mind thinks first
(its thinking is what it finds it cannot doubt). Then it considers action in the world in
terms of the categories of thought. But in human history and in every human life
practical action comes first: detached thought is a subsequent accomplishment. We
shall therefore be exploring the idea that practice is primary relative to theory.
Secondly, a radically social perspective cannot take as given our usual idea of
individuals acting atomically in an external environment. We must start with
something that is already irredeemably social: for Bourdieu39 this starting point is
habitus.
39 An important Anglo-American view exemplified by Sewell (1992) and Stones (2005) is that
Bourdieu’s practice parallels Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory (1979). I do not take up Giddens
because, despite resemblances, I believe Giddens diverges from Bourdieu on both the points just
made. Stones gets to the kernel of the matter when he says: ‘Giddens’ distinctive conception of
structuration is derived ‘transcendentally’ in the following sense. He begins from something in the
social world that can reasonably and without controversy be agreed to exist. He then works backwards
to ask what other things must also exist as preconditions for this something whose existence is
uncontroversial. The latter, in Giddens’ case, is simply the fact that people engage in actions and
interactions.’ (Stones, 2005, pp. 21-22) In other words Giddens constructs practice through the logic
of theory - the reverse of Bourdieu’s project.
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5.4.2 Habitus and field
A key shift in Project Three was to notice the dependence of communication and
thought on an unstated background ‘common sense’. Speech is a paradigm practice:
the practical sense, thick with nuance and possibility, which experienced speakers
have of a living language is a classic example of such a common sense. This sense is
different for different people, but it does not intelligibly belong to any one person.
Widened beyond language, such a common sense introduces us to the meaning of
habitus (Taylor, 1997, p. 171), of whom the leading exponent in the last century was
Norbert Elias.
In ‘The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’ (1996) Elias illuminates the micro-patterns
which he sees as constituting long-term macro-processes: in this case national
identity. For example at the close of the nineteenth century ‘common sense’ for
Germans included the ‘honour society’, whose members were visible through
duelling scars on their faces. They asserted the right (and duty) to settle
disagreements with each other outside the normal, plebeian law. The collision of this
once-aristocratic habitus with the democratic settlement imposed at the end of the
First World War had (Elias argues) specifically German political repercussions
beyond economic reparations and national shame (ibid., p. 183).
Habitus for Elias is held in common. It is no superposition of atomic life-worlds
(ibid., p. 67). One person’s habitus is meaningless. Here Bourdieu makes a critical
(and complicating) shift. What is this shift and why is it relevant to this research?
If habitus is like language, let us call ‘German’ the common sense of the professional
world to which the Simon Trust belongs. If so, Xavier and Zelda have worked in
Germany all their lives. Xavier runs a large town, Zelda a village which she has put
on the map. Stories true and false circulate about them. Yves grew up in France
where he ran a large business. In the last few years he has bought a house in
Germany and learned the language well, but is no native. The Simon Trust is perhaps
Liechtenstein – German-speaking but small, vulnerable and different.
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The appointment of any of the three will involve transplanting a living body from its
accustomed world. The strength of Eliasian habitus is that in describing bodies-in-
accustomed-worlds as one, it does not allow us to fall into atomic thinking. But the
professional task in senior recruitment is to think adequately about different shared
worlds of meaning and relatively abrupt, high-stakes moves between them.
Bourdieu separates Eliasian habitus into the interaction of habitus and field. For
Bourdieu (and I will now follow this interpretation) habitus is that which is carried in
the flesh of the individual and field is that which is carried externally – but neither
making sense without the other:
The source of historical action ... is not an active subject confronting
society as if that society were an object constituted externally. The source
resides neither in consciousness nor in things but in the relationship
between two stages of the social, that is, between the history objectified
in things, in the form of institutions, and the history incarnated in bodies,
in the form of that system of enduring dispositions which I call habitus.
(Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 190)
Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields
and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. (Bourdieu & Wacquant,
1992, p. 127)
Unlike positing a free (atomic) agent facing an external environment, Bourdieu’s
move is akin to tearing a banknote (Eliasian habitus) in half. He separates what is
somatised in one agent from what is not, but insists on the common social and
interlocking nature of each half. There is no individual life without a shared world of
meaning (field). Society is always already under the skin of the individual and vice
versa. Practice is what happens when field and habitus meet.
In Bourdieu’s understanding of practice, agency is moulded but not extinguished,
because agents exercise meaningful (though filtered) choices, which then affect their
future filters. Habitus engrosses the agent in a way which emphasises some features
of reality (those important to success in the corresponding field) but not others, and
offers the agent as more or less obvious a selective set of possible actions:
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In short, being the product of a particular class of objective regularities,
the habitus tends to generate all the ‘reasonable’, ‘common-sense’
behaviours (and only these) which are possible within the limits of these
regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned because they
are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of a particular field,
whose objective future they anticipate. At the same time, ‘without
violence, art or argument’ it tends to exclude all ‘extravagances’ (‘not for
the likes of us’), that is, all the behaviours that would be negatively
sanctioned because they are incompatible with the objective conditions.
(Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 55-56)
5.4.3 ‘My habitus’
Thus in some circumstances we can speak of the habitus of a person. We can do this
when individuals move between different fields, or act in multiple fields
simultaneously. ‘My’ habitus then means the pattern inscribed in me by the
succession or collision of these fields: the particular collection of half-banknotes
which my trajectory has produced. Bourdieu uses himself as an example:
... The contradictory coincidence of election into the educational
aristocracy with lower-class and provincial (I would like to say: very
provincial) origins underlay the constitution of a cleft habitus, generating
all kinds of contradictions and tensions. (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 111)
but there are several others in his work40. However habitus remains distinct from a
person’s personality – ‘the personal stamp marking all the products of the same
habitus’ (1990a, p. 60) in which Bourdieu as a sociologist disavows any interest.
Thus, it is intelligible to distinguish my habitus as a search professional (with a
particular commercial and socio-educational trajectory) from my nascent habitus as a
researcher, because the matching fields are clear: but I could not speak of my habitus
qua myself41.
40 For example the ‘two scientific habitus’ of Nobel prize-winners Pierre-Gilles de Gennes and Claude
Cohen-Tannoudji (ibid., p. 43) or a characterisation of Martin Heidegger’s habitus as a ‘professor
ordinarius’ from ‘the lesser rural petty bourgeoisie’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991, p.
47).
41 I believe Bourdieu regarded this distinction as important but some interpreters might consider it too
fussy, for example Näslund (2009, pp. 238-240).
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5.4.4 Working with habitus: Zelda’s interview
Section 5.3.1 identified Zelda’s interview as an obvious point of entry into the
narrative. I interpret the interview almost oppositely to my colleagues, and I misread
how they are reading it. In both cases my professional skill is on the line. To build
the connection with Project Three I will begin by making sense of this incident in the
language of skill and expertise, and then explore the shift to habitus.
In the interview itself, noticing that I and others appeared to be foreclosing on a
judgement, I kept my bodily engagement and attentiveness to Zelda high while
searching rapidly for an improvisation in my questioning. I wanted to stay within the
discipline of allocated themes. It remained important to let her show that her
leadership experience was richer than twenty years at one institution might suggest.
But now I also wanted to give her a good chance of surprising me with her
intellectual grasp. This felt like a challenge requiring a middling level of skill.
From the moment I closed the door behind her until the second interviewing day, it
was a different story. How best to engage with Bryan and my other panel colleagues
stretched my expertise to the limit. I read their body language as expressing a double
satisfaction: that they agreed with each other was appealing, and that they had seen
someone who could make the Trust richer was no less appealing. Bryan’s leadership
in expressing these sentiments gave me no way of challenging this consensus without
challenging him directly. However dressed up, my challenge could also easily be
read as suggesting my fellow panellists lacked intelligence (by my lights they missed
Zelda’s lack of intelligence). This felt a scary, high-wire improvisation.
Involved, intuitive expertise as proposed by Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986, pp. 21-41)
still describes these variations of skill better than the competency framework
dominant in my practice (Project Three, section 4.3.3). At the high end something is
going on which is fast, dependent on much experience and non-calculative.
Bourdieu’s account is also good. As quoted on page 105, the player ‘reads’ the
situation and already, non-calculatively, ‘sees’ according to her experience how the
situation may develop. What I ‘saw’ through experience was that the window of
opportunity to get my colleagues to re-think their perception was tiny. Zelda’s was
the last interview of the day, yet Bryan would want to move on within a very few
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minutes; had I paraded too much data – what I did when less experienced - my
intervention (I believed) would backfire.
But prominent in the episode in focus is something which Bourdieu’s framework
encompasses and Dreyfus’ does not: conflict and challenge. After Zelda’s interview I
challenge the panel (who then challenge me); in the interview I try to elicit data to
challenge my own emerging view. Challenge is central to the whole incident.
In Dreyfus & Dreyfus this theme is painted out. Possible conflict is recast in a
scientistic mode as the non-conformance of an environment with an agent’s
predictions. This is so even when they describe a fighter pilot in combat. The pilot
expected his opponent to be an expert but the latter’s manoeuvres foxed him. Then
he realised they were those of a beginner. ‘From then on, seeing the situation in
terms of his experience with beginners, he easily won.’ (1986, p. 39) This is
someone shooting to kill.
By contrast fields are intrinsically sites of struggle and conflict. Bourdieu expresses
this through the concept of symbolic power or capital.
5.5 Fields as sites of struggle: Curtis’ intervention
5.5.1 Symbolic capital
Different positions in fields offer different possibilities for action. This differing
scope Bourdieu calls symbolic power or capital (sometimes symbolic violence)
(1991a, pp. 167-170). Again, we can introduce the concept through the example of
language.
The ‘common sense’ of a language is not the same for all its speakers. Instead every
field – not simply that of speech -
... is a space of relations which is just as real as a geographical space, in
which movements have to be paid for by labour, by effort and especially
by time (to move upwards is to raise oneself, to climb and to bear the
traces or the stigmata of that effort). (Ibid., p. 232)
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Bourdieu notes a newspaper report of how moved an audience in Béarn, provincial
south-west France42, was when the mayor of Pau honoured a local poet by speaking
in Béarnais (the mother tongue of mayor and audience) (ibid., pp. 67-69). The
mayor’s standing with them (his symbolic capital, his capacity to act in future
situations) rose, because he defied the national convention to use French. Bourdieu
further notes these symbolic profits were only possible because the mayor was a
professor from a large town, putting beyond question his ability to speak immaculate
French. The same language act attempted by a Béarnais lacking a commensurate
position in the field would (Bourdieu claims) have had quite different consequences.
Section 5.3.1 noted Curtis’ surprising intervention against Xavier. For some days I
struggled with its meaning. It surprised by combining high stakes (the threat of
resignation) with no attempt, as the conversation progressed, to offer supporting
evidence. The idea of symbolic capital helped my understanding. Curtis strikes a
particular kind of blow against a candidacy: a downward blow, a gesture made from
a superior position, from a position in the field from which one is qualified to assert
that ‘everything’ Xavier has done in recent years is wrong. If this is right, Curtis must
not support his claims with evidence: only this absence asserts the superior position
he wishes to claim, and offers the symbolic profits for which he hopes.
Curtis’ move could have fallen flat but it does not. There is laughter and support. The
trivial evidential level is reinforced by another trustee: ‘He [Xavier] hides behind
pillars. Behind his spectacles.’ But the move comes unstuck in week 14. Curtis’ bluff
is called. Now he cannot use the same words again with anything like the same
effect. Some months afterwards Bryan has certainly not forgotten the episode (he
tells me, with a tinge of disappointment, that Curtis has not resigned)43.
My charging an expert daily rate or producing an apparently professional checklist
are interpretable in the same way as moves to increase my symbolic capital.
Importantly, the symbolic profits sought in all these moves are social, dependent on
42 Bourdieu described his own origins as ‘very provincial’ (on page 122).
43 I am struck how the preceding two paragraphs repeat the duet of voices which I described in section
3.2: the scientist – the repeated use of the word ‘evidence’ – and the cynic – his ‘bluff is called’.
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the response of the field. So fields are sites of social struggle, but about what? This is
the last element in Bourdieu’s analysis of practice.
5.5.2 Illusio
Every social field, whether the scientific field, the artistic field, the
bureaucratic field, or the political field, tends to require those entering it
to have the relationship to the field that I call illusio. They may want to
overturn the relations of force within the field, but, for that very reason,
they grant recognition to the stakes, they are not indifferent. (Bourdieu,
1998a, p. 78)
Illusio is the relationship of agents to their activity in fields which matter to them. It
is a relationship of involvement, of engrossment or investment, of finding what
happens in the activity significant. Habitus discriminates what is noticed and proffers
possible actions: illusio is the appetite to play the game. We notice the other side of
illusio’s coin when we experience how a game makes no sense from the outside:
When you read, in Saint-Simon, about the quarrel of hats (who should
bow first), if you were not born in a court society, if you do not possess
the habitus of a person of the court, if the structures of the game are not
also in your mind, the quarrel will seem futile and ridiculous to you. If,
on the other hand, your mind is structured according to the structures of
the world in which you play, everything will seem obvious and the
question of knowing if the game is ‘worth the candle’ will not even be
asked. ... Illusio is the enchanted relation to a game that is the product of
an ontological complicity between mental structures and the objective
structures of social space. (Ibid., p. 77)
With the framework fully in place, we can take the following steps. Firstly, to use a
short further narrative to deepen our exploration of habitus and of movement
between fields (section 5.6). Next, to take our framework further with the help of
critiques of Bourdieu by other thinkers (section 5.7). And finally, to attempt to move
beyond my stuck encounter of scientist and cynic by sketching an account of senior
selection interviewing as a radically social practice (section 5.8).
5.6 Moving between fields: a short further narrative
Exploring Zelda’s interview (section 5.4.4) suggested that Bourdieu’s habitus might
be more fruitful than the dominant conceptual framework (transferable skills) for
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addressing the decisions to be made in senior selection interviews. Section 5.4.2 also
claimed that movement between fields is fundamental to this practice. While the
dilemma posed by Yves’ candidacy is important in the selection process until its final
hours, he is not chosen. Can we, then, explore movement between fields with some
other narrative?
This project itself is part of such a move: my transition from expert interviewer to a
novice researcher. In its early versions the project took a different direction. This is
what happened (as in section 5.2 I shall use the present tense).
I am very excited to have the opportunity of exploring the live recruitment of a chief
executive, and a theme which emerges early is disrespect. I first wrote to my learning
set about feeling a ‘faint twinge’ of disrespect shortly after meeting the board for the
first time in week 1. A combination of things – a posh London club setting, gossip
between board members about ‘boogieing with the Queen’, my shaking everyone’s
hand while no-one comes forward to shake mine – together with the attention which
Bourdieu pays to questions of social and professional trajectory prompted me to
write:
I ponder my own starting point in this social space. This seems to me
being half-Chinese (lowish status), fundamentally a headhunter (very low
status), Cambridge first and Harvard (high status), two years at the end of
secondary school at St Paul’s in London – high intellectual status but no
more than middling social status.
But what puts some muscle behind the theme is Curtis’ treatment of Xavier. I begin
to think about the costliness of understanding strangers. I begin to think this involves
not only time but the risk of change to one’s own identity, and start to formulate
disrespect as the ex ante judgement that someone is not worth understanding. I have
never read about disrespect in connection with selection processes but now I can see
it as endemic in my professional activity. I make connections to the low status of
human resource professionals noted in Khurana’s research (2002); also Elias and
Scotson’s classic (1994) on the arrival of strangers in a 1960s English suburb
(associating with strangers is status-reducing); also the work on disrespect of the
Frankfurt philosopher Axel Honneth (1995) (2007).
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It is thrilling to find by reflection on experience unexpected insights from wider
literature into decades of my working life. I feel motivated and competent in my
research. I am ski-ing on virgin snow. All of us in the learning set know that doctoral
work needs to be original: originality starts to seem possible.
After a few weeks I circulate some material and am strongly challenged by my
supervisor. He asserts: ‘You will not be able to defend this as research’. He reminds
me of the need not simply to situate my work in literature, but in conflicts or tensions
of difference; I am making connections all over the place but not working with
difference. Now I remember this point had also been important in Project Three, but
I overlooked it. For a while I lose understanding of what I am doing. What do I think
research is? Is conflict and challenge essential to it?
What has happened in this narrative? In the Dreyfus model, the beginner uses
‘context-free rules’; this description fits poorly. Indeed the Dreyfus model implies
that a sufficiently self-aware actor can (by observing how rule-dependent her actions
are) know her own level of expertise. By contrast an account in terms of an under-
developed research habitus fits my misplaced confidence well. The sense of virgin
snow as I race off - the lack of cross-cutting, conflicting tracks in my reading -
excites me, assuaging my anxieties about originality. This is emotionally mistaken
perception: learning from Project Three I should have been fearful. I needed to walk,
not race, close to the cross-cutting tracks of others. The learning was not forgotten;
once prompted I recalled it and its importance immediately. But it was too weakly
inscribed in my deeply ingrained habitus44 as an interviewer, to whom fast leaps in
the compressed time of an interview have become second nature.
In an unfamiliar field, I presented my half banknote. I swung dramatically between
misplaced, intuitive confidence and a collapse of understanding. For a while I felt
bruised. Motivation was tested. Only as the new field starts to write itself in my flesh
do I begin to find out whether I have the appetite for the new game: are its stakes
44Being etched in the body, habitus has ‘its specific inertia, its hysteresis’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant,
1992, p. 130).
Page | 129
really worth the cost? Illusio foregrounds this question which frameworks of skill or
competence treat reductively (as rational choices or responses to stimuli: see the
‘arousal’ of motivation in Project Three, section 4.3.3).
Symbolic capital also fits. Like the production of the recruitment checklist, the
pursuit of a doctorate is readily interpretable as an attempt to increase power, as is
my supervisor’s intervention (his influence over my work increases, he demonstrates
that he is worth paying). But there are two problems with this.
Firstly, these interpretations of symbolic capital are recognisably the cynic’s. They
do not accommodate my palpable sense of some professional, other-directed,
unselfish element within both the narratives. In particular, interpreting my
supervisor’s action as mainly selfish feels outlandish. Is Bourdieu’s world cynical?
Does it allow for unselfishness? Will symbolic capital help me move my stuck
dialogue (section 5.3.2)?
Secondly, is the ease of fit itself suspicious? Suppose instead of pursuing my
doctorate I abandon it: am I now pursuing some other capital (such as money, time or
standing among sceptical business colleagues)? Had my supervisor not challenged
me, or had I gone along with the panel’s initial assessment of Zelda: would he or I
have been ‘protecting relational capital (goodwill)’? Is Bourdieu’s symbolic capital a
virtus dormitiva45?
5.7 Dreyfus and Sayer: misrecognition and disinterested practice
5.7.1 The critical landscape
These two questions are precisely those levelled against Bourdieu by (Hubert)
Dreyfus (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1993) and Sayer (1999). Does Bourdieu explain too
much (and so explain nothing) or does he explain too little (because he cannot
explain unselfishness)? I will focus on these questions but first note how much wider
the critical landscape is (Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, 1993) (Shusterman, 1999).
45 Quoted by Nietzsche from Molière (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 19). Opium induces sleep because it
contains a ‘sleep-inducing principle’.
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That landscape includes large tracts of philosophical discourse. Since I interpret
Bourdieu not as reconstructing an aspect of life called ‘practice’, but as
reconstructing the human world through practice, his sociological tanks are parked
on philosophy’s lawn (Callewaert, 2006).
Dreyfus (himself a philosopher) states:
Pierre Bourdieu has developed one of the most analytically powerful and
heuristically promising approaches to human reality on the current scene.
As opposed to the other two plausible living contenders, Jürgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Bourdieu has continued and enriched the
line of modern thought that runs from Durkheim and Weber through
Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1993,
p. 35)
On a smaller scale, one critique which for lack of space I am not pursuing is that of
feminist thinkers such as Butler (1999), Krais (1993) and McNay (1999). I
referenced gender in Project Two (section 3.8) and the work of career advice which I
have taken up (Project Three) raises questions of identity. The thinkers I have cited
are attracted by Bourdieu’s emphasis on embodied agency, and the durability as well
as changeability of habitus as a resource for better understanding gendered
identities46. For Butler Bourdieu’s framework underestimates agents’ scope to make
radical change, while McNay see this as a realistic consequence of embodiment. But
I cannot do justice to their arguments here.
5.7.2 Misrecognition
Before asking whether Bourdieu explains too much or too little, both Dreyfus and
Sayer raise a prior objection. They point out that he draws from his own framework
the claim that agents are misled about their own action. This means, say Dreyfus and
Sayer, agents are (contrary to Bourdieu’s intention) robbed of any meaning. Dreyfus
(with Rabinow) argues:
... [Bourdieu] necessarily denies the validity of the manifold
significances of the practices to the practitioners. Behind these
46 Later addressed specifically by Bourdieu (2001).
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experiences he finds the explanatory reality – the meaning of human
being (maximizing symbolic capital) – which structures the social field
embodied in the habitus. But in a theory of human being, unlike a theory
of nature, the theory must account for why the practitioners are deluded
and why the scientist is not. (1993, p. 41)
In other words, if everyone misunderstands what they are doing, so must scientists
and so must Bourdieu. Sayer puts the same point with wry elegance:
As an admirer of the work of Pierre Bourdieu I sometimes wonder why I
appreciate it. Is it because of my habitus – those deeply engrained
dispositions towards other people, objects and practices in the social
field, which orient what I think and do? Am I just swayed by Bourdieu’s
educational capital? Is my appreciation actually an unconscious strategy
of distinction, a way of ingratiating myself with academic colleagues?
(Sayer, 1999, pp. 403-404)
The inference of Bourdieu’s to which they refer is that practice entails
‘misrecognition’ (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 105). The truth of a practice cannot be grasped
from the outside, by an observer for whom the stakes in the game do not matter. If
the stakes in the game do not engage you, you cannot understand them. In this way
the detached scientist is fated to misrecognise what she observes. But if you become
a player – if you acquire the habitus of that field - then you also misrecognise your
practice. The price of becoming a player is that the stakes of the field are inscribed in
your habitus; the price of that inscription is an intuitive ‘obviousness’ of what the
practice is about. The obviousness is the product of a matching habitus and field.
I argue that what misrecognition entails is that no agent can command the whole
truth of her practice: there is always something more to be said (social science tries
to construct this). It may be, as in Bourdieu’s interpretation of the Béarnais, that the
missing understanding so undercuts the agent’s own understanding that one might
say such an agent is in the grip of an illusion, or fooled. But the necessary burden of
misrecognition is that the agent’s understanding is incomplete, not negated. Hence
Bourdieu insists that the ‘somewhat disenchanted’ nature of the gaze which he seeks
in research is ‘not sniggering or cynical’ (1998a, p. 75).
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But are we still caught in the trap? Bourdieu says his research gaze is not ‘cynical’ –
but he also says that all of us misrecognise our own work (so he must misrecognise
his own). In what sense is knowledge possible in a Bourdieusian world?
5.7.3 Science and social science
Science (meaning the physical sciences) is a human game whose impact is hard to
exaggerate. Its success springs from our experience that at scales intermediate
between the subatomic and the cosmic the universe behaves like a single objectivity,
subject to universal laws. The paramount stake in this game is more fully discovering
this objectivity. For Bourdieu this is a misrecognition, because scientists’ ‘truths’ are
necessarily products of a social game – but an unusually potent one:
[I reject] both the naïve realist vision in which scientific discourse is a
direct reflection of reality, a pure recording, and the relativist-
constructivist vision, in which scientific discourse is the product of a
construction, oriented by interests and cognitive structures, which
produces multiple visions of the world, underdetermined by that world ....
Science is a construction which brings out a discovery ... .(Bourdieu,
2004, pp. 76-77)
Several attributes of the scientific field interlock to account for its potency (ibid., pp.
47-54 and 62-84).
(a) For diverse reasons (not least the complexity of mathematics) science has
evolved relatively high autonomy from games with other stakes, so that its
rules (such as experimental rigour) are more consistently and vigorously
applied than those of more corruptible fields.
(b) Its stakes and the rewards of fame in the field motivate scientists to
exceptional vigilance and challenge of each other’s work, searching for error.
(c) The stability of the physical world enables increasingly accurate and valuable
predictions, which attracts more (and more talented) people to play the game.
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Science’s autonomy is neither perfect nor fixed. It was won with some permanence
from religion but with continuing encroachment from politics and business (for
example not reporting adverse experimental results in the pharmaceutical industry).
But overall, the autonomy of science from both politics and business is manifestly
greater than that of social science, which is vulnerable also to the hegemony of
science itself (ibid., pp. 85-88 and 100-109).
Bourdieu, like Elias (1978; 1987) and many other social scientists such as Flyvbjerg
(2001) see that social science lacks the protection of (a). Taking self-aware humanity
as its quarry, it lacks also the apparently stable foundations of (c). Thus social
science is even more dependent upon the dynamic of conflict and challenge within its
own field47:
The fact that [in science] producers tend to have as their clients only their
most rigorous and vigorous competitors, the most competent and the
most critical, those therefore most inclined and most able to give their
critique full force, is for me the Archimedean point on which one can
stand to give a scientific account of scientific reason, to rescue scientific
reason from relativistic reduction and explain how science can constantly
progress towards more rationality without having to appeal to some kind
of founding miracle. (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 54)
Contrary to Bourdieu’s intentions, do illusio or misrecognition wreck agency by
turning all agents (including scientists and social scientists) into fools? To repeat,
misrecognition is the incompleteness, not the necessary reversal, of the agent’s self-
understanding. A physical scientist may well believe she is directly discovering a
physical universe: this is a misrecognition but nevertheless, because of the nature of
the scientific game, she makes real discoveries. In the case of social science, and
therefore in the case of himself, misrecognition must also apply (and with worse
consequences). Bourdieu argues in response for the social sciences to adopt a strong
discipline of reflexivity, to keep chipping away at the unknown remainder (2004, pp.
85-114). Knowledge in social science is necessarily more time-bound and insecure
than science, but for Bourdieu there is still better (more objective) social science
thinking and worse.
47 Accordingly I concluded that my supervisor (on page 128) was correct.
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5.7.4 A selfish world vs disinterested practice
We can now return to the contrasting arguments that Bourdieu explains too much and
too little. The first argument is:
Everything from accumulating monetary capital to praise for being
burned at the stake automatically counts as symbolic capital. To say that
whatever people do they do for social profit does not tell us anything if
profit is defined as whatever people pursue in a given society. (Dreyfus
& Rabinow, 1993, p. 42)
But symbolic capital cannot explain everything. It has a radically social grammar,
which can form some kinds of explanation but not others. Symbolic capital cannot
explain an atomic world, such as one of private goods in which I am attracted only to
starlight, you to plainsong and she to whole numbers divisible by 3.
Sayer’s contrary suggestion48 is that there is disinterested action and Bourdieu’s
world is too flat, amoral and economistic, too similar to rational choice theory, to
explain it. Sayer regards moral stances as inescapably part of life. He sees them
present but unacknowledged in Bourdieu’s work – for example when Bourdieu labels
situations as ‘domination’ (Sayer, 1999, pp. 404, 407, 426). Sayer (ibid., p. 411) cites
Bourdieu’s exposure of class bias in tutors’ comments on students’ work in ‘The
State Nobility’ (Bourdieu, 1996). If Bourdieu makes no moral judgement, Sayer
asks, why should he care? And can assessments be biased without granting the
possibility of unbiased – disinterested – assessment?
Bourdieu strongly differentiates his position from rational choice theory in lectures
given in 1988 - in English ‘Is a Disinterested Act Possible?’ (1998a). Important
disinterested practices can and do develop, such as today a parent, a judge, a
scientist, a bodyguard or a suicide bomber. The content and purity of
disinterestedness varies over place and time according to the content of the principles
48 Sayer also fails to grasp radical sociality, as in his (to my mind forlorn) project to distinguish the
‘intrinsic’ value of an élite education from its reputational and network advantages: the intrinsic value
of the classroom experience is affected by the calibre and breadth of your class-mates, which is the
school’s social cachet made flesh (1999, p. 422). However I grant Sayer that if the making of value
judgements is intrinsic to human meaning-making – a view to which following Taylor (1989, p. 31) I
am inclined – then the necessity (as opposed to the possibility) of such judgements is not apparent
from Bourdieu’s framework.
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embodied in each specific game, and contingent factors (already discussed in the
case of science) which shape how vigorously transgressions of those principles
become unthinkable in the flesh of those who play.
Again, misrecognition is necessary incompleteness, not necessary negation or
cynicism. Suppose last year I took vows as selfless as you please; I also joined a
monastic order which studies such vows and punishes infractions severely. Today I
express those vows in an act as unreserved and unselfish as Sayer can conceive.
Misrecognition does not render my act greedy: it exposes that there will always be
something more to say. That ‘something more’ could be like the ‘sculpture found at
the Auch cathedral, in the Gers, which represents two monks struggling over the
prior’s staff’ (ibid., p. 78); or something which shows my act to have been even more
selfless than hitherto imagined. In Bourdieu’s world action is fated to be complex but
not to lack generosity or virtue.
5.7.5 Implications for this research
The wide discussion in this section has substantial implications for my inquiry.
Firstly: the inaptness of science as the model for the human study of human activity.
Yet, science’s intellectual hegemony in the habitus of modernity, compounded by a
narrow reliance in thinking about interviewing on behavioural psychology and the
stance of ‘measurement’, have given my practice the underlying assumptions of
science. If human activity is reflexive and social, then help is more likely to come
from thinkers who have taken up not only the theme of science-inappropriateness but
also power and exclusion.
Secondly, Bourdieu is one such, but not alone. Since I am taking a radically social
view, his relevance is increased. I have also argued that his interpretation of habitus
is more promising than Elias’ in helping us think adequately about movement
between fields. I shall argue in section 5.8 that his idea of a disinterested practice – a
practice like research itself - is also valuable.
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Thirdly, I am not putting forward disinterested practice simply as an interesting idea.
Experiencing in this research a challenging framework for judgement which I have
come to recognise as durable and worthy of respect, but no part of which is beyond
challenge or metaphysically out of reach, has been vital. I have encountered in the
flesh (as in section 5.6) a possible answer to the question posed twice in the
Introduction: if science goes out the window, is every opinion or judgement no better
than any other?
Fourthly, along with the other participants in my practice (including clients and
candidates) I must misrecognise my contribution. The greater my expertise, the more
profound the match between habitus and field, the more difficult my task of noticing
something which obviousness has made ‘practically’ invisible. This is a major
challenge, but if it can be overcome I can glimpse the possibility of a discourse
beyond that of the scientist and the cynic. This section has separated Bourdieu’s
stance from both of these.
The last point raises a question of method. Neither detached observation nor
engrossed participation can escape misrecognition. An agent’s theorisations after the
event will be even less help:
... There is every reason to think that as soon as he reflects on his
practice, adopting a quasi-theoretical posture, the agent loses any chance
of expressing the truth of his practice. ... Academic interrogation inclines
him to take up a point of view on his own practice that is no longer that
of action, without being that of science ... . (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 91)
But if, rather than theorising, my body has absorbed something of the habitus of
research then in carrying out that practice I might notice something of research value
– something worth discussing.
5.8 Sketching a radically social practice
My argument concerns thinking about interviewing as a practice and thinking within
the practice about candidates. I contend that in both cases thinking in the form of
vigilant and challenging conversation, grounded in experience and borrowing the
intellectual compass of the humanities, can unstick a discourse and a practice
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presently captured by science. I have built on Bourdieu’s thought both to make my
argument and to construct an offering into such a conversation. To the latter end I
offer this first sketch of senior selection interviewing as a radically social practice: in
other words, my attempt based on this project to move beyond the scientist and the
cynic.
The task of this research is to notice something elusive. I offer three possibilities.
Firstly, the re-thinking of transferable skills, expertise and movement between fields
in terms of habitus leads to much heightened anxiety and sense of the unknown when
an organisation appoints to a senior role. It is profoundly unclear what happens when
someone presents half a banknote in a foreign country. The difficulty in this noticing
is fear of two kinds – that at the beginning of section 5.2.1 but now redoubled and a
professional crisis (and fear of power loss) for me as a practitioner. The risks for both
organisation and supposed expert are existential.
Secondly, we can take one more step with the Béarnais example of misrecognition
(on page 125). For Bourdieu careful attention to necessary conditions shows that,
even if the participants think their defiance undercuts the dominance of French, they
are in fact enacting that dominance – reproducing it socially. From this an important
clue to my practice lies in Curtis’ rhetorical coup. It would have failed to yield his
desired (but temporary) symbolic profits had he not flagrantly defied the unspoken
supposition that claims should be supported by evidence. But for that reason his
defiance enacts and reproduces the significance of what is defied. If an opponent of
religion spits in a font she attacks its significance yet reproduces it; hers is a
particular act of consecration. May professional elements of my practice – for
example the checklist – do unnoticed work even in the course of being defied? Here
the difficulty in noticing lies in reversing an understanding which is embedded in the
practice as obvious.
Finally, I have emphasised the bodily nature of knowing. For example cutting out
narrative material and hard-won potential insights from earlier versions of this
project has been painful. At each stage (the present version is the eighth) I have
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vigorously but not wholly articulately resisted reducing the narrative to a collection
of incidents (such as Zelda’s interview). Is there something still to notice about the
narrative’s larger shape?
Possibly this: its felt familiarity. This familiarity goes unremarked whether you
experience it or not. The habitus of someone familiar with senior selection processes
makes the familiarity obvious, it goes without saying; while those unfamiliar will not
see any familiarity about which to speak.
Patterns of interviewing at senior levels differ but in my experience they are both few
(crudely, panel interviews in public sector organisations and one-to-one interviews in
private ones) and difficult to change (I have tried). Perhaps what I need to notice is
how the very familiarity and repetitiveness of ‘ordinary’ steps (eg there is a person
specification or checklist, there is a shortlisting meeting and it is followed by ...)
helps the participants create and experience ‘felt familiarity’ as they step into the
unknown.
This unknown I have now described in newly-alarmed, existential terms. The idea of
‘transferable skills’ reduces fear. So does the felt familiarity of a process. The
various professional elements of the practice (such as the checklist) do not only do
‘what it says on the tin’: they combine (I am suggesting) in a pattern which enables
the participants to experience ‘knowing what to do’, and feeling that they so know
and can act. As the process develops, the participants take many small steps and
occasional large ones into the unknown. But I characterised intuition in Project Three
in these exact terms. The practice of senior selection interviewing helps its
participants act into an abyss while experiencing many of their actions and choices as
intuitive or obvious. (Indeed the logic of practice is that this experience is a
necessary condition for meaningful choice within the urgent time-span of action.)
Of course this familiarity is not equal for all people. Reduced to its details (ie a panel
member who knows that there should be a checklist versus one who does not), this
differential familiarity identifies those used to senior appointments from those less
used. The patterns of power and exclusion thus contour relations among panel
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members and between them and others, as well as creating and limiting49 the roles of
search consultants and expert advisers.
To summarise, the role played in the practice of senior selection interviewing by an
undergirding concept of professionalism, or betterment, or objectivity – a sense
which currently mainly comes from ideas of science or measurement – I will
characterise as a weak ethical gravity. Created by the participants and the histories
inscribed in  the habitus and field out of which they act, it orients social space.
Without constraining the participants much, it grants them a taken-for-granted ‘up’
and ‘down’ which enables joint action into an unknown of more than usual danger.
In the narrative this ‘weak ethical gravity’ is represented not only by a number of my
interventions but my presence at all (the idea that an expert is worth paying). Another
way of saying this is to describe senior selection interviewing as a disinterested
practice with very weak autonomy or capacity to resist corruption.
What I misrecognized previously was that the contribution of this orienting effect by
no means lies necessarily in the participants agreeing to move in the direction in
which I vigorously try to point (cf Zelda), or even in some hypothetical ‘confidence
effect’ whereby my confidence in acting into the unknown spreads to my clients. The
fact that there is an ‘up’ and a ‘down’, even if we do not care precisely which
directions these are or flagrantly go in other directions, helps us act together. The
question asked twice in the Introduction (if science goes the window is every opinion
or judgement no better than any other?) points to a deep fear of directionless
disorientation.
The presence or absence and the nature of a weak ethical gravity in this practice
touches many people. It extends to practice participants in the widest sense: everyone
who decides to apply for senior roles, or who considers applying but decides against.
It extends to those over whom the appointees will have authority (the concerned staff
who I met at the start of the project).
49 My perception of a ‘tiny window’ on page 113 available to me to influence my client’s assessment
of Zelda demonstrates the limiting effect.
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The idea of no ethical gravity at all would have wider repercussions still. Our society
is partly defined by its complex interlocking fields and concerns about the differing
kinds of access individuals should have to differing roles. This strand of thought,
often expressed as meritocracy, goes back at least as far as the Weberian idea of
bureaucracy. A review of these ideas and concerns is offered by Walzer, who argues
for the wide applicability of a meritocratic understanding of ‘office’ as part of the
contemporary philosophical understanding of justice (1983, pp. 129-164):
... An office is any position in which the political community as a whole
takes an interest, choosing the person who holds it or regulating the
procedures by which he is chosen. Control over appointments is crucial.
(Ibid., p. 129)
Of course, it cannot be inferred that the ethical gravity in interviewing needs to point
in any particular direction – that it must exclude nepotism or gender discrimination,
for example. Those are contingent, socially contestable matters.
To continue sketching this practice: if the suggestion of felt familiarity has merit,
then change is likely to be slow. Moreover, any ethical patterning within the practice
will remain weak – far weaker than science but also markedly weaker than social
science. This flows from what makes this field what it is.
Taking up the arguments about social science versus science in section 5.7.3, senior
selection interviewing partakes in all the weaknesses of autonomy which characterise
social science, and then some: not merely the powerful stakes of politics and
business, but also all those stakes - such as those of specialisms versus management
in the Simon Trust, or quantitative versus qualitative research in academic
appointments (Bozionelos, 2005) - which matter in the fields in which specific
appointments lie. Senior appointments mean intensified stakes: by its nature the
practice of senior selection interviewing straddles these different fields and is
exposed to them all.
A powerful engine of change can be professional interests seeking the symbolic and
material profits which derive from the cause they advocate, such as jurists and
bureaucrats in the case of the modern, universal, meritocratic State:
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The profit of universalization is undoubtedly one of the historical engines
of the progress of the universal. (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 60)
But there is little sign that the professionals already established (in many cases with
significant material profits) in my field see much reason for change. Indeed the
management of potential embarrassment which Khurana sees as central to the
executive search industry is, arguably, antithetical to the cultivation of conflict and
challenge for which I am arguing (2002, pp. 128-134, 142-150).
Finally, selection interviewing is hampered in its development as a practice by
several opacities. Curtained by confidentiality, the practice trails in front of clients,
candidates and professionals alike numerous temptations to make uncorroborated or
inflated claims. Then there is an opacity between client and adviser which makes it
difficult for the wider professional field to hold the adviser accountable for the
quality of her work in any particular case (contrast architects and buildings with
search professionals and major appointments). Moreover, for reasons now developed
over two projects, the expert and the novice interviewer alike will probably
experience many of their judgements as intuitive, with the opacity which this implies
in terms of vigilant reasoned discourse.
Yet very weak as this ethical gravity or disinterested practice may be, according to
this project it is essential, and so it has influence. In the Synopsis I review the work
done in all four projects before asking where this leaves the practice and my practice.
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Appendix to Project Four – Simon Trust interview checklist
CANDIDATE √√, √, ?,X COMMENTS
DRIVES AND
VALUES
Energy, ambition, persistence
Importance of P and Q50 in society
(nature of excellence, regional
commitment)
TRACK
RECORD
Organisational and financial
management
Leadership of innovation
Sufficient51 experience across more
than one of: P; Q; marketing;
influencing government
SKILLS
(STRENGTHS52)
Sensitive, tactful, persuasive with a
wide range of people
Speaking to small and large groups
SKILLS
(BALANCED53)
Decision-making
Imagination                     focus
risk-taking         (vs)        discipline
Managing staff
Personal touch               results
motivating        (vs)         firmness
flexible                            fair, consistent
Trustee relations
Will take                         can lead,
direction from  (vs)        motivate,
the board                       use
trustees
All ten attributes are important but the (suggested) highest priority five are shaded.
50 P and Q refer to the two main fields within which the Simon Trust works. The fields are large (each
with several types of sub-specialist expert).
51 ‘Sufficient’: how likely to be effective across all the areas, and accomplished in some, within 1
year?
52 More is good (cf ‘balanced’ below).
53 A skilled balance of opposites/complements is required.
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Chapter Six: Synopsis
6.1 Argument
The central questions which have emerged in this research are: Is the practice of
senior selection interviewing stuck? and If so, can a different theorisation of the
activity contribute to fresh action and understanding?
A summary of the response this research offers should begin by noting that research
into selection at or near board level is limited – Fletcher (2005), Khurana (2002),
Russell (1990). However this research confirms, as does my own experience, that at
senior levels interviewing is the dominant selection tool. By contrast the research
into selection interviewing at junior and middle levels is plentiful. Overwhelmingly it
follows the scientific (typically psychological) idea of the measurement of skills
which belong to individuals and are transferable with them. In particular senior
selection has not been studied as a product of radically social human agency – ie
agency not reducible to the interactions of autonomous individuals making free
choices or following habits. This is unsurprising, since thinking atomically is part of
today’s common sense.
The scientific and as-if-scientific measurement of discrete individuals dominates not
only theory but also selection practice, through the tools, concepts and discussions
taken for granted in it - such as the person specification annexed to Project Four.
What consequences does this have for an activity in which humans are intensely
concerned with judging other humans, and in which high stakes in terms of power,
status and money are common?
This research argues that the consequences are damaging. Scientific research is
valuable in its own terms. It has also helped move many organisations beyond the
situation of the Broadway Manufacturing Company which Boyatzis studied, where
the only detectable difference between those who were promoted farthest over 20
years and their counterparts was height. But the natural sciences’ inadvertent
intellectual hegemony cuts the practice off from a wealth of other scholarship –
including the very arguments made in the social sciences and philosophy about the
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inappropriateness of mimicking the natural sciences in social studies. I have
developed this argument drawing particularly on the work of Bourdieu (2004;
1990a), but it is made by many other writers, for example Flyvbjerg (2001). At its
simplest, the self-awareness of human beings means that significant acts of
understanding human activity change significantly that which was understood.
This thesis has demonstrated more specific damage from an overly narrow
theorisation of selection interviewing. Intuitions are common experiences for
interviewers, yet best practice in interviewing does not draw the distinctions between
expert intuition and first-impression heuristics identified in mainstream management
studies. Competencies (Boyatzis, 1982) (Wood & Payne, 1998) and transferable
skills are relied on as the intellectual and practical bedrock of contemporary human
resource management, usually in ignorance of arguments and evidence about the
contextual nature of expert knowledge (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). These points have
implications for practitioners even without any more radical reframing of these
themes.
While focussing on sociology, examples have been given of the wealth of wider
thinking relevant to choosing leaders, including critical theory (and feminist
thinking) and philosophy – thinkers on power such as Arendt (2000a) or Foucault
(1986), on disrespect such as Honneth (2007) or on justice in a plural society such as
Walzer (1983).
The argument then takes two further steps. Firstly, this scientific dominance is
contributing to a stuck practice. The best practices and tools for improvement offered
to selection interviewers make transparency a foundational step – all the issues
concerning the role to be filled should be made explicit and, so far as possible,
resolved. However, drawing on arguments which challenge dominant thinking about
leadership (Griffin, 2002)(Stacey 2010), this research argues that senior roles are
intrinsically political and incapable of being rendered fully transparent: indeed
current interviewing best practice self-certifies its incompetence in matters of power.
I explore the stuckness of my own practice, caught in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’
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between scientist and cynic; a wider stuckness is suggested by how the practice
remains dominated by interviewing with little innovation in techniques.
Secondly, a contribution is offered to the more multi-faceted discourse for which this
research calls. Working with Bourdieu’s logic of practice raises the reflexive
question, how do I misrecognize my own contribution to the practice? Trying to
move beyond the scientific objectivity which I now find deceptive and the
unconstrained subjectivity which I find unstable and chaotic, I sketch a basis for
thinking differently about what constitutes ‘better’ and ‘worse’ in senior selection
interviewing. The practice produces (I suggest) a ‘weak ethical gravity’ as well as a
common sense which allows action together into (and despite) profound uncertainty
and anxiety; all this created and continually re-created in a radically social way
between all the participants (expert and not, candidates and interviewers) in the
practice of interviewing. This contribution will be useful if it offers new illumination
of experience which stimulates fresh thought and action – ie a break with stuckness.
6.2 Drawing the projects together
6.2.1 The world of selection interviewing
Taken together, the four projects relate to each other in different ways. For example,
one might place a decisive break at the end of Project Two. Thus Projects One and
Two deal with power while Projects Three and Four deal with interviewing. The
closeness of Projects One and Two is emphasised in the way my failure to empower
the champions of my firm’s strategic vision (Project Two, section 3.3) follows on
from my working with my partner Bill on strategy-setting (Project One, section 2.3).
Project Two ends (section 3.10) with a summary of the intertwining of power and
silence from both projects. Project Three onwards also sees a shift in narrative
emphasis from the exploration of puzzles in the past to action in the present, which is
part of the shift towards discovering the puzzling in the ordinary.
Excepting the unsuccessful search to replace the difficult chief executive of a major
professional association in Project One (section 2.6), the world of the professional
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interviewer only confronts us in Projects Three and Four. If this world is our
destination, in what kind of world do we arrive?
This research opens up an emotionally wearing world of high stakes, big gambles,
fast judgements, closed doors and professionals of ambivalent status.
The stakes are high for organisations. In the Project One narrative, Patrick causes the
organisation which he leads to defeat the attempts of two search firms to replace him,
with these costs: considerable humiliation for an international organisation and its
board; wasted fees and expenses alone likely to exceed £150,000; and significant
likelihood of a makeshift ultimate appointment. The Project Four narrative takes up
the aftermath of a chief executive’s unexpected departure, and is sufficiently nerve-
wracking for Bryan, the experienced businessman chair, to be attracted to advisory
‘belt and braces’ – me as well as a search firm.
The stakes are no less high for individuals: candidates reaching the pinnacle of their
careers; encountering the esteem or disrespect of colleagues; or striving for the
financial means to support themselves, and wondering afterwards whether too much
or not enough preparation, or the wrong kind of jacket or sense of humour was to
blame. I think of staff finding themselves with a new boss (perhaps one of their
former peers), or board members like Curtis, a gambler who ultimately loses out in
his threatened resignation over Xavier. The gamble for both organisation and
candidate when a senior person, particularly a chief executive, is appointed is huge.
Let us notice time. Anxiety and organisational vulnerability are part of the reason
behind the shortage of time which seems to be a taken-for-granted part of this world.
But the rush might seem odd by contrast with the high stakes. My examiners may
easily spend three times longer interviewing me on this thesis than many British
university committees will spend interviewing a candidate for vice-chancellor – and
the multiple will be much larger for the time spent digesting the paperwork. Even if
fifty minutes is a wise amount of time to spend interviewing a leadership candidate,
why is five or ten minutes a wise amount of time to spend distilling that interview
into a judgement?
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It is a world of closed doors which exclude people – of conversations in private about
the ‘real’ needs of the organisation, interviews in private, decisions made in private,
and doors closed in the faces of many candidates seeking appointment who will not
get an interview, let alone be appointed to the role.
It is, I suggest, also a world of ambivalently regarded professionals, with a number of
individuals well paid for doing a job which is not easy and whose consequences are
significant, but with low status (Project Four, section 5.6).
6.2.2 Voice and presence in this writing
Alternatively we can notice something different from a ‘game of two halves’ –
perhaps a wave motion which gradually stabilises.
In the Introduction (section 1.2) I highlighted as particularly difficult my striving to
make myself sufficiently present in the text while leaving room for another.
Impersonal, deceptive objectivity and personal, overwhelming subjectivity produce
in common a text which does not have space for the reader as a person. But the
terrain between these poles differs for each writer, and contains individual perils. I
am reminded of this by re-reading my supervisor’s comments on the recurrence in
my early drafts of ironic detachment to my own experience. Certainly I do not find
this journey towards a different voice and presence one which a beginner can make
on their own.
Thus in Projects One and Two my depiction of the stakes at play in my bargaining
over strategy with Bill, followed by my two year attempt at empowering champions
(or attempting to ‘disprove’ the accusation of being too controlling) strikes me now
as muted. I tell you that these were failures of leadership in a setting to which I had
not only given my heart but two central decades of my working life, and I invite you
to infer the pain from the data. By contrast when I re-read the choosing of learning
sets, I have a foretaste of the emotion which bursts through in Project Two in the
poem ‘Naming of Parts’ and in the photograph of the bound woman (section 3.8).
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Similarly with the organisational trauma inflicted by Patrick on his internationally
reputed organisation in Project One (section 2.6). Apart from defeating the efforts of
two search firms, Patrick caused a senior individual who had publicly resigned from
his job elsewhere to unresign (practically unheard of in my experience). Again I
slightly side-step and let you infer the pain. By contrast I hope the organisational
anxiety involved in the chief executive search in Project Four comes to life more
(section 5.2.1 – the arrival of strangers) but not so insistently as to exclude other
interpretations.
Three years ago I would have interpreted this pattern in amateur psychological terms
– something to do with an insecure psyche. Insecure psyches have not been
abolished, but now I think it as important as a first step to see the pattern in terms of
practised physical skill, involving my fingers as much as my mind: in the early
projects I do not know how to be more present in my writing in a way which does
not push you out; and as a second step to notice the inadequacy of skill as a
descriptor compared to habitus.
Thus, writing is not picking each next word rationally from the Shorter Oxford
Dictionary according to some measure of its expected rhetorical effects – as if
writing were buying words from Amazon, whose algorithm predicts that ‘Writers
like you who have bought ‘whose algorithm predicts’ often next buy ‘the future’’.
The skill here would be the precision and speed of the algorithm. Nor is it, as
Dreyfus & Dreyfus propose in an important advance beyond skill which nevertheless
remains inadequate, an expert mind individually and intuitively (in their term
arationally) sensing patterns of words as a result of a decade of immersion in that
dictionary, like a Scrabble master with autism. Rather it is a small number of words
(including some which the writer has never previously read or written54) already
rising off the keyboard in my immersion with others in a game – in this case a game
of research. The apparently solitary act of writing is radically social.
In Project Four I invite you to explore Curtis’ outburst against Xavier, the shock of
Zelda’s interview yielding diametrically opposed views, the tension of the panel’s
54 For example ‘telic power’ at the end of section 4, Project Two.
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final decision-making and my abortive first attempt at writing the project. By Project
Four I may be more successfully finding language which offers both of us space to
be. If so, this struggle in the domain of writing mirrors the struggle of this research in
the domain of thought to join Bourdieu in rejecting the opposites which he labelled
‘social phenomenology’ and ‘social physics’ (1990a, p. 135).
6.2.3 A journey of destruction and construction: radical sociality
For me, however, the most telling break is between Projects Three and Four. Here
there is a fundamental shift in the investigative journey towards radical sociality; a
journey which can be understood as a twofold path of destruction and construction.
Each of Projects One to Three contained revelatory shocks. Pillars of my taken-for-
granted understanding collapsed. It was a double shock in Project One to lose, thanks
to Stacey and Griffin’s analysis of systems thinking and leadership, my ethical
understanding of myself as a leader. I had bathed in a warm humanitarian glow, but
my treatment of colleagues and staff had been de-humanising. A shock in itself55: but
a double shock to realise that bookshelves of insights from well-regarded academic
sources only compounded the problem. A quotation about the efficacy of soft
systems methodology particularly sticks in my throat:
Given the frame of mind outlined above, any problematical situation in
human affairs may be tackled with some confidence. (Checkland &
Poulter, 2006, p. 168)(Project One, section 2.8)
The first shock in Project Two was larger still. I do not until sections 3.8 and 3.9
make explicit the idea of communication as gesture-response which I am working
towards – I link this to Bourdieu and Mead, pointed to by Stacey and Griffin.
However this thinking underlies the collapse in section 3.4 of the signal-processing
idea of communication (what I term the fundamental ambiguity of meaning). If you
can understand anything which someone else is saying, then it is possible that that
55 Which took time to reach fruition. Project One was written in 2007. At the beginning of section 8 I
listed the assessment of capital adequacy for banks, on which I had worked in the Treasury, as an
example of the unproblematic use of systems thinking. Then we had the world’s worst financial crisis.
In January 2010 I had the opportunity to give a lecture on this and took a less rosy view -
http://www.gresham.ac.uk/event.asp?PageId=45&EventId=925 (accessed 11 April 2010).
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understanding is meant to deceive you. I had inhabited a world in which isolated
Cartesian minds assigned meanings to symbols for their convenience, like
shipwrecked dictionary-writers. I entered one in which human communication is
always and necessarily a matter of shifting power relations.
In Project Two my understanding of power also changed, from something akin to
physical force to something much more paradoxical, in which the insights of Elias
into mutual dependence and Foucault into the politically-inflected nature of truth-
telling (and silence) were significant. However the resolution of my narrative – why
had I failed to empower energetic colleagues despite walking my talk for two years?
– did not come until Arendt distinguished violence from the power of creative social
action. In my narrative I had demanded creative social action at the point of a
managerial gun. Arendt suggested that this might be doomed to fail. The thinkers
about power whom I classified as atomic (Dahl and Lukes) did not.
In Project Two I see now an unconscious hint of the central theme of Project Three
(intuition). This lies in the silent anticipation of the wishes of the powerful, without a
word or gesture needing to be uttered (‘lip-reading’). On reaching Project Three, the
shock was a double demolition: to find alarming inadequacies in the concept of
competences (Boyatzis) which is foundational in contemporary human resource
practice, including recruiting; and the concept of intuitive expertise arising from
long, immersed practice (Dreyfus & Dreyfus) not surviving long in its place.
This is half of my answer to the question I posed in the Introduction (section 1.3):
why does the shift to radical sociality take so long (not until Project Four)? What
really changes? Part of what changes is a work of demolition or clearing, reflecting
how interwoven are the strands of my taken-for-granted understanding.
But the other half of my answer is a process of construction, more experiential than
intellectual. I have experienced three years of working with difference, using conflict
and challenge as part of creating relatively durable intersubjective knowledge about
human affairs, in place of deceptive objectivity mimicked from the physical sciences.
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As project succeeded project, I began to experience an answer to the anxiety which
dominated the start of this research (Introduction, section 1.2): if we cannot stand on
science, can we stand on anything at all? Is all we have plural, meaningless chaos –
and if so how is meaningful and ethical action possible? It seems my increasingly
inadequate Cartesian foundations did not finally give way until I felt in the flesh
different conditions of possibility for action. The old ground refused to give way
until I experienced somewhere else to stand. Here – between Projects Three and Four
– a transition takes place which, as remarked in the note placed at that point, is not a
turning to a radically social perspective outside of me, but a change in my own
understanding of myself in the world.
‘In the flesh’ is not rhetoric. The conflict and challenge of the journey on which nine
of us embarked three years ago have involved pain. Six of us withdrew, for a mixture
of medical reasons, personal choice or on faculty advice. One has received a master’s
degree: two remain. As colleagues and in learning sets, we became involved in each
other’s fate. This journey has been undertaken in the flesh.
6.3 Critical reflections
Having drawn the four projects together, three questions stand out for me as
priorities for critique. These provide the subject matter for sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
Firstly, narrative and personal identity. Narratives have been a fundamental building
block of each project – why? This is not only a question of method: what of the fact
that selection interviewing also concerns people and their stories? To what concept
of personal identity does this work point?
Secondly, subjectivity and objectivity. Initially through Elias’ understanding of
involvement and detachment, then with borrowings from Stacey, and culminating
with Bourdieu, this has been a central theme. What sense do I make of these
understandings in relation to each other? Are they a coherent thread or broken and
contradictory? New work by Stacey (2010) suggests the latter.
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Thirdly, whatever the reasons just suggested in section 6.2.3, the full weight of
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of practice surfaces late in this research. If we take
practice not as one kind of human activity (distinct, say, from detached reflection)
but as foundational for the whole range of human meaning-making, then this
conceptual framework cuts to the core of our understanding of ourselves and our
world. Further work to sharpen what I am saying and to make it more accessible to
challenge is a priority. To do this I will return to Karl Weick and take up his idea of
sense-making.
6.4 Narrative and personal identity
6.4.1 The significance of narrative
I wrote in Project Two, section 3.8:
... I have been deeply struck by the unity of the challenge of this research
(method) with the challenge of interviewing a candidate for a job (my
substantive inquiry). Both in this research, and when someone is being
interviewed, we are seeking to explore a range of experience which to a
large extent is only accessible by the individual recalling that experience,
making assertions about it and reliving it in narration.
In opening up the connections between narrative and personal identity, I will leave
large parts of identity as a subject untouched – even parts directly relevant to themes
raised earlier56. Instead, my focus is to ask why has narrative been central to this
work? How does this relate to the place of narrative in the practice of interviewing?
And what does this mean for personal identity?
I suspect that every interviewer immediately knows the difference between a
narrative and a summary of events when they ask for one and their interviewee gives
them the other. In the first an experience is, to a degree, lived or re-lived; the second
presents itself as a statement of facts. In my interview practice, stories help me
glimpse – imperfectly - how a person understood what they were doing at the time;
56 For example identity is a central theme for feminist thinkers (cf Project Four, section 7.1). See for
example ‘Feminism After Bourdieu’ (Adkins & Skeggs, 2004). This theme is developed further in the
context of identity and reflexivity by Adams (2006).
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what mattered to them; what worried or delighted them; how influential (or not) they
experienced themselves as being in the situation; and how successful (or not) their
actions seemed to themselves. Practised story-tellers and actors can dissimulate, but
mostly when we are ‘deceived’ by a person’s narration of an experience of some
significance to them, we are being deceived by their own misperceptions and blind
spots more than by their artifice. Imperfectly, we enter their habitus.
Stories, then, are important if we consider the person’s lived experience important.
While the reference to sense-making anticipates section 6.6, Weick puts this point
powerfully. Stories are carriers of how we understand our world, evoking
participative responses both synchronically (between people) and diachronically (in
the same person’s memory):
If accuracy is nice but not necessary in sensemaking, then what is
necessary? The answer is, something that preserves plausibility and
coherence, something that is reasonable and memorable, something that
embodies past experience and expectations, something that resonates
with other people, something that can be constructed retrospectively but
also can be used prospectively, something that captures both feeling and
thought, something that allows for embellishment to fit current oddities,
something that is fun to construct. In short, what is necessary in
sensemaking is a good story.
A good story holds disparate elements together long enough to energize
and guide action, plausibly enough to allow people to make retrospective
sense of whatever happens, and engagingly enough that others will
contribute their own inputs in the interest of sensemaking. (Weick, 1995,
pp. 60-61)
Narratives have been the bedrock of this research because I take humans to be
capable of insight which influences their own action and that of others. That insight
is always corrigible (ie we misrecognize our own actions) but it is rarely
meaningless. If we accept this, then any study of human activity which does not
capture that insight simply fails, in its reductionism, to address reality. Conversely if
we reject this assumption, then any research as a human process – including research
of the most scientific and empirical kind - is deluded.
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A leading thinker about identity and narrative is Paul Ricoeur. I interpret his study
‘Oneself as Another’ (1992) as a meticulous exploration of human identity in which
he argues that the self is radically social (meaningless without ‘another’ and
‘others’). Ricoeur suggests that a human identity is, fundamentally, a dialogue and a
struggle between two different kinds of sameness or continuity in one body – the
identity of objectivity in which two entities are ‘one and the same’, or
interchangeable or possess uninterrupted continuity in time (idem or sameness) and
the identity of subjectivity and agency – I who speak and act, who promised you
yesterday and will (or not) keep my promise today (ipse or selfhood)(ibid., pp. 116-
117):
... it is within the framework of narrative theory that the concrete
dialectic of selfhood and sameness ... attains its fullest development.
(Ibid., p. 114)
Moreover, through emplotment – an idea kindred to sense-making (ibid., p. 141) -
narrative weaves together action and happenstance, choice and chance, sense and
nonsense, making the sense which is human existence. A narrative expresses an
identity not only through what it claims happened but through what it implies might
have happened:
In truth, the narrative does not merely tolerate these variations, it
engenders them, it seeks them out. (Ibid., p. 148)
with the net result that the narrative unity of a life:
... must be seen as an unstable mixture of fabulation and actual
experience. (Ibid., p. 162)
The significance of narrative within this research can now be located in a context.
Ricoeur goes on to identify the significance for human identity not only of practices,
but of the larger combinations or sequences of these into:
... life plans ... those vast practical units that make up the professional
life, family life, leisure time and so forth. (Ibid., p. 157)
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His focus on this, as well as on ‘an unstable mixture of fabulation and actual
experience’ fits well my first year of experience in my new career advice business
(Project Three). My experience is of working with clients in a way which is intense
because of the kind of clients I seek57 and because (unlike a search professional) my
professional obligation is now unambiguously towards a person, not an organisation.
In our time together58 we work with my client’s experience, seeing new things within
it and trying different ‘fabulations’ around it. In this emergent work part of my role is
to be mindful of the strong but not unchallengeable resistance of habitus and field to
change.
6.4.2 Narrative, interviewing and personal identity
Bourdieu has trenchant things to say about interviews which go to the heart of
personal identity. Recall that this was the subject of my disagreement with him in
Project Two (section 3.8). He declines the invitation of his colleague and
interlocutor, Wacquant, to say something about ‘the private person Pierre Bourdieu’,
and I go on to make this charge:
I vigorously contend that contra Bourdieu, in order to be as real as may
be, reflexive sociology cannot limit itself to sanitised words from a
fictitious impersonal occupant of my social class and professional track.
To be so limited is to resurrect the ghost of the detached scientific
observer, albeit clothed in some social habits and outlooks. (Section 3.8)
Of course, there is no neutrality here: my habitus and economic livelihood as a
selection interviewer and career adviser both depend on, and produce, commitments
to the significance of individuality.
In his essay ‘The Biographical Illusion’ (2000a) Bourdieu takes up interviews in a
broad sense. He argues that interviews should not be seen as revealing an inner
constancy but as the social production of a succession of remarks, produced for
various contingent reasons and effects:
57 Ones wishing to explore a marked shift in career direction: in other words a lot of their identity is at
stake.
58 Over the first year of my new business, the ‘three hour’ discussions whose creation I explored in
Project Three have ranged between three and three and a half hours.
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... unconscious assumptions about the interview (like the concern for
chronology, and all that which is inherent in the representation of life as
history), and through the interview situation which, depending upon the
objective distance between the interviewer and the interviewee and the
ability of the interviewer to ‘manipulate’ this relationship, will move
from this mild form of official interrogation (which is most often,
without the knowledge of the sociologist, sociological inquiry), right to
the secret, moving through the more or less conscious representation that
the one queried will make of the situation of inquiry. This representation
will be based on the interviewee’s direct or indirect experience of
equivalent situations (interview of a famous writer, or politician,
examinations taken, etc), and these will direct all his efforts to
presentation of self, or rather, to production of self. (Bourdieu, 2000a, p.
301)59
Thus far I would agree. Bourdieu goes on to link the idea of selves to the production
of  narratives. But unlike Ricoeur’s narrative in which the tension between
conflicting purposes and chance is central, here Bourdieu treats narrative as thin and
linear:
... The autobiographical narrative is always at least partially motivated by
a concern to give meaning, to rationalize, to show the inherent logic, both
for the past and for the future, to make consistent and constant, through
the creation of intelligible relationships, like that of the cause (immediate
or final) between successive states, which are thus turned into steps of a
necessary development.
...
To produce a life history or to consider life as a history, that is, as a
coherent narrative of a significant and directed sequence of events, is
perhaps to conform to a rhetorical illusion, to the common representation
of existence that a whole literary tradition has always and still continues
to reinforce. (Ibid., p. 298)
Noting Shakespeare’s ‘tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing’, Bourdieu argues that identity is a fiction instituted by the State (in the
registration of a proper name) in the guise of an act of recording (ibid., p. 300).
Moreover:
59 Atkinson and Silverman (1997) contend that we are living in an ‘interview society’ in which, both
generally and in qualitative research, individuals speaking about their own lives are taken at face
value. They do not discuss selection interviews. These, because of their competitive structure and
interests at stake, do not normally take interviewees’ answers uncritically.
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... The proper name cannot describe properties and conveys no
information about that which it names; since what it designates is only a
complex and disparate rhapsody of biological and social properties
undergoing constant flux, all descriptions are valid only within the limits
of a specific stage or place. (Ibid., p. 300)
But in Bourdieu’s view is there nothing durable about a person?
Without doubt one can find in the habitus the active principle, irreducible
to passive perceptions, of the unification of the practices and of the
representations (that is the historically constituted, hence, historically
situated, equivalent of this self of which, according to Kant, one must
postulate the existence in order to account for the synthesis of the various
sensations given through intuition, and for the liaison of representations
in a consciousness). But this practical identity reveals itself to intuition
only in the inexhaustible series of its successive manifestations, in such a
way that the only manner of apprehending it as such consists perhaps in
attempting to recapture it in the unity of an integrative narrative ... .
(Ibid., p. 299)
In this essay Bourdieu takes the step against which I railed prematurely in Project
Two. He now says not merely that the personality (whatever is left over beyond
habitus) is beyond sociological inquiry – that was the point Bourdieu made when he
said:
Sociology treats as identical all biological individuals who, being
products of the same objective conditions, have the same habitus. (1990a,
p. 59)
but that it is ‘a tale told by an idiot ... signifying nothing’.
Of course the experience of being a self does not simply signify what the individual
(or ‘idiot’) doxically believes – that is the burden of misrecognition. But equally, as
Bourdieu has maintained throughout his work, it does not signify nothing. In this
particular expression of his thought perhaps we hear the cynic’s voice, rather than
that of the person who wrote:
It is because agents never know completely what they are doing that what
they do has more sense than they know. (Ibid., p. 69)
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or the Bourdieu who, while emphatically rejecting the ‘subject from nowhere’ –
transhistorical, causa sui – also rejects the exaggeration of habitus to be something
monolithic or immutable, ‘leaving no room in any circumstances for conscious
intention’ (2000b, pp. 115, 64).
The ‘idiot’ claim in ‘The Biographical Illusion’ (originally published in 1986 in
Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales), may be rhetorical overstatement. Taken
literally, Bourdieu lacks the courage of his convictions. He should have called for the
abandoning of referencing of previous academic work by authors’ names: an
attribution to a social/trajectory classification and a publication date should suffice if
the proper name, a fiction of the State, tells us nothing more of value.
That Bourdieu shrinks from telling us about himself the kind of details he tells us in
his work on Heidegger (like Bourdieu a provincial character risen to intellectual
heights) – ‘[Heidegger’s] belated and purely scholastic acquisition of an educated
language’, ‘this dark, athletic little man, an accomplished skier, with energetic but
impassive features’, ‘his penchant for anti-semitism’, ‘his total lack of a sense of
humour’ (1991b, pp. 47-49) – is Bourdieu’s privilege, as a private human being. But
it is a privacy we accord him because he has an identity which is more than his
sociological co-ordinates, and which matters.
6.5 Subjectivity and objectivity
My second critical focus is shifts in how I have worked with the theme of
subjectivity and objectivity through the projects, and whether these differences
conceal important contradictions. I will first reprise this journey, from Elias via
Stacey to Bourdieu, underlining its continuity.
Project One formulates this theme in the Eliasian terms of involvement and
detachment (1987). I noted Elias’ conception that humanity’s first mode of relating
to the world was engagement, dominated by highly involved, magico-mythic
thinking. From this emerged detachment, including science, which yielded great
material advantages in controlling and using non-sentient matter but was less
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effective when we tried to understand ourselves. Elias rejected Descartes’ Cogito
ergo sum as absurd, as positing a fantastic ‘I without a we’ (ibid., pp. 14, 57). For
Elias a ‘subject-object relationship’ conceived in this Cartesian way is an inadequate
basis for thinking about knowledge; instead we are always involved and detached at
the same time.
In Project Two I take steps which I understand as intensifying involvement and
detachment in this research: I try to be bold, I try not to ‘hide anything’ (section 3.9).
That is the intensified subjectivity. My idea of intensified objectivity is to try to put
as much effort and boldness into criticising what I say as into saying it. But I
conclude that this is misconceived. I have remained in a Cartesian trap – trying to ‘do
reflexivity’ as Robinson Crusoe might, still thinking fundamentally atomically,
remaining caught around the pole of my subjectivity. I draw on Stacey and Griffin to
illuminate that:
If one takes the view that knowledge emerges and evolves in a history of
social interaction, rather than being developed by an autonomous
individual, then one attaches central importance to research as a
participative, social process. Research on organizations is then done by
participating in a community of researchers who are together exploring
the meaning they are making of their experience. This inevitably involves
conflict as people explore their differences and, indeed, this conflict is
essential for the movement of thought. (Stacey & Griffin, 2005, p. 23)
This lays the foundation in Project Three (and subsequently) for an intensified effort
to work with difference in wider literature – for example juxtaposing Dreyfus &
Dreyfus’ scheme for expertise with Weick’s for improvisation.
The interpretation I offer in Project Four of Bourdieu’s understanding of science and
social science as disinterested practices (section 5.7.3) has common ground with
Elias’ production of detachment as a social accomplishment from an original state of
involvement, and with Stacey’s and Griffin’s conception of research as historical,
social and conflictual. This is the argument that my thread is coherent.
But thinking from Stacey (2010) suggests that I have overlooked serious differences.
Stacey starts from a position of bafflement as to how dominant thinking about
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management and organisations can continue apparently undeflected, not only by the
multiple experiences of failed prediction and contradiction which are (Stacey argues)
the daily lot of organisational life but also by a  massive global financial crisis,
unplanned and unpredicted. He then recapitulates his dissection of the problems in
this mode of thinking. A number of these themes appeared in Project One –
especially systems thinking and split thinking about causality. But Stacey now goes
further to suggest why manifest failings may leave the dominant mode of thinking
undisturbed.
In part he draws on Elias to suggest that this as-if or pretend-science is functioning as
the magico-mythic thinking of modern society. Precisely because it works badly, it
leaves us in the grip of the powerlessness, fear and anxiety which natural science
(working rather well) often in our physical lives lets us escape. In other words, the
‘miracles’ which science works in our daily lives enable as-if science to function as a
religion (and keep us powerless) in our organisational lives (ibid., pp. 99-100).
But he criticises Elias for not fully exploring his own distinction between
involvement and detachment (ibid., p. 101). Elias seems to assume that detached
thinking is more realistic, but detachment could be abstraction as a flight from
reality. Involvement (for example in the form of a therapist’s engagement with a
client’s emotions) could be a greater awareness of reality. Instead Stacey proposes
that we are always engaged, simultaneously and paradoxically, in processes of
immersion into and abstraction from the local interactions which are our lives.
By ‘immersing’ Stacey means:
... to describe what we are doing as we act locally in ways which
unconsciously reflect the generalizations and idealizations, the habitus of
our society. (Ibid., p. 108)
while ‘abstracting’ means ‘simplifying, generalizing and categorizing’ our
experience in one of two ways. Firstly, ways (such as narrative) which keep the
original complexity of action close to hand60 - he calls these first-order abstractions.
60 Relevant to the discussion of narrative in section 4.1.
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Or secondly, ways (such as a mission statement or an abstract discussion of research
methods) which simplify, generalize and categorize other abstractions rendering
original complexity invisible – second-order abstractions61.
We can now go to the crux of important differences in treating subjectivity and
objectivity which Stacey sees between Bourdieu and Elias, and between both of them
and himself, and which my claim of coherence overlooked:
Bourdieu’s notion of pre-occupation in the game seems close to Elias’
involved thinking and Bourdieu’s reference to rational planning seems
close to detached thinking. Nevertheless, Bourdieu dismisses the rational
planning and focuses on pre-occupation, so taking the opposite view to
Elias. However, in most of his other work Elias argues in terms of
interdependence and habitus where reality congruence is a problematic
notion. It seems to me that Elias presents a duality of involved and
detached thinking and regards a move towards the detached pole as
desirable while Bourdieu proposes a similar duality with the preoccupied
mode at one pole and the rational planned mode at the other pole, his
preference being for the former. Neither presents a strong paradox where
both involved-preoccupied and detached-planned are practised at the
same time: after all people do make plans and at the same time, they are
preoccupied in the game, acting out the habitus in which they live. (Ibid.,
pp. 107-108)
Having discussed in Project Four differences between Bourdieu and Elias in
interpretations of habitus, here I will stick to differences within the theme of
involvement and detachment. Stacey makes at least two important contributions to
this discussion.
Firstly, Stacey emphasises that for Bourdieu, illusio is the foundation of meaningful
action (ibid., p. 107, citing Bourdieu 1998a, pp. 77-78), its opposite being uninterest
to the point of not noticing. I am arguing that from this primary state we construct, as
social practices and processes, possibilities for detachment – because some games
have detachment or disinterest as their stakes (Project Four, section 5.7.4).
Reflexivity of any importance – certainly for Bourdieu reflexivity with any potential
61 Stacey emphasises that he is not critical of second-order abstractions per se; indeed science and
modernity would be impossible without them. What he suggests is that we have not fully noticed the
extent either of the explosion in second-order abstraction in modern organisational life or the
accompanying disappearance of the original complexity of local action from our view (ibid., pp. 108-
116).
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to challenge what is taken as obvious, doxic, common sense, part of the habitus of an
activity – needs to take the form of engagement in an appropriate new game, and not
simply be wistful self-contemplation.
I demur from Stacey’s suggestion that Bourdieu neglects the significance of
detachment or is in this respect oppositely situated to Elias. For me, Bourdieu had no
more consistent passion than to raise social science to the greatest detachment, or
objectivity, or realism, of which it was capable (2004, pp. 89-91); a process of
difficult work, social and historically contingent through and through. In this respect
I see little difference with Elias, who in ‘Involvement and Detachment’ (1987) is at
pains to remind us not only how valuable – life-saving, in the parable of the
maelström – detachment is, but how long a journey of centuries society needed to
travel to pass on to us a habitus which embodies high levels of detachment and
makes us moderns (ibid., pp. 34-35, 75-76, 108-112)62.
Secondly, Stacey suggests that Bourdieu and Elias offer discourses with a weak
sense of paradox, which for Stacey makes them less congruent with lived experience.
The marks of paradox are two elements in tension, present simultaneously and
neither making sense without the other. Paradox requires, as well as tension,
necessary inter-dependence as the reason for co-presence. Thus, a radically social
view considers the terms ‘individual’ and ‘society’ in this way.
The three years of this research, subjecting to intense inquiry much experience not
recorded here (plenary and learning set meetings, discussions of discarded draft
projects), has persuaded me that the absence of paradox is a valuable warning sign of
an inadequate conceptualisation. (I stop short of arguing that paradox is always
62 Disagreeing with Stacey’s claim prompts me to ask whether I see some other important difference
between Bourdieu and Elias. I think so. I now notice how Bourdieu’s language enables him to
distance himself from emotions. Elias talks repeatedly of fear, frightening magico-mythic worlds,
shame and other emotions. Bourdieu wraps all this up in illusio. This remarkable, fertile concept of
absorption in a game allows him to say the equivalent of ‘all human life is here’ – witness the remark
of the football manager that football is far more important than life and death. So in the wrapper of
illusio, Bourdieu can have fear, shame and joy, but he does not have to deal with them as directly as
Elias. Following the explosion of emotion at the end of Project Two, did I find it safer to shift towards
a more dispassionate reflexivity?
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essential. I do not know whether human experience in all societies at all times must
be paradoxical.)
Bourdieu sees his own thought as paradoxical:
[Pascal] points beyond the dilemma of objectivism and subjectivism: ‘By
space the universe comprehends me and swallows me up like an atom; by
thought I comprehend the world.’ ... .
From this paradoxical relationship of double inclusion flow all the
paradoxes which Pascal assembled under the heading of wretchedness
and greatness, and which ought to be meditated on by all those who
remain trapped in the scholastic dilemma of determinism and freedom:
determined (wretchedness), man can know his determinations (greatness)
and work to overcome them. (2000b, pp. 130-131)
I experience now an understanding of the world both enchanted and disenchanted at
the same time, which leads me to agree with Bourdieu. That world is constructed by
repeated acts of reflexive social practice which try to disenchant it – to overcome
misrecognition. Yet each blow must misrecognize itself; it springs from its own
illusio and habitus, its own things not yet defined which it takes for granted in order
not to take its object for granted. I understand contemporary humanity as both
inhabiting and creating a world of unending disenchantment – yet by the same token
unending enchantment, an enchantment never exhausted by the process which
unfolds.
6.6 Bourdieu and Weick: practice and sense-making
My third priority in terms of critique is to sharpen and make more accessible to
challenge the conceptualisation of practice which I have drawn from Bourdieu. To do
this, I return to working with difference – specifically contrasting practice with
sense-making as developed by Karl Weick, on whom I drew in Project Three.
Weick’s work is more widely understood among management scholars working in
English than Bourdieu’s63.
63 An alternative path which I have declined (because of space and because sense-making is a more
developed and widely known body of thought) would follow the take up of practice and habitus by
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Bourdieu (1930-2002) and Weick (1936- ) are contemporaries, but neither in
Weick’s principal exposition of sense-making (1995) nor in two volumes of papers
collected over three decades (2001) (2009) does he cite Bourdieu or habitus. Nor do I
know of any citation by Bourdieu in the opposite direction.
Both habitus and sense-making are attempts to give an account of human meaning-
making and agency in action – in pressured and complex worlds which,
uninterpreted, would overwhelm any possibility of thoughtful agency. Both scholars
break sharply from the supposition that a rational, Cartesian mind could simply
contemplate the totality of what exists and formulate logical actions:
The concept of sensemaking ... is intended to break the stranglehold that
decisionmaking and rational models have had on organizational theory
... . (Weick, 2009, p. 194)
We can see in the thought of both scholars an echo of the Heideggerian idea that we
are agents thrown into a world of concern and pressed to act (Heidegger, 1962, pp.
174, 236). And to the extent that rational thought-before-action is our doxic
understanding of ourselves, both Bourdieu and Weick make a fundamental claim of
misrecognition. Both say our common sense is mistaken: but the interpretations
which they offer instead are different.
Weick traces his ‘fascination’ with sense-making back to conversations in the early
1960s with individuals such as Harold Garfinkel (Weick, 1995, p. 10). Weick cites a
central tenet of sense-making from research on trial juries:
In place of the view that decisions are made as the occasions require, an
alternative formulation needs to be entertained. It consists of the
psychologically oriented writers. Lizardo has written illuminatingly about the influence which he sees
of the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget on Bourdieu (Lizardo, 2004): very relevant to ‘tearing
the banknote in half’. Piaget emphasised the bodily nature of human being, as did Merleau-Ponty:
Crossley has provided an account of Bourdieu’s habitus which emphasises the connections with
Merleau-Ponty and Mead (Crossley, 2001). Pickel offers from ‘a systemic and mechanismic
philosophy of science perspective’ an interpretation of habitus which in my view is reductionist and
not radically social (Pickel, 2005). Turner attacks radical sociality and Bourdieu from an atomic
perspective lacking in reflexivity: he finds them unscientific and quasi-Marxist (Turner, 2007).
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possibility that the person defines retrospectively the decisions that have
been made. The outcome comes before the decision. In the material
reported here, jurors did not actually have an understanding of the
conditions that defined a correct decision until after the decision had been
made. Only in retrospect did they decide what they did that made their
decisions correct ones. (Garfinkel, 1984, pp. 113-114)
Whereas Bourdieu’s logic of practice is anticipatory – the player ‘adjusts not to what
he sees but what he fore-sees, sees in advance in the directly perceived present’
(1990a, p. 81) – Weick takes a different tack. After referring to William James’
uninterpreted (and, if left uninterpreted, overwhelming and meaningless) ‘stream of
experience’, Weick takes as self-evident that we can only attend to what is past:
... Experience as we know it exists in the form of distinct events. But the
only way we get this impression is by stepping outside the stream of
experience and directing attention to it. And it is only possible to direct
attention to what exists, that is, what has already passed. (Weick, 1995, p.
25)
In passing, for Weick attention is detached whereas for Bourdieu anticipation is
involved, but let us look more closely at what Weick argues we can notice. Firstly, in
the face of the potentially overwhelming stream, agents do not need more
information but more interpretation:
... Investigators who favour the metaphor of information processing ...
often view sensemaking, as they do most other problems, as a setting
where people need more information. That is not what most people need
when they are overwhelmed by equivocality. Instead, they need values,
priorities and clarity about preferences to help them be clear about which
projects matter. Clarity on values clarifies what is important in elapsed
experience, which finally gives some sense of what that elapsed
experience means. (Ibid., pp. 27-28)
For Weick, meaningful experience is not simply ‘there’ in the flux of the physical
world, but humanly constructed. ‘Noticing’ is a kind of action. Secondly, then, what
an agent is capable of noticing is influenced by her possibilities for action. Pointing
to the history by which medical professionals came to ‘notice’ unexplained fractured
bones as child abuse, Weick summarises:
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When people develop the capacity to act on something, then they can
afford to see it. (2009, p. 32)
This observation chimes with the suggestion in section 6.2.3 above that only at the
end of Project Three – when sufficient experience had accumulated for me to feel
that thoughtful action would still be possible on the far side of a shift to radical
sociality - did I notice things which prompted that shift.
Finally, we recall from section 6.4 the central role for Weick of stories as carriers of
sense. To do its work, sense does not have to be exact – as in the example of soldiers
lost in a snowstorm who survive thanks to a map of the wrong mountain (1995, p.
54).
A key problem in Project Four - individuals moving to unfamiliar organizational
settings – has been studied using sense-making. Meryl Reis Louis (1980), a
management scholar, identifies previous theorisation of this subject as reliant on
rational agency and its associated expectations. Sense-making offers a more adequate
account, she suggests, than explanations of recruitment wastage centred on conscious
expectations rationally formed prior to entering the new organization – ie thought-
before-action.
Among other things, Louis points out that surprises may arise at least as much from
the new entrant’s mistaken assumptions about herself (what I can and want to do) as
from mistaken expectations of the job (Louis, 1980, pp. 245-246). This ‘thicker’
account of major transition for which Louis argues sits well alongside that which I
gave using habitus in Project Four, section 5.6 – for example the idea that what the
agent will turn out to want is itself a significant unknown.
But the heart of the matter is the relationship of sense-making to action: how does
this compare with the logic of practice and habitus? The following are the central
features of Louis’ sense-making account (ibid., p. 242). Drawn to notice features of
the environment by contrast and surprise, the agent makes fresh sense of her
situation. She is influenced by past experiences and interpretative schemes, her
predispositions and purposes and others’ interpretations. The agent then ‘selects’ her
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behavioural response (she acts). The sense freshly made, as well as unplanned
consequences of the action and new changes in the environment, lead to a fresh
sense-making/action cycle.
Comparing this to Bourdieu’s logic of practice, the similarity is that under the
pressure of time and involvement, the experienced reality to which the agent
responds is heavily interpreted in a way which is not fully conscious. This
interpretative matrix is affected by what happens (including interaction with others)
and by the agent’s own history, and it carries forward with both continuity and the
possibility of change to the next action cycle. However there are important
differences.
In sense-making the agent sees a constructed past. Constructing a visual metaphor,
we can picture this as an agent who strides forward but whose head faces backwards
- sense-making came alive for me when I first experienced this unorthodox image as
more accurate than the conventional (forward facing) picture. Indeed if we were to
focus on the top-level decision-making of a business, the sense-making picture fits
extremely well. Management information systems necessarily look backwards.
Colloquially we speak of someone leading an organisation ‘by looking in the rear
view mirror’. The curriculum vitae of candidates for a role tell us what they claim to
have done in the past.
What the sense-making agent ‘sees’ (or notices) in this constructed past is much
influenced by surprise or discrepancy. Progressively greater failure of parts of the
environment to function as expected trigger progressively deeper, or more active,
thinking64. This is contrasted with habitual, or relatively unconscious, thinking, often
with a tendency – while not dismissing habitual thinking as unproductive - to value
conscious modes of thinking as more potent65.
64 This line of thought is central to Heidegger’s conception of human being, and has been developed
into a ‘taxonomy of surprise’ and associated modes of thinking by Yanow and Tsoukas (2009). While
their apparent emphasis is classificatory, there are some indicators that they take habitual or
unconscious thought to be the lesser relation.
65 Or, for example ‘more mindful’, ‘controlled’ versus ‘automatic’ thinking (Weick, 2009, p. 55).
Weick has developed ideas of organisational mindfulness as contributors to functioning with high
reliability (ibid., pp. 98-99).
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By contrast, in Bourdieu’s logic of practice, the agent’s gaze is involved and
anticipatory: the product of the interaction of habitus and field is that she ‘fore-sees’
the game (she does not in the act of gazing construct a conscious predictive model
which a retrospective sense-maker may choose to do). The agent’s focus is the game.
This seems to me a more accurate and richer description than making different kinds
of surprise the dominant explanation for focussed attention. An agent with a
particular feel for the game may give rapt attention to a fifth day of repetitive cricket;
a priest marking forty years in the priesthood may be overwhelmed by celebrating
communion; yet both events may be entirely free of surprise. Games have other
drivers beyond surprise. The Bourdieusian agent not only faces in a different
direction but does so with a different kind of gaze.
Moreover, Bourdieusian practice leaves open whether more conscious, more active,
or more reflective thought will be more effective than the product of an expert
habitus which closely matches its counterposed field. The situational openness of
which mode of thinking should be preferred would be better reflected, perhaps, if we
spoke of thinking which is ‘slow’ (rational, explicit) versus ‘fast’ (the product of
matching habitus and field). Hares and tortoises can both find ways to make
livings66.
We may note two further differences before drawing the threads of this comparison
together. Firstly, Weick emphasises the extent to which the environment can become
what the agent makes of it (of course it then acts circularly back on the agent):
The problem is that [the environment] is empty. If the environment is
empty then it is not surprising that people are able to enact the conditions
that in turn enact them. (2009, p. 203)
66 Louis’ suggestion that more conscious thinking is always better when stakes are high is rebutted by
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, notably in the experiment in which video recordings of five students and one
experienced paramedic giving cardiopulmonary resuscitation were shown to other experienced
paramedics, students and instructors. Asked whom they would choose to save their own lives in an
emergency, nine out of ten experienced paramedics picked their counterpart, while seven out of ten
instructors picked students (the students themselves were in between). ‘The instructors, attempting to
find the paramedic by looking for the individual closely following the rules they taught, failed to find
the expert because an experienced paramedic has passed beyond the rule-following stage’ (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986, pp. 200-201).
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By contrast the Bourdieusian agent faces fields which may at times seem near-solid.
Secondly, conflict is intrinsic to the radically social conception of field and symbolic
power (Project Four, section 5.5). By contrast, in many atomic accounts conflict
recedes or disappears. This happens in interesting ways in Weick’s world. A
prominent feature of his work is studies of life-threatening situations such as child
abuse, tragedy on the space shuttle and wildfires (2009, pp. 31, 111, 246). These
settings offer him possibilities to treat goals (such as saving life) as if they were non-
conflictual and ethically unproblematic. In this respect there is not only an absence of
conflict and ethical complexity in Weick’s work relative to Bourdieu’s, but also a
less rigorous reflexivity.
Pictorially, the Bourdieusian agent is like a centaur whose rational eyes look
backwards (see the past), but whose equine, preconscious eyes look forward and see
(and the body already begins its response to) what the interaction of habitus and field
reveal – a field of possibilities which is also full of constraints. Of course the picture
is clumsy, but it is a step I am trying to take in my thinking which not only captures
difference but hints at possible complementarity.
We can now see clear differences between the Bourdieusian and the Weickian agent.
Because of sense-making’s backwards focus, its description of how the agent’s
options for action materialise is thin. ‘Select behavioural response’ is a limited
concept compared to the generative capacity of the habitus. This limitation shows as
Weick explores how agents can act creatively - the question of improvisation which
we explored in Project Three (section 4.3.5) was a central one for him. Since
Weickian agents look backwards, a reference point fixed in the past (a source
melody) is central to his analysis of improvisation.
But there is some complementarity. We confronted in Project Four the difficulty of
taking further insightful steps in our account of what follows when an agent moves to
a very different field: the torn banknote (mismatched habitus and field) took us some
way, but can Weick take us further? During such a period of mismatch, the
Bourdieusian agent is in the position of a centaur whose equine instincts are failing.
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Then, all is thrown back on the rational, backward-looking eyes, and sense-making
offers a valuable account of what may - for a period - happen67.
The suggestions about agency which have emerged from this work are sketchy but I
am excited about the possibilities which open up. A horse in a field has more chance
of provoking interest and challenge from my colleague practitioners than a habitus in
a field. The image solicits fresh action. Graspable within a few minutes, it invites
interviewers to see both candidates and themselves in a way which foregrounds and
changes their understandings of rational thinking, intuition and the springs of action.
From Weick the practice of interviewing also gains a valuable description of the kind
of panel discussion following selection interviews to which as a result of this
research I now aspire, as part of moving beyond the ‘measurement’ or scientific
mindset:
... Deeper knowledge develops when people attend to more things,
entertain a greater variety of interpretations, differentiate their ideas,
argue, listen to one another, work to reconcile differences, and commit to
revisiting and updating whatever profound simplicities they settle on as
guidelines for action. (2009, p. 21)
6.7 Method
6.7.1 The nature of my knowledge claim; validity and generalisability
Project Four proposed that knowledge claims – even those of natural science - are
not transcendental or universal, but particular, local in a place and time, and social,
and that research has the characteristics of a disinterested practice. The judging of
claims as valid is a recognition of them by members of a research community as
worth exploring seriously. That recognition is always local but never ‘merely’ local;
it is shaped by, and shapes, an academic habitus and game, with particular stakes.
67 A weakness of this image is the way in which, with a cartoon flourish, it covers over the
relationship between practice and detached reasoning. I treated this in section 5.
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I offer this dissertation to seek that recognition at a place, the University of
Hertfordshire, which – borrowing a definition adopted by the national research
funding councils in 1996 – articulates the game’s stakes like this:
Research ... is to be understood as original investigation undertaken in
order to gain knowledge and understanding. It includes work of direct
relevance to the needs of commerce and industry, as well as to the public
and voluntary sectors; scholarship; the invention and generation of ideas,
images, performances and artefacts including design, where these lead to
new or substantially improved insights; and the use of existing
knowledge in experimental development to produce new or substantially
improved materials, devices, products and processes, including design
and construction ... . (University of Hertfordshire, 2006, p. A32)
What is a ‘gain’ in knowledge and understanding? My claim is that it is the same
kind of process which underlies what Project Four called a ‘weak ethical gravity’ in
relation to what makes for better interviewing or worse, better judgements about
candidates or worse: a process which Stacey and Griffin articulate in this way:
Justification and validity arise in complex social acts in which people
refer to the sensuous experience they have in common of the real world
they live in. What people are doing, as they engage in this way, is
exchanging propositions, and the product of the inquiry process is a
challenge to existing ways of thinking; that is, transformation and
movement in the nature of the propositional beliefs held by the inquirers.
As such movement occurs people find themselves fitting into the social
nexus in a different way. Making a contribution to knowledge is,
therefore, engaging in this social process so as to produce movement in
thought and so action. (2005, p. 39)
The understanding of science and social science which I offered in Project Four
suggests that the best which we can do to establish validity is to keep challenging
misrecognition reflexively – to keep exploring with others who find these stakes
important whether the sense we are making together of our actions as researchers is
the best we can currently offer.
One aspect of this reflexivity has been to include and explore narratives of this
research itself: these appear in all the projects except Three. These open up research
as a practice and make it easier to ask what are we doing together – rather than what
we believe we are doing. The same point applies in relation to the narratives of my
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practice. Exploring the narratives with others with different backgrounds has enabled
challenge of what has been omitted, or could be noticed and interpreted differently.
Another has been to work with difference – to identify patterns of similarity and
difference and using these to crystallise questions and to bring unnoticed aspects to
light. I have found this a profoundly valuable step – to find (and to be helped by
others to find) intellectual ‘fault lines’ which run through my experience which are as
deep as possible: in other words which have been the subject of intense
disagreements between able minds with different experience over generations.
Exploring how these fault lines change the sense I am making has offered real
reflexive gains. I have been prompted to notice differently. Others who have worked
with those fault lines in their own experience can more easily enter mine and offer
different insights. Thus the opportunity is created to break out of purely local
understandings. Since this work engages with questions as basic as what it is to be a
thinking, acting human being, it opens itself to challenge and development on a
broad front.
The breadth of experience available through this research programme – international,
and including many individuals with their own experiences of selection interviewing
as managers and as candidates – has been a major asset. I have also sought
conversations with individuals with wide experience of the practice which I am
studying68. I owe thanks to Dame Janet Paraskeva and Professor Jo Silvester, both of
whom made time to meet me and to read several of the projects as well as a draft of
this synopsis69.
Janet Paraskeva has been chief executive or chair of several organisations. For the
last five years she has been the First Civil Service Commissioner, responsible both
for chairing herself and guiding the chairing by others of panels which appoint
candidates to the most senior posts in UK public administration. The Civil Service
68 Not least with women, given my observations in Project Two on gender.
69 Professor Rakesh Khurana at Harvard met me at an earlier stage of this work, and a research fellow
and colleague of Jo Silvester, Dr Efrosyni Konstantinou, read a draft synopsis and commented in
detail. I thank them not only for their time, encouragement and insight but also for exemplifying for
me, a newcomer, the virtues of the academic habitus.
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Commissioners are charged by law with ensuring that appointments are made solely
on merit. Janet therefore has current experience of making senior appointments her
central focus as well as broad experience as a line manager.
Janet said she was ‘pretty sceptical’ of the value of academic research and the
motives behind it. She had had experiences of research as a self-promoting activity,
exclusive and remote from practical problems. She reacted differently to this work
(to the extent of wondering whether she might do some research herself). She
recognised the world described and found the themes of power, intuition and skill
important. She concurred with the description of the practice as stuck. This research
stimulated new reflections for her on her own experience. She asked for further work
to address for practitioners these issues and their implications for the concept of
merit.
Alongside interviewing is its associated, predominantly scientific, research discourse.
Jo Silvester, Professor of Psychology at City University London was formerly
associate editor of the International Journal of Selection and Assessment. A current
research interest for Jo is the selection of political leaders and the kind of leadership
which they provide. She recognises the description of the research field provided
here, and the key role of the political in practice. Rather than ‘stuck’, a number of her
experiences lead her to speak of active resistance towards currently proffered
selection ‘best practices’. She sees the wider discussion for which this research
argues as important but not easy to achieve, given the preference of academic
journals in the field for scientific incrementalism. As a step towards exploring how
an engagement with the psychological perspective might best start, she has offered
me the opportunity of a joint lecture in the autumn to her MSc students.
These responses were powerful ones for me - particularly the sense of movement of
thought, of a world recognised, and of interest in talking further.
6.7.2 Locating this research within the discourse on method
How knowledge is understood has implications for discussing method. Consider my
understanding of knowledge three years ago, which I have variously characterised as
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Cartesian, scientific or atomic (overlapping rather than synonymous terms). A
solitary mind contemplated the world and asked what it could know of it. This mind
placed its faith in reason – leading for example to mathematical laws, considered to
be universal or transcendental – and in regularities discovered by science through
experimentation. I espoused a kind of naïve logical positivism.
This kind of knowledge was discovered by techniques of reasoning (for example
reductio ad absurdum to prove that there are different sizes of infinity) or of
experiment (for example randomised controlled double-blind trials). Corresponding
to techniques are rules. One can ask of some research, on what techniques does it
rest? Were the rules of those techniques followed? Was a good choice made between
different possible techniques? These constitute a discussion of method, and provide a
rationale for comparing the approach taken in any piece of research with approaches
taken elsewhere.
On the understanding of knowledge I have put forward, this discussion makes no
sense. Knowledge is embedded in social practices: rule-following is meaningless or
impossible outside of a common (ie shared) sense. But two different questions make
sense in comparing the approach taken here with approaches taken elsewhere:
 into what social practices does this work try to speak? In which games of
research are the stakes the ones which matter here? Where, to what extent and
with what response does the researcher – who in contrast to the Cartesian
perspective cannot be separated from the research – participate in the habitus
of a research community?70
 working with difference – as elsewhere in this work, by contrasting what was
done here with similar (but not identical) approaches elsewhere, we may gain
sharper awareness of both limitations and potential for development.
70 Being a research community, the response required is not one of agreement but of recognition –
that the research, and researcher, are according to the stakes of that community worth disagreeing (or
agreeing) with.
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It is with those questions in mind that I identify four types of research (families of
research games) as offering fruitful similarities and differences.
Firstly, hermeneutics. The process of reworking successive versions of each project,
within the context of conversation and challenge within a learning set and through
engagement with literature, is in large measure the work of this research. The pattern
of iteration is circular, moving outwards to literature returning at each step to the
narrative fragment. Hermeneutics is the pattern of research in which, in a circular
iteration, a fragment is interpreted in a larger context and the larger context re-
examined in the light of new interpretation of the fragment. Alvesson and Sköldberg
group together three (overlapping) hermeneutics71:
…  all are in some sense preoccupied with the uncovering of something
hidden. For the existential hermeneutics this hidden something
constitutes an original structure of properties buried at the root of our
existence, but for this very reason also forgotten. For the poetic
hermeneutics, it forms an underlying pattern of metaphor or narrative.
For the hermeneutics of suspicion, finally, it is something shameful – for
instance in the form of economic interests, sexuality, or power – and
therefore repressed. (2009, pp. 96-97)
This research has connections with all three. The structure of habitus and field is
proposed as an existential structure, how we all are and how we act, without
(normally) knowing it. Key features of poetic hermeneutics include narrative and
time – the sense of time that is meaningful to an agent (ibid., p. 127). This has been
at the heart of the logic of practice. The concept of misrecognition is also related to a
hermeneutics of suspicion (though not, as I argued in Project Four, of cynicism).
In noting these connections, it is important however to emphasise a difference: the
fragment which is being interpreted is an experience of the author’s to which the text
gestures, and not, as in many instances of hermeneutics, an isolated text (ibid., p.
100).
Secondly, critical theory. This research (in particular Projects Two and Four) has
concluded that human communication and relating are intrinsically political, and
71 Under the title alethic hermeneutics (from the Greek aletheia, or uncovering).
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disputed the interpretation of science as a neutral recording and study of ‘facts’. This
stance is closely related to that of critical theory, associated in the 1920s with the
University of Frankfurt. These connections share common ground with the
hermeneutics of suspicion.
Important stakes in this game include identifying political, ideological and special
interests, and to distinguishing ‘what is socially and psychologically invariant from
what is, or can be made to be, socially changeable’ (ibid., p. 144). Bourdieu’s work
falls squarely in this pattern, but with two differences: as we saw in referring to how
his work has been taken up by feminist thinkers, some critical thinkers regard
Bourdieu as understating the scope for radical change; and Bourdieu himself
criticised critical theorists for their lack of interest in empirical studies (ibid., p. 162)
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991, p. 248).
There are political implications to this research. In particular, society has a great deal
invested in merit understood in the dominant (as-if scientific) way. Merit underpins
many of our social structures and, in particular, access to significant leadership
positions. A shift in the understanding of merit could increase the prospects for
gender and other diversity in our leadership cadres. It could also undermine some of
the case for the explosion in senior remuneration (which, in present market
structures, drives search professionals’ remuneration). Conversely the promise of a
resilient, post-scientific discourse of merit could fail to be delivered, leaving chaos
and sacrificing decades of scientific, professional and political struggle against the
filling of positions of power by unchallenged instinct and self-interest.
Thirdly, ethnomethodology. Taking seriously the agent-researcher’s understanding of
his own experience has been fundamental in this research. The research stance which
focuses particularly on agents’ understanding of their own practice is
ethnomethodology. However a core principle of ethnomethodology is to insist on
understanding a practice using only the agents’ own understandings (pure
subjectivity). As Garfinkel expresses it:
... A leading policy is to refuse serious consideration to the prevailing
proposal that efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness, intelligibility,
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consistency, planfulness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of
activities – ie that rational properties of practical activities – be assessed,
recognized, categorized, described by using a rule or a standard obtained
outside actual settings within which such properties are recognized, used,
produced and talked about by settings’ members. (Garfinkel, 1984, p. 33)
This excludes in a fundamental way working with concepts such as habitus and field,
or the idea of misrecognition. What this says about the limitations and weaknesses of
this research is that, notwithstanding its critique of science misappropriated or
misapplied, it too may be open to similar objections. My efforts to say something
which is not simply a subjective opinion may be mistaken pretension, motivated by a
desire for status or power. Alvesson and Sköldberg say:
Social science is conceived as moralizing towards the everyday world of
the social actors: ‘We, the social scientists, know better.’ It is thus being
assumed that abstract categories are superior to the actors’ own
knowledge. The ethnomethodologists hold that such is not the case.
(2009, p. 78)
In trying to sit in between science (which emphasises objectivity) and
ethnomethodology (which emphasises subjectivity), clearly the risk is of falling
between two stools. Instead, as discussed in section 6.5, the claim of this research is
one of paradox.
Finally, action research. This research has embraced action and involvement – for
example in Project Four my decision to charge a commercial fee and take the risk of
losing the research opportunity, rather than offering to work pro bono. Perhaps the
most important type of research in which involvement is an important stake is action
research. In my experience it is the kind of involved research of which human
resource practitioners are most commonly aware. Alongside it stands the kind of
involved social science advocated by Flyvbjerg (2001). Alvesson’s recommendation
of ‘at home ethnography’ is quite opposite: he wants individuals to notice and
research events in which they participate in ordinary working life, but to ‘step back’
and try to avoid being carried along in the flow of interaction (2009, p. 160). It is the
logic of practice, under the demands of the game which will not simply reveal itself
to the actor in quiet reflection which is an important stake for me.
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Action research emphasises an involved researcher working co-operatively with
people in a situation under study. Action research is concerned to give those
individuals voice, to apply knowledge in collaboration with them to achieve
improvements in their situation (as well as gains in knowledge). A classic statement
is provided by Reason and Bradbury (2001) and it is further explored by Marshall
and Eikeland (Marshall & Reason, 2007) (Eikeland, 2007).
Trying to grapple with involved research, I found Marshall and Reason’s description
of an ‘attitude of inquiry’ of some help. However action research tends to reach for a
large system which the researcher, albeit within it, tries to embrace and within which
certain values such as co-operation are held to be self-evident goods. By contrast this
research has questioned systems thinking and highlighted the significance of conflict
and challenge.
I found particularly illuminating Eikeland’s way of thinking about the ‘researcher-
knower’ and the ‘researched-known’ becoming one and the same, ‘suspending’ the
division of labour between them (2007, p. 351). In this research the researcher-
knower and the researched-known are one individual. However Eikeland’s analysis
does not describe my experience well. I read him as suggesting that when researcher
and researched are the same individual, the distance between the two must collapse.
It did not feel like that to me. Sometimes in re-thinking my experience, the tension
between the roles was exhausting, occasionally painful. I would rather say that as
researcher and researched (say, interviewer) I am engaged in two distinct games with
different habitus. I would describe the tension between them as somatised rather than
collapsed.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
In this section – to be read alongside the argument in section 6.1 of the synopsis - I
suggest the contribution of this research.
Two sources previously cited capture particularly clearly the state of both research
and ‘good practice’ in senior selection interviewing. Firstly, Schmitt and Chan
(1998). Neal Schmitt was a former editor of the Journal of Applied Psychology and
President of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Writing with
David Chan, they point to the dominance of the scientific (measurement) paradigm
by opening with these words:
Personnel selection research has been conducted for most of the
twentieth century .... This research has followed the [following] general
paradigm .... The job for which individuals will be chosen is examined to
determine what tasks and responsibilities will be required. This
specification of the domain of job tasks is followed by the generation of
hypotheses concerning the knowledge, skills, abilities and other
characteristics (KSAOs) required of individuals who must perform these
tasks. Specification of the tasks and KSAOs leads to the development of
measures of both job performance variables and predictor variables and
evaluation of the hypotheses about ability-performance relationships
proposed during the job analysis phase of the project. Assuming some
confirmation of these hypotheses, various steps are taken to implement
the selection procedures and to assess their practical costs and benefits in
an organizational context.
This basic paradigm appropriately underlies good personnel selection or
staffing research. (Ibid., pp. 1-2)
Schmitt & Chan go on to introduce four practical examples. The first three concern
the selection of entry-level investigators in a US law enforcement agency (about 300
from 10,000 applicants); the use of a multi-aptitude test battery in another federal
agency ‘to select applicants into a large number of agency jobs’; and the selection of
emergency telephone operators in a small city (ibid., pp. 12, 13, 20, 26). This is
selection at frontline or middle levels.
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The fourth example is at a senior (in American parlance, ‘executive’) level – the
selection of a single vice president for human resources. The authors say:
... This practice is usually called individual assessment. Because this
selection practice is rarely, if ever, described in research reports, we have
constructed an ideal example of an individual assessment based on the
selection model presented at the beginning of this chapter ... . (Ibid., p.
33)(emphasis added)
Thus, having just emphasised the rarity of live research material in senior selection,
the authors present a single case study which is fictionalised. Nor do any of their 11
key ‘research issues for the future’ (ibid., p. 293) call for repair of this research gap;
possibly they resigned themselves to the difficulty of access, confidentiality and
getting sufficient numbers at senior levels for scientific research.
The second is Hollenbeck, writing reflectively on a long career as an industrial-
organisational psychologist and as an executive (2009, p. 130). His focus is senior
selection. He bemoans the lack of research material (ibid., p. 141) and the
‘uncomfortable truth’ that industrial-organisational psychologists are ‘largely absent
from the table’ when senior selection decisions are made (ibid., p. 134). He argues:
That we get no respect and don’t have a seat at the table are symptoms,
not the cause of our problems. Nobody is buying because we don’t have
much to sell. This is not a marketing problem; our traditional
psychometric selection model has led us down the wrong paths. (Ibid., p.
140)
... Our field has stuck with our classical personnel selection model,
seeking to correlate predictors with criteria, hoping for large samples. We
do this even though it continues to disappoint us in terms of research,
results, or respect. Our model is so thoroughly ingrained in all of us that
we keep hoping that the right set of predictors and criteria and a large
enough N will (finally) produce the results we seek. (Ibid., p. 138)
Hollenbeck courageously describes a stuck practice and calls for help. He proposes
as changes to unstuck the practice that the question of senior selection should be
reframed as a broader one in ‘decision making and judgment’ (ibid., p. 140), and that
senior selection should become a focus for research, even if it might be difficult to
meet some research publication criteria (ibid., p. 141).
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The contribution of this research is aimed at the selection of individuals at or near
board level, in which interviewing is the dominant selection technique. No inflated
ideas about the power of senior individuals are needed to consider research into this
practice important: if it needs demystification, that requires research. Moreover in
very many organisations in varied fields, some trust that senior appointments are
made at least partly on merit is part of our social fabric and an important source of
the authority which appointment confers. Senior selection is also an arena in which
many individuals aspire to achieve positions which may represent the culmination of
their working lives. It is an important practice with widespread effects.
This research has noticed the practice in a new way – as stuck. It also contributes
towards unsticking it. Its first step in this direction is to link the stuckness in practice
to a narrowness in the associated research field. This narrowness is identified as the
intellectual dominance of the scientific paradigm, which inadvertently cuts
theorisation about the practice off from a wealth of wider insights. The same
paradigm also shapes the ‘good practice’ offered to practitioners by books, training
courses, peer example and a variety of ‘experts’.
An important mechanism of stuckness-in-practice identified in this research concerns
power and politics. These are suggested to be ubiquitous features of all
organisational life; but in dealing with senior roles the impact of power, however
little spoken about, can rarely be avoided. This research offers reasons why scientific
approaches might make little headway here.
Furthermore, scientific research requires numbers of interviewers and numbers of
candidates, and some way of controlling for differences in job contents and
environments. This looks nearly impossible to achieve at senior levels. A
contribution of this research is to exemplify one way (among many) in which senior
selection practice can be explored in the future.
This research goes beyond calling for a wider reflective conversation about senior
selection practice, to supporting such a conversation by sketching a radically social
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way of thinking about the practice and its idea of merit. Finally illuminating
Bourdieusian practice with the help of the more widely known Weickian framework
of sense-making, access to the former by managers and scholars working in English
may be increased..
And in terms of practice – firstly senior selection in a broad sense, and then more
personally? As to the former, some clues suggest new potential, new energy for
change. It may be that the pointing out of stuckness - if this releases energy and
confidence for practitioners to act differently into senior selection situations without
being overawed by ‘science’ - offers the biggest potential for change, more than any
of the more specific interpretations within this research. That is why in proposing
some writing aimed at practitioners, I have invited a former colleague to join me in
reflecting together  on our experiences (and inviting our readers to do similarly): with
this research figuring as one, albeit transformative, part of my experience.
For this research has been transformative for me. Three years ago I did not consider
myself professionally stale: by this I meant that the affairs of candidates and clients
still mattered. I still cared. But now I realise I was stuck, unable to innovate
productively. When I reached the end of the selection project narrated in Project
Four, I did not have any ideas about what to do differently next time: now I do. In
particular I see quite direct, tangible actions which as a practitioner I would like to
encourage clients to take up – ways of translating into interviewing practice the
fundamental difference between merit considered objectively (as measurement) and
inter-subjectively (as a ‘weak ethical gravity’). However these possible actions are
not proven or established by this research; they are simply new possibilities which
appear to me where none did before.
For example, final interview days for clients using panels are frequently crammed
full of candidates, compressing the time for discussion and decision. This is a
sensible use of time if the process were one of uncontentious measurement, as in
Prince Charming’s search for Cinderella. Given a marginal hour, it is logical to spend
it measuring one more candidate rather than discussing existing candidates at greater
length. Now I want to suggest that panels – especially where consultants have
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already done a round of thorough interviewing – should see one fewer candidate, and
use the hour released for a more searching and exploratory  discussion of the others.
To further shift towards an intersubjective paradigm which is more than the
summation of individual whims, I would suggest an additional change. For example
on each candidate, two different members might be remitted in advance to lead the
panel’s discussion of that candidate: one making an optimistic case (how might
things be if we appointed this candidate and that turned out well) and another the
converse. In the discussion panel members would need to move beyond opining their
one ‘right answer’ – though of course, as in every aspect of life, decisions would then
have to be made.
Importantly, though, this research points to strong reasons why practice may not
change: in particular the depth of the anxieties (and vested interests) present in senior
selection. The journey of this research leads me to underline the anxieties as much, if
not more, than the vested interests. I have sensed, and tried to convey, something of
the dimensions of our need to create and to cling to familiarity to diminish our fear of
being paralysed by the unknowns involved in choosing leaders. Nor can it be known
that the consequences of unsticking will on balance be ‘good’: gains hard-won
(thanks to science) could be lost with nothing better put in their place. In that sense,
the practice’s stuckness does valuable work, enabling us as well as constraining us in
acting into the unknown.
Finally three years ago my preference was to find new ways of earning my living:
that journey into career advice remains exciting and I will continue with it, but now I
am looking for a way to keep some involvement in senior selection. I also find
myself in conversations exploring part-time academic possibilities.
My understanding of life and my life has changed in ways which I had never
dreamed. I owe a great deal to my supervisors, Douglas Griffin and Ralph Stacey,
my fellow students and other faculty on this doctoral programme, and to Bourdieu’s
logic of practice to which Griffin introduced me.
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